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Article
Providing Adolescents with Independent and
Confidential Access to Childhood Vaccines: A
Proposal to Lower the Age of Consent
LOIS A. WEITHORN & DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS
The recent rise in rates of nonvaccination and vaccine-preventable diseases
and the attendant risks to the public’s health require that lawmakers consider new
policy solutions. This Article proposes one such solution. We recommend creation
of a limited exception to parental decisionmaking authority by permitting certain
older minors to provide legally binding consent for childhood vaccinations and
protecting the confidentiality of minors who request vaccination. We analogize this
proposed policy to other statutory exceptions that permit certain minors
independent access to services relating to contraception, pregnancy, sexually
transmitted diseases, mental health and substance abuse, and sexual assault. In this
interdisciplinary paper, we analyze the constitutional, policy, scientific, and
practical issues relevant to this proposal, and provide lawmakers with a blueprint
with which to enact the proposed legislative reform. We also suggest that, in the
absence of legislative action, courts allow mature minors to consent independently
to recommended childhood vaccinations.
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Providing Adolescents with Independent and
Confidential Access to Childhood Vaccines: A
Proposal to Lower the Age of Consent
LOIS A. WEITHORN & DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS *
INTRODUCTION
The World Health Organization identified vaccine hesitancy (that is, an
individual’s lack of confidence in vaccines, often leading to vaccine refusal)1
as one of the major threats to global health in 2019.2 Vaccine hesitancy is an
important contributor of recent upsurges in rates of infection from diseases
such as measles and pertussis.3 In the first six months of 2019, 1095 cases
of measles were confirmed across twenty-eight states in the United States.4
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), “[t]his
is the greatest number of cases reported in the U.S. since 1992” and since
the elimination of measles in 2000.5 The number of pertussis cases reported
annually in the last ten years has reached levels that had “not been observed
in more than 5 decades.”6
In the last several years, researchers have demonstrated the strong
relationship between parental refusal to immunize their children and higher
rates of infection with vaccine-preventable diseases.7 Researchers have also
*
Lois A. Weithorn, J.D., Ph.D.; Professor of Law, Harry & Lillian Hastings Research Chair,
University of California—Hastings College of Law. Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, LLB, Ph.D.; Professor of
Law, James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, University of California—Hastings College of Law. The
authors gratefully acknowledge the enormously helpful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript
provided by Dr. Paul Offit, Dr. Douglas Opel, and Professor Michael Wald. We also thank Arianna
Brady, Margot Brooks, Kya Coletta, Allyson Cox, Enne-Mae Guttiarez, and Alexandra (Ally) Relat for
excellent research assistance.
1
Eve Dubé et al., Vaccine Hesitancy: An Overview, 9 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS
1763, 1763 (2013).
2
Ten
Threats
to
Global
Health
in
2019,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
3
Varun K. Phadke et al., Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
in the United States: A Review of Measles and Pertussis, 315 JAMA 1149, 1150 (2016).
4
Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last visited July 3, 2019).
5
Id.
6
Phadke et al., supra note 3, at 1153.
7
For reviews of the literature, see Phadke et al., supra note 3, at 1150; Dorit Rubinstein Reiss &
Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the
Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 881, 930–31 (2015) [hereinafter Reiss &
Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis]; Lois A. Weithorn & Dorit Rubinstein Reiss,
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demonstrated that legal policies governing exemptions from states’
school-entry vaccination requirements affect rates and patterns of intentional
nonvaccination in the United States.8 In response to these data, lawmakers
in several states have tightened exemption policies.9 Such reforms are
critical to protecting the public’s health from the dangers posed by vaccine
refusal. Yet the scope of the childhood vaccination crisis and the
recalcitrance exhibited by many parents who reject vaccines necessitate
additional legal reforms. We recommend providing older minors with the
legal authority to consent to vaccinations independent of their parents as one
such reform.
On June 10, 2019, at the annual meeting of the American Medical
Association (AMA), the Association’s delegates voted “to support ‘state
Legal Approaches to Promoting Parental Compliance with Childhood Immunization Recommendations,
14 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1610, 1610–11 (2018).
8
See, e.g., Nina R. Blank et al., Exempting Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few
Barriers Had Highest Rates of Nonmedical Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282, 1289 (2013) (finding
that non-vaccination rates in states with simpler nonmedical exemption procedures and less stringent
requirements were more than twice as high as those in states with more-complex procedures and more
stringent requirements); Daniel R. Feikin et al., Individual and Community Risks of Measles and
Pertussis Associated with Personal Exemptions to Immunization, 284 JAMA 3145, 3145 (2000)
(reviewing studies demonstrating dramatically elevated measles risk in unvaccinated children exempted
from vaccination mandates); Aamer Imdad et al., Religious Exemptions for Immunization and Risk of
Pertussis in New York State, 2000-2011, 132 PEDIATRICS 37, 42 (2013) (finding higher rates of pertussis
in New York State counties with higher rates of vaccine exemptions); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical
Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with
Pertussis Incidence, 296 JAMA 1757, 1763 (2006) (finding elevated exemption rates and pertussis
incidence in jurisdictions that permit personal belief exemptions and are lenient in granting exemptions);
Saad B. Omer et al., Vaccination Policies and Rates of Exemption from Immunization, 2005-2011, 367
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1170, 1171 (2012) (analyzing the relationship between legal exemption policies and
rates of exemption); Jennifer L. Richards et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements
in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal Analysis of Trends and Associated Community Factors, 31
VACCINE 3009, 3012 (2013); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Factors Associated with Refusal of Childhood
Vaccines Among Parents of School-aged Children, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED.
470, 470 (2005) (demonstrating higher rates of disease in areas with higher exemption rates); Daniel A.
Salmon et al., Health Consequences of Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from Immunization
Laws: Individual and Societal Risk of Measles, 281 JAMA 47, 51 (1999) (demonstrating statistical
relationship between increasing rates of exemption and increases in outbreaks of vaccine-preventable
diseases); Stephanie Stadlin et al., Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the
United States—Association of State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates (2004-2011), 206 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 989, 989 (2012) (demonstrating relationship between ease of obtaining medical
exemptions in states and rates of medical exemptions); Joseph W. Thompson et al., Impact of Addition
of Philosophical Exemptions on Childhood Immunization Rates, 32 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 194, 200
(2007) (demonstrating relationship between availability of philosophical exemptions in Arkansas and
geographic risk of disease outbreaks); Y. Tony Yang & Vicky Debold, A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Effect of Nonmedical Exemption Law and Vaccine Uptake on Vaccine-Targeted Disease Rates, 104 AM .
J. PUB. HEALTH 371, 375–76 (2014) (analyzing relationships between exemption policies, vaccination
rates, and rates of infection).
9
For recent legislative changes in vaccine exemption laws, see States with Religious and
Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(June 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
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policies allowing minors to override their parent’s refusal for vaccinations’
and encourage ‘state legislatures to establish comprehensive vaccine and
minor consent policies.’”10 Five days before the AMA action, Professors
Ross Silverman, Douglas Opel, and Saad Omer published an article in the
New England Journal of Medicine suggesting that state laws be modified to
allow adolescents who wish to be vaccinated “despite persistent parental
resistance” to provide consent for this “medically recommended and
evidence-based treatment.”11 In 2013, the Society for Adolescent Health and
Medicine published a position paper, recommending that: “Clinicians,
public health personnel, and policy makers should explore all available legal
options for allowing minor adolescents with capacity for informed consent
to give their own consent for vaccinations.”12
We concur that authorizing older minors to provide independent consent
for recommended childhood vaccinations is an important and necessary
policy reform. In this Article, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the
relevant legal, bioethical, psychological, and policy issues, as well as a
detailed proposal to create an exception to the default of parental consent for
childhood vaccinations. We recommend that states adopt a statutory age of
consent of fourteen years old for those vaccinations recommended by the
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP).13 We further
recommend that states authorize physicians to administer or authorize
administration of vaccines to requesting minors ages twelve and thirteen
who are capable of consenting to vaccination, consistent with the modern
standards of competence detailed within.14 In states that do not pass such
legislation, however, we recommend that courts adjudicating a minor’s
petition to receive vaccinations without parental consent adopt a
treatment-specific mature minor rule that would allow those minors who
10

Kevin B. O’Reilly, Highlights from the 2019 AMA Annual Meeting, AMA (June 13, 2019),
https://www.ama-assn.org/house-delegates/annual-meeting/highlights-2019-ama-annual-meeting.
Furthermore, “[i]n a separate action, the delegates directed the AMA to develop model legislation for
mature minor consent to vaccinations.” Id.
11
Ross D. Silverman et al., Vaccination Over Parental Objection—Should Adolescents Be Allowed
to Consent to Receiving Vaccines?, 381 NEW ENG. J. MED. 104, 106 (2019). See also Soc’y for
Adolescent Health & Med., Adolescent Consent for Vaccination: A Position Paper of the Society for
Adolescent Health and Medicine, 53 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 550, 550 (2013). For proposals focusing
on minors’ independent access to the vaccine for human papilloma virus (HPV), see, for example, Suchi
Agrawal & Stephanie R. Morain, Who Calls the Shots? The Ethics of Adolescent Self-Consent for HPV
Vaccination, 44 J. MED. ETHICS 531, 531 (2018); Allison M. Whelan, Lowering the Age of Consent:
Pushing Back Against the Anti-Vaccine Movement, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 462, 470 (2016).
12
Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., supra note 11, at 550. Furthermore, in December 2019,
while this Article was in press, another team of pediatric experts wrote in support of this proposed policy
reform. See Y. Tony Yang et al., Adolescent Consent to Vaccination in the Age of Vaccine-Hesitant
Parents, 173 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1123, 1123 (2019), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/
article-abstract/2752559.
13
See infra notes 27–71 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 328–44 and accompanying text.
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demonstrate capacity to provide informed consent to access these vaccines
independently if a physician determines a minor to be mature. Finally, we
strongly recommend that the authorizing legislation require that minors’
preferences regarding confidentiality be respected and that their vaccination
status and vaccination-related medical contacts not be disclosed to their
parents without their consent.
We do not argue here that the demonstration of adult-like health care
decisionmaking capacities should lead to legal authorization for independent
consent to treatment by minors more generally. In our nation, parents
typically retain legal authority to make most health care decisions for their
minor children,15 There are exceptions, however. The state can intervene on
a case-by-case basis in medical neglect proceedings, substituting itself for
the parent when it determines that a parent’s failure to treat a child seriously
endangers that child’s health.16 A few states authorize “mature minors” to
consent independently to general medical care by statute or case law.17 Most
states authorize “emancipated minors” to make independent health care
decisions for themselves.18 In addition, in order to achieve certain policy
goals and/or to satisfy constitutional mandates, state legislatures have
created several treatment-specific statutory exceptions, authorizing older
minors to consent independently to the specified treatments.19
Currently, however, the law in most states does not provide a
mechanism for minors to access vaccinations independent of their parents.20
In the handful of states that allows mature minors authority to consent to
general medical treatment, minors who meet the legal criteria of maturity21
can be vaccinated over parental refusal.22 In addition, some states’ statutory
exceptions allowing minors to consent to services related to sexually
15
See Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to
Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 789–91 (2013) (discussing which states
do not allow mature minors to consent to medical treatment).
16
See infra Part II.B.2.i.
17
See infra Part II.B.2.ii.
18
See infra note 250.
19
See infra Part II.B.2.iii.
20
For a detailed, state by state table, see Table of State Laws Relevant to Minors’ Consent to
Vaccinations Independent of Parents, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uUDrkdYqzzSG9icT
TSHEIWQbgtm0uFVGtBZ7rTDU8sQ/edit?usp=sharing (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). The Society for
Adolescent Health and Medicine issued a position paper on adolescent consent for vaccination,
interpreting state laws as somewhat more permissive of minors’ authority to consent independently than
our analysis suggests. Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., supra note 11, at 550.
21
See infra notes 22–23.
22
For example, in Alabama and Oregon, minors over a specified age can consent to treatment
without parental involvement. ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (West, Westlaw through Act 2019-540); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.640 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.). Certain other states allow independent
treatment access by minors, conditioned on determinations of those minors’ maturity or capacity to
consent. See Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789 (noting that some jurisdictions “permit all
adolescents above a certain age to consent to general medical treatment,” including vaccination).
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transmitted diseases are broad enough to authorize minors to consent to
vaccines for hepatitis B and human papilloma virus (HPV).23 A handful of
legislatures are considering statutes that would authorize minors of specific
ages to provide independent consent for vaccinations, although none have
passed to date.24 In this Article, however, we propose a more comprehensive,
treatment-specific exception that would enable older minors to consent to
all of the recommended childhood vaccinations25 if their parents have not
provided consent. We argue, therefore, that the default of sole parental
discretion in decisionmaking for children’s health care should not prevail in
this context, and that this default should be supplemented by authorization
of competent minors to consent independently to recommended childhood
vaccinations.
***
In Part I, we establish the medical and public health foundation for our
proposal. We describe the structure and substance of vaccine
recommendations in the United States and provide a brief summary of the
state of knowledge on vaccine safety and efficacy. We discuss current
understandings of parental vaccine opposition or hesitancy and the public
health crisis that has resulted from recent increases in parental
non-vaccination of their children.
In Part II, we examine the legal landscape for health care
decisionmaking for minors. In Section A, we discuss the legal and
23
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch. 524) (“A minor
who is 12 years of age or older . . . may consent to medical care related to [prevention of a sexually
transmitted disease] . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 710 (West, Westlaw through ch. 218 of the 150th
General Assembly (2019-2020)) (authorizing a minor age twelve and older “who professes to be either
pregnant or afflicted with contagious, infectious or communicable diseases” to consent to “any
diagnostic, preventive [or medical care]”). See also Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 104 (noting that
California and New York permit adolescents to consent to vaccines for hepatitis B and HPV).
24
For example, in March 2019, Senate Bill 4244 was introduced in New York. The proposed text
would allow minors aged fourteen and older to consent to the administration of vaccines “if the minor
has capacity to consent and provides informed consent to the administering of the vaccine.” S.B. 4244,
2019 Leg., 242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019). Other states considering authorizing all or some minors to consent
to all or some recommended vaccines include Maryland, Public Health - Immunizations - Minor Consent
(Access to Vaccines Act), H.B. 87, 441st Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2020) (authorizing minors to consent to
immunizations if they are aged 16 and older who are determined to be competent to consent by a health
care provider); Virginia, S.B. 104, 2020 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (authorizing minors who can demonstrate
decisionmaking competence to consent to vaccinations independently); Illinois, S.B. 3668, 101st Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019) (authorizing minors aged fourteen and older to consent to
immunizations with the same legal authority as an adult); New Jersey, S.B. 5399, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(N.J. 2019) (authorizing minors age fourteen and older to receive recommended childhood vaccines,
including immunization for human papilloma virus (HPV) and hepatitis B, independent of parental
consent); Washington, D.C., Minor Consent to Vaccinations Amendment Act of 2019, Washington D.C.
Legislative Bill 171 (D.C. 2019) (authorizing “a minor of any age to consent to receive a vaccine where
the minor is capable of [giving informed consent], and where the vaccine is recommended by [ACIP]
and provided in accordance with the ACIP’s recommended vaccinations schedule”); Wisconsin,
Assemb.B. 863, 104th Leg. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019) (authorizing minors ages sixteen and older to
consent independently to recommended vaccines).
25
See infra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
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constitutional justifications for the prevailing legal mechanism governing
consent for children’s health care: the doctrine of parental consent. In
Section B, we consider existing exceptions to that doctrine. First, we analyze
the general constitutional and policy frameworks that underlie the
exceptions. Second, we detail the exceptions, including those authorized by
medical neglect statutes, statutory and judicial “mature” minor exceptions,
and treatment-specific statutes authorizing minors’ independent access to
health care services.
In Part III, we lay out the arguments supporting our recommendations
that certain subsets of minors be authorized to consent to vaccinations
independent of their parents. In Section A, we assert that the state’s interests
in protecting the health of the public and individual minors and the child’s
interests in receiving protection from vaccine-preventable diseases converge
to outweigh parental interests in sole decisionmaking authority over
children’s health care in the vaccination context. In Section B, we argue that
statutory authorization of capable minors to consent independently to
childhood vaccinations is consistent with the policies justifying existing
treatment-specific exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent. In Section
C, we demonstrate that most adolescents and older preadolescents are
capable of providing meaningful consent, consistent with legal standards of
competence to make medical decisions. Finally, in Section D, we underscore
the necessity of legal guarantees of confidentiality for minors who seek
vaccinations independent of their parents. We observe that minors might be
deterred from requesting vaccinations due to fear of disclosure to parents.
Furthermore, in extreme cases, the welfare of minors who disregard parental
objections to vaccines might be endangered by disclosure of their
vaccination-related medical contacts.
Part IV details our legislative proposals and their legal, policy, and
scientific justifications. Part V provides recommendations to the courts
regarding adoption of a treatment-specific mature minor rule in appropriate
cases, in the absence of relevant legislative action. Finally, we make
concluding observations, placed in context by remarks shared with us by
Ethan Lindenberger in a recent telephone interview.26

26
Telephone Interview with Ethan Lindenberger, Pro-vaccination Activist, via Skype (June 16,
2019) (recording on file with authors). Eighteen-year-old Ethan Lindenberger made national news when
he testified before Congress regarding his mother’s opposition to vaccinations, and his decision to
become vaccinated as soon as he was legally capable of doing so. See generally James Doubek,
18-Year-Old Testifies About Getting Vaccinated Despite Mother’s Anti-Vaccine Beliefs, NPR (Mar. 6,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/03/06/700617424/18-year-old-testifies-about-getting-vaccinateddespite-mothers-anti-vaccine-beli (discussing Lindenberger’s testimony before Congress).
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I. VACCINES, THE ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT, AND THE VACCINATION
CRISIS
A. Recommended Vaccines’ Risks and Benefits
The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) currently
recommends that children in the United States routinely be vaccinated
against fifteen diseases before the age of eighteen. Children under age two
are recommended to receive vaccines to protect them from thirteen diseases:
diphtheria, haemophilus influenzae type b, hepatitis A, hepatitis B, influenza
(an annual vaccine), measles, mumps, pertussis, pneumococcal disease,
polio, rotavirus, rubella, and varicella (chicken pox).27 It is recommended
that preteens receive vaccinations to protect them from meningococcal
disease and HPV.28 In determining whether to recommend vaccines, the
ACIP requires that the benefits outweigh the risks and that the
recommendation be cost-effective.29 After the Committee recommends
vaccines, the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) considers those recommendations, together with input from the
American Academy of Pediatrics and the American Academy of Family
Physicians, and makes its own authoritative recommendations.30 Generally,
the CDC Director accepts ACIP recommendations.31
Although vaccine recommendations are made by the CDC, a federal
agency, there are currently no federal vaccine mandates in the United States.
Rather, in the United States, the authority to mandate vaccine compliance
rests primarily with the states, which determine which vaccines are required
prior to school entry.32 Generally, states require some subset of those
vaccines recommended by ACIP, although the specifics of state
requirements vary across the nation.33
Emphasizing the high benefit and low cost ratio characterizing
recommended vaccines, the National Academies of Science, Engineering,
and Medicine concluded that vaccines “have many health benefits and few

27

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RECOMMENDED CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE
FOR
AGES 18
YEARS OR YOUNGER tbl.1
(2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html#birth-15 (last visited July 18,
2019).
28
Id.
29
Jean Clare Smith, The Structure, Role, and Procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 285 VACCINE A68, A72 (2010).
30
Id. at A72–A73.
31
Id. at A73.
32
WEN S. SHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10300, AN OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL
AUTHORITY
TO
IMPOSE
VACCINATION
REQUIREMENTS
1
(2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10300.pdf.
33
Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 892–93.
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side effects.”34 Indeed, there is a global expert consensus that vaccines are
both safe and effective.35 This is, of course, a generalization: nothing is
100% safe or 100% effective (and no “consensus” is 100%). It does,
however, mean that vaccines’ benefits are substantial, vaccines’ risks are
low, and that the benefits far outweigh the risks. The World Health
Organization has emphasized that “[t]here is arguably no single preventive
health intervention more cost-effective than immunization. Time and again,
the international community has endorsed the value of vaccines and
immunization to prevent and control a large number of infectious diseases
and, increasingly, several chronic diseases that are caused by infectious
agents.”36
Extensive data reveals that vaccines dramatically reduce the burden of
disease.37 Public health experts estimated, for example, that over the course
of the lives of children born from 1994 to 2013, routine vaccination will
prevent “322 million illnesses, 21 million hospitalizations, and 732,000
deaths . . . at a net savings of $295 billion in direct costs and $1.38 trillion
in total societal costs.”38 Globally, the World Health Organization estimates
that vaccines save 2 to 3 million lives annually, and that another 1.5 million
lives could be saved if vaccination programs were fully implemented
worldwide.39
Some vaccines are more effective than others. For instance, the measles,
mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR) is highly effective against measles.40
The influenza vaccine is less effective,41 although it still prevents deaths and

34
Vaccines Are Safe, NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. ENGINEERING & MED., http://sites.nationalacademies.org/
BasedOnScience/vaccines-are-safe/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2020).
35
Francis E. Andre et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity
Worldwide, 86 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 140, 140 (2008), https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/
86/2/07-040089/en/.
36
Ten Facts on Immunization, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://origin.who.int/features/factfiles/
immunization/en/ (last updated Mar. 2018).
37
Sandra W. Roush & Trudy V. Murphy, Historical Comparisons of Morbidity and Mortality for
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases in the United States, 298 JAMA 2155, 2156–59 tbls.1–2 (2007); Cynthia
G. Whitney et al., Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era – United
States, 1994-2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 352, 352–55 (2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6316a4.htm.
38
Whitney et al., supra note 37, at 352.
39
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 36.
40
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINEPREVENTABLE DISEASES 218 (Jennifer Hamborsky et al. eds., 13th ed. 2015) [hereinafter PINK BOOK]
(“Studies indicate that more than 99% of persons who receive two doses of measles vaccine (with the
first dose administered no earlier than the first birthday) develop serologic evidence of measles
immunity.”).
41
CDC Seasonal Flu Vaccine Effectiveness Studies, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/effectiveness-studies.htm (last visited July 18,
2019).
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other adverse effects of disease, especially in children.42 Both the polio43 and
hepatitis B vaccines44 are extremely effective, protecting over 95% of
recipients. In addition to reducing deaths and suffering, vaccines
dramatically reduce costs to society and individuals, saving billions of
dollars annually.45 Vaccines also have positive effects on health equity and
lead to other social benefits.46 In short, all routinely recommended vaccines
have considerable benefits, both for the individual and for society.
Vaccines protect not only those individuals who are vaccinated from
becoming infected, they also confer an additional benefit through
community (or herd) immunity. When enough people in a community are
vaccinated, others at risk of infection from the disease are also protected.
These other beneficiaries include those who cannot safely be vaccinated for
medical reasons, those who are too young to be fully vaccinated, those
within the small minority of persons for whom vaccinations did not create
immunity, and those who are intentionally unvaccinated.47 Thus, when
parents vaccinate their child, they protect not only their child through direct
action, but also others in the community who, as noted above, are not or
cannot be fully vaccinated. And conversely, parents who do not vaccinate
are creating a risk not just for their own child, but also for other unprotected
individuals. As the number of unvaccinated children in the community
increases, the risk of outbreak also increases, putting anyone who is
42

See Brendan Flannery et al., Influenza Vaccine Effectiveness Against Pediatric Deaths:
2010-2014, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1–8 (2017) (reporting rates of infection and death from influenza in
children); Karen K. Wong et al., Influenza Associated Pediatric Deaths in the United States 2004-2012,
132 PEDIATRICS 796, 796–803 (2013) (same); see also Faruque Ahmed et al., Effect of Influenza
Vaccination of Healthcare Personnel on Morbidity and Mortality Among Patients: Systematic Review
and Grading of Evidence, 58 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 50, 50, 52–56 (2014) (reporting data
relevant to rates of infection among health care personnel); E. Amodio et al., Can Influenza Vaccination
Coverage Among Healthcare Workers Influence the Risk of Nosocomial Influenza-Like Illness in
Hospitalized Patients?, 86 J. HOSP. INFECTION 182, 182–86 (2014) (same).
43
The CDC estimates that 99% of people who received three doses of inactivated polio vaccine are
immune. PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 302–03.
44
The hepatitis B vaccine is 95% effective in children, but is slightly less effective in adults. PINK
BOOK, supra note 40, at 159 (“After three intramuscular doses of hepatitis B vaccine, more than 90% of
healthy adults and more than 95% of infants, children, and adolescents [from birth to nineteen years of
age] develop adequate antibody responses.”).
45
Fangjun Zhou et al., Economic Evaluation of the Routine Childhood Immunization Program in
the United States, 2009, 133 PEDIATRICS 577, 581 (2014) (analyzing efficacy and cost-effectiveness of
immunization initiative); see Charlotte A. Moser et al., Funding the Costs of Disease Outbreaks Caused
by Non-Vaccination, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 633, 633 (2015) (analyzing the economic burden of
nonvaccination patterns and related disease outbreaks).
46
See Jeroen Luyten & Philippe Beutels, The Social Value of Vaccination Programs: Beyond
Cost-Effectiveness, 35 HEALTH AFF. 212, 212–17 (2016) (recommending broad, multidimensional
evaluations of vaccination programs that expand beyond economic variables, also incorporating
assessment of social and ethical impacts).
47
T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New Insights and Definitions,
16 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 602–03 (2000); see also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Herd Immunity and
Immunization Policy: The Importance of Accuracy, 94 OR. L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2015).
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vulnerable at risk.48 The decision not to vaccinate, therefore, has substantial
implications beyond the immediate family.
Thus, vaccines have substantial individual and social benefits. That
said, nothing is risk free, and vaccines, too, have risks. Those risks,
however, are relatively low. The World Health Organization Bulletin
explains that:
[I]ndependent experts and WHO have shown that vaccines are
far safer than therapeutic medicines. Modern research has
spurred the development of less reactogenic products, such as
acellular pertussis vaccines and rabies vaccines produced in
cell culture. Today, vaccines have an excellent safety record
and most “vaccine scares” have been shown to be false
alarms.49
In contrast to the low risks posed by immunizations for these diseases,
the risks posed by the vaccine-preventable diseases are significant. For
example, polio led to tens of thousands of cases of paralysis and over a
thousand deaths each year in the United States before vaccines led to the
elimination of polio.50 The Oral Polio Vaccine—which is no longer used in
the United States51—also presented its own risks, however. It could cause
paralysis in approximately six to ten cases a year.52 The incidence of
paralysis with the vaccination occurred at a substantially lower rate than that
which occurred with infection from the polio virus.53 Yet, when it occurred,
of course, it was still a tragedy for the families affected. The currently used
Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV) does not present the same risk. The IPV has
48
See Paul Fine et al., “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911,
914 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“Social clustering among parents who decide not to vaccinate their
children can result in groups of children in which vaccination levels are well below the herd immunity
threshold. The same effect is found in religious communities that eschew vaccination . . . .”); see also
Jessica E. Atwell et al., Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Pertussis in California, 2010, 132
PEDIATRICS 624, 627 (2013) (analyzing the association of “geographic areas with high rates of
[nonmedical vaccine exemptions]” and “high rates of pertussis”); Saad B. Omer et al., Geographic
Clustering of Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements and Associations with
Geographic Clustering of Pertussis, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1389, 1394 (2008) (discussing the
significant overlap between clusters of exemptions and clusters of pertussis cases); Jennifer L. Richards
et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to Immunization Requirements in California: A 16-Year Longitudinal
Analysis of Trends and Associated Community Factors, 31 VACCINE 3009, 3012 (2013) (reporting that
geographic areas with high rates of nonmedical exemptions were also associated with high rates of
pertussis in California between 1994 and 2009).
49
Andre et al., supra note 35, at 140 (citations omitted).
50
PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 297–98.
51
Id. at 302.
52
Id. at 301 (“From 1980 through 1999, a total of 162 confirmed cases of paralytic poliomyelitis
were reported, an average of 8 cases per year. Six cases were acquired outside the United States and
imported.”).
53
Id. at 299–300, 303 (demonstrating that this vaccine led to eight to ten cases of paralysis annually
until its replacement by the inactivated vaccine).
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fairly minimal side effects: minor local reactions and a theoretical (although
not observed) risk of allergic reaction.54 It is clear that those risks are both
absolutely low, and substantially lower than those of the polio virus.
Figure 1: Polio Risks v. Polio Vaccine Risks
Risks of Polio Virus
About 1:200 Paralyzed
Death

Risks of Vaccine:
OPV (not used in United States anymore):
1:2–3 million paralyzed.
IPV (currently used):
Local reactions.
Theoretical risk of allergic reaction to
antibiotics—never seen in practice.

Measles—as another example—can cause complications in about 29%
of people who get the disease, including pneumonia in over 5%, death in
about 1 to 3 in a thousand, and encephalitis in 1 per thousand—and that is
in developed countries.55 It can cause subacute sclerosing panencephalitis
(SSPE), an always fatal complication that leads to a slow, lingering death.56
Scientists once thought this complication was very rare, but recent studies
reveal a higher incidence than initially reported when the measles patient is
young.57 Even a routine case of measles (without complications) typically
produces high fever that typically lasts at least a week.58 The CDC estimates
that three to four million children were infected with measles each year in
the United States before the advent of the vaccine.59 The present rate of
measles infection in the United States is the highest rate since 1992.60
54

Id. at 306.
Robert T. Perry & Neal A. Halsey, The Clinical Significance of Measles: A Review, 189 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES S4, S7 (2004). The rate of harm is, of course, higher in underdeveloped countries.
56
Id.
57
See Katharina Schönberger et al., Epidemiology of Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis (SSPE)
in Germany from 2003 to 2009: A Risk Estimation, PLOS (2013), https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article
?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0068909 (estimating the risk at 1:1700 to 1:3300 in children under age five);
Kristen Wendorf et al., Subacute Sclerosing Panencephalitis: The Devastating Measles Complication Is
More Common Than We Think, 3 OPEN F. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 916, 916 (2016) (estimating the rate at
1:1367 for children under five, and a terrifying 1:609 for infants who contract measles before the age of
one).
58
Perry & Halsey, supra note 55, at S4.
59
Measles History, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
measles/about/history.html (last reviewed Feb. 5. 2018).
60
See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
55
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The MMR, which protects against measles, mumps, and rubella, led to
dramatic reduction in measles cases and attendant harms.61 Of 500,000
reported cases before the availability of effective vaccines, there were four
to five hundred deaths and tens of thousands of hospitalizations.62 This
contrasts with the risks of the MMR, which include fever in 5% to 15% of
children; a mild, non-contagious rash in 5% of children; febrile seizures
(which are scary, but usually harmless) in about 1 in 2300 to 2600 children;
a blood platelet disorder (thrombocytopenia) in about 1 in 30,000 cases; and
very rarely, an allergic reaction.63 Thrombocytopenia is less common when
it occurs following administration of the MMR than it is as a complication
of measles. Furthermore, thrombocytopenia is usually short-lived when it
follows MMR administration: over 90% of children overcome it in six
weeks.64 Temporary arthralgia (that is, joint pain) is fairly common (up to
25%) in adult women who receive the MMR. The CDC explains: “Joint pain
or stiffness occurs in up to 1 in 4 of females past puberty who were not
previously immune to rubella; their symptoms generally begin 1 to 3 weeks
after vaccination, are usually mild and last about 2 days. These symptoms
rarely come back.”65
While these vaccine side effects and complications, ranging from
temporarily unpleasant to serious, are not insignificant, serious reactions
from MMR are rare.66 In spite of anti-vaccine movement claims, the MMR
is not linked to autism.67 Most recently, a study of over 650,000 children in
Denmark reaffirmed the extensive existing literature, finding no increased
risk of autism with MMR vaccination.68 Indeed, “studies in three continents
61
See Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last reviewed Oct. 11, 2019) (finding that the
majority of people who contracted measles were unvaccinated).
62
PINK BOOK, supra note 40, at 214.
63
Id. at 226.
64
E. Miller et al., Idiopathic Thrombocytopenic Purpura and MMR Vaccine, 84 ARCHIVES DISEASE
CHILDHOOD 227, 228 (2001), https://adc.bmj.com/content/84/3/227.full.
65
Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) Vaccine Safety, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/vaccines/mmr-vaccine.html (last reviewed Jan. 29,
2020).
66
Nicola P. Klein et al., Safety of Measles-Containing Vaccines in 1-year-old Children, 135
PEDIATRICS e321, e321 (2015); Annamari Patja et al., Serious Adverse Events After
Measles-Mumps-Rubella Vaccination During a Fourteen-Year Prospective Follow-Up, 19 PEDIATRIC
INFECTIOUS DISEASES J. 1127, 1127 (2000).
67
Most recently, seventeen studies examining 657,461 children found no link between MMR and
autism. Anders Hviid et al., Measles, Mumps, Rubella Vaccination and Autism: A Nationwide Cohort
Study, 170 ANN. INTERNAL MED. 513, 513 (2019). See also Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & John Diamond,
Measles and Misrepresentation in Minnesota: Can There Be Liability for Anti Vaccine Misinformation
that Causes Bodily Harm?, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 562–63 (2019); Jeffrey S. Gerber & Paul A.
Offit, Vaccines and Autism: A Tale of Shifting Hypotheses, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 456, 456–
58 (2009).
68
Hviid et al., supra note 67, at 513–14.
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spanning millions of children [have] found no link between the MMR and
autism.”69
Figure 2: Risks of Measles v. Risks of MMR:
Risks of Measles
Risks of MMR
Ear infections
Local reactions
Croup
Fever
Diarrhea
Febrile Seizures
5% pneumonia
ITP: 1:24,000, usually temporary.
1:1000 encephalitis, almost 50% Severe allergic reaction 1:1.5–1.8
mortality.
million.
1–3:1000 deaths.
SSPE: Germany: 2003-2009
1:1750–3300 in kids under 5.
California: 1:660 in infants.
More generally, the most serious risk from vaccines are probably severe
allergic reactions which occur about once in a million doses.70 As this
discussion demonstrates, the risks of modern vaccines are both absolutely
and relatively low when compared to the benefits.71
B. Why Don’t Parents Vaccinate?
An extensive body of literature72 addresses the question of why people
do not vaccinate. We touch on key points here. Several studies have
examined the reasons provided by parents when asked why they do not
vaccinate. Beyond the articulated justifications, parents’ values may affect
their susceptibility to specific anti-vaccine arguments. Furthermore, parents’
social networks influence their views.

69
Reiss & Diamond, supra note 67, at 562–63 (providing a detailed overview of the MMR and
autism studies).
70
Michael M. McNeil et al., Risk of Anaphylaxis After Vaccination in Children and Adults, 137 J.
ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 868, 868 (2016).
71
See also Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at
885–88.
72
For examples of such literature, see generally PAUL A. OFFIT, DEADLY CHOICES: HOW THE
ANTI-VACCINE MOVEMENT THREATENS US ALL 180–85 (2011); JENNIFER REICH, CALLING THE SHOTS:
WHY PARENTS REJECT VACCINES (2016); Melissa B. Gikey et al., Forgone Vaccination During
Childhood and Adolescence: Findings of a Statewide Survey of Parents, 56 PREVENTIVE MED. 202
(2013); Edward Mills et al., Systematic Review of Qualitative Studies Exploring Parental Beliefs and
Attitudes Toward Childhood Vaccination Identifies Common Barriers To Vaccination, 58 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1081 (2005); Douglas J. Opel & Edgar K. Marcuse, Window or Mirror: Social Networks’
Role in Immunization Decisions, 131 PEDIATRICS 1619 (2013).
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We have examined the literature on the rationales for parents’ refusal to
vaccinate in detail elsewhere.73 We pointed out that the reasons include
(generally ill-founded) safety concerns, misconceptions about preventable
diseases that underestimate disease risks and the efficacy of vaccines,
distrust of doctors and government (shading, in the extreme, into conspiracy
theories), preferences for alternative medicine as well as “natural”
approaches to health without scientific foundation, and a view that
governmental vaccination policies reflect unjustified governmental intrusion
that violate their civil rights.74 In addition, occasionally religious beliefs
underlie parental objections.75 While some parents’ objections to vaccines
may be grounded in sincere religious views, courts and commentators have
concluded that such assertions at times mask the parents’ true reasons for
their anti-vaccine positions.76 There is substantial variability in the rationales
and degree of tenacity in parental opposition to vaccines. Vaccine-hesitant
parents may be more open to persuasion by their children if the children wish
to be vaccinated. By contrast, vaccine-rejector parents typically repel any
form of persuasion. The repercussions for minors who request vaccination
over parental opposition may be most severe when parents are
vaccine-rejectors.77
Parents who refuse vaccines typically voice deep and consistent
concerns about the harms they believe are associated with vaccines.78
Typically, however, the information that leads parents to think vaccines’
risks are high is misleading or patently false. For example, scientific data do
not support parental beliefs that vaccines weaken the immune system or that
the recommended vaccine schedule gives infants too many vaccines too
soon. Multiple vaccines on the schedule are not harmful in combination (and
challenge babies’ immune systems to a lesser degree than other natural
exposures), and have important benefits.79 Concerns about vaccines’
73

Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 937–52.
Id. at 937.
75
Anat Gesser-Edelsburg et al., Why Do Parents Who Usually Vaccinate Their Children Hesitate
or Refuse? General Good vs. Individual Risk, 19 J. RISK RES. 405, 408 (2014).
76
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Thou Shalt Not Take the Name of the Lord Thy God in Vain: Use and
Abuse of Religious Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1570–
88 (2014).
77
E. Allison Hagood & Stacy Mintzer Herlihy, Addressing Heterogeneous Parental Concerns
About Vaccination with a Multiple-Source Model: A Parent and Educator Perspective, 9 HUM.
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1790, 1791 (2013).
78
REICH, supra note 72, at 79–86; Mabel Berezin & Alicia Eads, Risk Is for the Rich? Childhood
Vaccination Resistance and a Culture of Health, 165 SOC. SCI . & MED. 233, 234–35 (2016); Chephra
McKee & Kristin Bohannon, Exploring the Reasons Behind Parental Refusal of Vaccines, 21 J.
PEDIATRIC PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 104, 104 (2016); Daniel A. Salmon et al., Factors
Associated with Refusal of Childhood Vaccines Among Parents of School Aged Children: A Case-Control
Study, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 470, 471 (2005).
79
Francesco Nicoli & Victor Appay, Immunological Considerations Regarding Parental Concerns
on Pediatric Immunizations, 35 VACCINE 3012, 3015 (2017); Paul A. Offit et al., Addressing Parents’
74
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ingredients raised on anti-vaccine sites80 are also unfounded. The ingredients
in vaccines that concern some parents occur in amounts that do not present
a danger to the child.81 For example, formaldehyde is present in vaccines in
amounts that are substantially less than that which an infant’s body produces
naturally as part of the infant’s own metabolism.82 Extensive evidence shows
that vaccines do not cause autism,83 food allergies,84 or Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome.85 Furthermore, parents also substantially underestimate the risks
posed by the diseases that vaccines prevent.86 Ironically, at least in part, the
success of vaccines in preventing disease has contributed to the problem.87
In other words, as vaccines have led to the disappearance of some diseases,
parents unfamiliar with the dangers of vaccine-preventable diseases
disbelieve the evidence on the benefits of these life-saving interventions, and
Concerns: Do Too Many Vaccines Overwhelm or Weaken the Infant’s Immune System?, 109 PEDIATRICS
124, 124–25 (2002).
80
Anna Kata, Anti-Vaccine Activists, Web 2.0, and the Postmodern Paradigm—An Overview of
Tactics and Tropes Used Online By the Anti-Vaccination Movement, 30 VACCINE 3778, 3781 (2012).
81
The amount of pork gelatin in vaccines, however, may be associated with allergic reactions in
about one per two million people. Paul A. Offit & Rita K. Jew, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do
Vaccines Contain Harmful Preservatives, Adjuvants, Additives, or Residuals?, 112 PEDIATRICS 1394,
1397 (2003). For additional information, see also Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccine Ingredients, CHILD. HOSP.
PHILA., https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients (last
reviewed Oct. 28, 2019).
82
Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccine Ingredients – Formaldehyde, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA.,
https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccine-ingredients/formaldehyde
(last reviewed May 14, 2018).
83
See notes 67–69 and accompanying text. Most recently, a large study of MMR vaccine found no
link to autism. See Hviid et al., supra note 67, at 513. Previously, a meta-analysis examining studies
involving over one million children reached the same conclusion, Luke E. Taylor et al., Vaccines Are
Not Associated with Autism: An Evidence-Based Meta-Analysis of Case-Control and Cohort Studies, 32
VACCINE 3623, 3623 (2014), as did an Institute of Medicine Report about vaccines’ adverse events,
Margaret A. Maglione et al., Safety of Vaccines Used for Routine Immunization of US Children: A
Systematic Review, 134 PEDIATRICS 325, 325 (2014). See also Frank DeStefano, Heather Monk
Bodenstab & Paul A. Offit, Principal Controversies in Vaccine Safety in the United States, 69 C LINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 726, 726 (2019).
84
Paul A. Offit & Charles J. Hackett, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Vaccines Cause Allergic
or Autoimmune Diseases?, 111 PEDIATRICS 653, 653 (2003); see also Vaccine Educ. Ctr., Vaccines and
Asthma or Allergies: Do Vaccines Cause Asthma or Allergies?, CHILD. HOSP. PHILA.,
https://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccines-and-other-conditions/
vaccines-asthma-allergies (last reviewed Oct. 10, 2017).
85
Pedro L. Moro et al., Deaths Reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System, United
States, 1997–2013, 61 VACCINES 980, 980–84 (2015); Giuseppe Traversa et al., Sudden Unexpected
Deaths and Vaccinations During the First Two Years of Life in Italy: A Case Series Study, 6 PLOS ONE
e16363, e16363 (2011); Y. Tony Yang & Jana Shaw, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome,
Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Vaccines: Longitudinal Population Analyses, 36 VACCINE
595, 595 (2018); M.M.T. Vennemann et al., Sudden Infant Death Syndrome: No Increased Risk After
Immunisation, 25 VACCINE 336, 336–37 (2007).
86
See Mark Doherty et al., Vaccine Impact: Benefits for Human Health, 34 VACCINE 6707, 6711
(2016) (discussing the re-emergence of vaccine-preventable diseases and the implications for
unimmunized persons in a community).
87
See id. at 6709 (examining the success of vaccines in reducing childhood mortality).
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focus instead on the more visible, albeit lesser, risks and costs of the
vaccines.88
In short, most of the beliefs that typically lead parents to refuse
vaccination are without scientific foundation. Anti-vaccine websites mislead
parents who, seeking to choose the lesser risk for their children, ultimately
choose the greater risk.89 These parents then also, intentionally or
unintentionally, place others at risk because unvaccinated children are at
higher risk of becoming infected and transmitting diseases to other
intentionally unvaccinated individuals: the small percentage of persons for
whom vaccines are not effective; those too young to be vaccinated; and those
with medical conditions that preclude some or all vaccinations, such as
transplant recipients or immunocompromised individuals.90
In her book Calling the Shots: Why Parents Reject Vaccines, scholar
Jennifer Reich places vaccine refusal in a broader social and cultural
context.91 She points out that modern society directs people to be “informed
consumers,” challenging the pronouncements of scientific and governmental
authorities and performing “research” themselves.92 Vaccine-rejecting
parents see themselves as “researchers” of that variety. They perceive
themselves to be self-educating, as informed consumers, in order to make
good decisions for their children.93 Similarly, vaccine refusers’ views fit well
within an age of personalization, explains Reich, and a call to personalize
both consumption and medicine.94
Even more broadly, a new body of literature examines the role of values
in vaccine refusal. Scholars find that parents who are strongly vaccine
hesitant are more likely than others to value purity (that is, placing an
emphasis on avoiding anything considered “disgusting” or “unnatural” and
expressing concerns about vaccines’ content) and liberty (that is, valuing
personal choice).95 That literature suggests that different messaging might
be more successful in influencing parents who oppose vaccines.96
88

Id. at 6708.
Kata, supra note 80, at 3779; Meghan Bridgid Moran et al., What Makes Anti-Vaccine Websites
Persuasive? A Content Analysis of Techniques Used by Anti-Vaccine Websites to Engender Anti-Vaccine
Sentiment, 9 J. COMM. HEALTHCARE 151, 151–53 (2016); Richard K. Zimmerman et al., Vaccine
Criticism on the World Wide Web, 7 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e17, e17 (2005).
90
See generally IMMUNIZATION ACTION COAL., PERSONAL BELIEF EXEMPTIONS FOR
VACCINATION PUT PEOPLE AT RISK. EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE FOR YOURSELF (2019),
http://www.immunize.org/catg.d/p2069.pdf (citing studies demonstrating higher risk from unvaccinated
individuals).
91
REICH, supra note 72, at 67–75.
92
Id. at 72–75.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 87–89.
95
Avnika B. Amin et al., Association of Moral Values with Vaccine Hesitancy, 1 NATURE HUM.
BEHAV. 873, 873 (2017).
96
Noel T. Brewer et al., Increasing Vaccination: Putting Psychological Science into Action, 18
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 149, 150 (2017).
89
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Finally, we observe that vaccine refusal is highly socially embedded.
Local attitudes and virtual social networks can influence a person’s vaccine
hesitancy.97 These networks are also “contagious,” traveling from one
community to another.98 Social networks support and reinforce parental
decisions not to vaccinate.99 In a community with high rates of vaccine
hesitancy, a minor’s choice to be vaccinated may have stronger social
repercussions for the minor and the minor’s family than in other
communities, thus creating “counter pressure,” and thereby strengthening
parental opposition to a minor’s vaccination request.100
II. AUTHORITY FOR HEALTH CARE DECISIONS FOR MINORS: THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE
A. The Doctrine of Parental Consent
It is well-established that in the United States, parents and guardians
retain legal authority to make health care decisions for their minor children.
This doctrine of parental consent is but one facet of the broad authority
vested in parents to make decisions affecting the welfare of their minor
children.101 In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court reflected that the “the interest
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children” is “perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”102 The
state gives parents a relatively wide berth with which to carry out their
responsibilities vis-à-vis their children.103 Now recognized as a veritable
fixture in American law, parental discretion in decisionmaking concerning
minor children is the starting point for most analyses of decisional authority

97
Katie Attwell et al., The Social Basis of Vaccine Questioning and Refusal: A Qualitative Study
Employing Bourdieu’s Concepts of ‘Capitals’ and ‘Habitus’, 15 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. PUB. HEALTH
1044, 1044 (2018); Heidi Y. Lawrence et al., Reframing Medicine’s Publics: The Local as a Public of
Vaccine Refusal, 35 J. MED. HUMAN. 111, 111 (2014); Marcel Salathé & Sabastian Bonhoeffer, The
Effect of Opinion Clustering on Disease Outbreaks, 5 J. ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE 1505, 1508 (2008).
98
Ellsworth Campbell & Marcel Salathé, Complex Social Contagion Makes Networks More
Vulnerable to Disease Outbreaks, 3 SCI. REP. 1, 1–2 (2013); Y. Tony Yang, George Washington Univ.,
Why Stricter Immunization Laws Are Justified? Empirical Evidence of Nonmedical Exemptions’
Contagiousness (Nov. 2019), https://apha.confex.com/apha/2019/meetingapi.cgi/Paper/454274?
filename=2019_Abstract454274.html&template=Word.
99
Jennifer A. Reich, “We Are Fierce, Independent Thinkers and Intelligent”: Social Capital and
Stigma Management Among Mothers Who Refuse Vaccines, SOC. SCI. & MED., July 2020, at 1, 1–4,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0277953618306233.
100
Id. at 4.
101
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”).
102
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000).
103
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (stating that the primacy of the parents
in raising their children leads the Court to respect a “private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter”).
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regarding children or adolescents.104 Yet, it is not necessarily the ending
point. The law governing health care decisions for minors reveals a complex
array of exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent, each of which
provides for a decisionmaking mechanism to supplement, or in some cases
replace, parental discretion.
Although principles governing consent for children’s health care
initially evolved through the common law,105 the doctrine of parental
consent assumed constitutional dimensions in the latter part of the twentieth
century.106 This important line of cases had its inception in the 1920s, with
Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.107 These cases together
establish that parental authority to exercise discretion in the upbringing of
their children is an expression of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.108
Investing parents with some measure of discretion in decisionmaking
regarding their minor children’s welfare recognizes the functional role of
families in our society. Our social structure is premised upon the existence
of family units, whose dependent children rely for support, nurturance, and
104

See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 584–85 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635–39 (1979)
Under early common law, fathers had property-like interests in their children and their wives,
which were associated with substantial legal control over those persons. It included, for example, fathers’
entitlement to the wages earned by his minor children and disciplinary authority, including corporal
punishment. See, e.g., Anne C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE
L.J. 1448, 1457–58 (2017) (describing common-law property-based theory of parental control of
children); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM . & MARY L. REV. 995, 1045–46 (1992) (discussing common law rights of patriarchs
to “enforce control over their households”). Parental authority for health care decisions specifically,
however, also flows from tort law. See, e.g., Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Medical Practitioner’s
Liability for Treatment Given Child Without Parent’s Consent, 67 A.L.R. 4th 511 § 2[a] (1989)
(describing changing liability for treatment of minors without parental consent); Walter Wadlington,
Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REV. 311, 314–16 (describing early development of doctrine of parental consent). Depending on the
case facts, physicians’ failure to secure the consent of a child’s parent before treating the child can result
in liability as a form of battery, or more commonly in recent decades, negligence. Veilleux, supra, at
517. Principles clarifying exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent that allow minors authority to
consent, discussed infra Section II.B.2, not only facilitate minors’ independent access to treatment, but
also protect physicians from such liability when relying solely on the consent of the minor. Doriane
Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General
Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 790 (2013).
106
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (assuming a child has a liberty and due process
right in their voluntary admittance to a mental institution but ultimately upholding the state of Georgia’s
procedures for admitting a child for treatment to a state mental hospital); Bellotti v. Baird, 442 U.S. 622,
651 (1979) (holding a state can require parental consent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but that there
must be a judicial route for minors seeking an abortion without parental consent).
107
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923).
108
For a critical analysis of Meyer and Pierce as constitutionalizing a property-like notion of
parental rights, see Woodhouse, supra note 105, at 997 (asserting that Meyer and Pierce “were animated,
as well, by . . . a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-stratified society, and to a
parent’s private property rights in his children and their labor”).
105
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protection upon parents who have both the desire and capacity to act in their
children’s best interests.109 Parents in our society are charged with guarding
their children’s welfare and guiding their children’s destiny. Allowing
parents to carry out these duties in a manner consistent with their judgment
and values serves a myriad of positive goals. Indeed, there are many
justifications for a legal regime that protects parental authority over their
children’s welfare, including health care decisions.110 We highlight four
here: (1) the family unit serves as a core building block within our social
structure and is the institution best situated to care for, protect, and socialize
children; (2) parental discretion in raising children is an important
accompaniment to legal childrearing obligations; (3) parents are those
persons typically most motivated, able, and best situated to make decisions
in the best interests of their children; and (4) most minors have not yet
achieved adult levels of maturation and must rely on adults to make
important decisions for them.
The primacy of the family in American society provides the first
rationale for protection of parental authority over children’s welfare. The
family, as a unit, has a special place in American society. It forms the
“building blocks out of which the larger units of social organization are
fashioned,”111 and its social and economic stability and functionality are
essential to the perpetuation of a healthy society.112 One component of the
family’s traditional role in society is the procreation, nurturance, and
socialization of children.113 Modern conceptions of family view it as an
institution uniquely suited to this role.
Major shifts in images of children and family occurred during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114 For example, historian Michael
109
Lois A. Weithorn, Envisioning Second-Order Change in America’s Responses to Troubled and
Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1305, 1391–92 (2005) [hereinafter Weithorn, Envisioning].
110
Id. at 1391–98. Grounded initially in the legal and social authority of husbands and fathers over
their wives and children, the purposes and nature of parental control over children has shifted
substantially over the centuries. MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 4–5 (1985).
111
John Demos, Images of the American Family, Then and Now, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE
FAMILY 43, 46 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1979). See also Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977) (“It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many
of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”).
112
See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND
RESPONSIBILITY 20–21 (2006) (analyzing how families instill values in future generations and help
perpetuate social goods); Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1389–91 (describing theories of the
family unit as the foundation of social, religious, educational, and political life).
113
“Families care for dependent children, prepare them for citizenship, and educate them to be
productive members of society.” Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status:
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 304 (2015).
114
For example, sociologist Viviana A. Zelizer highlights children’s roles as substantial economic
assets to the family through their childhood labor prior to the shifts that occurred during the nineteenth
and, even more sharply, twentieth century. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE
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Grossberg notes that during the nineteenth century, evolving perceptions of
children as vulnerable and malleable, with each having his or her own unique
“needs, talents, and characters,” required the personalized and customized
upbringing that only a family could provide.115 While the state (such as
through public schools) shares in “molding the nation’s young, . . . youthful
minds and bodies would develop properly only in a special, sheltered home
under the watchful guidance of concerned . . . parents.”116
Protecting some level of the family’s autonomy in raising and
socializing children from overly intrusive state regulation is also consistent
with democratic ideology. In its rebuke to Oregon’s legislature for regulating
parental decisions regarding school choice with too heavy a hand, the Court
asserted in Pierce that:
The fundamental theory of liberty . . . excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children . . . . The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.117
The Court’s opinion implies that vesting considerable discretion in parents
not only protects against governmental overreaching and excessive intrusion
in family matters, but also guards other substantive liberties expressed
within the family (such as political ideology and religious beliefs). Family
autonomy, in turn, is viewed as fostering pluralism and diversity, which
reinvigorates our democracy. Thus, constitutional protection for parental
decisional authority over their minor children serves important social goals
unrelated to individual children’s needs.
A second, and corollary, argument for giving parents some degree of
freedom in the ways in which they raise their children relates to the heavy
burden parents assume in raising children. Empowering parents with the
authority to raise children the way they see fit, albeit consistent with certain
minimal state-imposed limits, may be viewed as a form of reciprocity for
satisfying the legally enforceable duties of parenthood.118 In this, “[t]he
exchange view of parenthood[,] . . . [p]arents have rights that create
obligations and obligations that create rights. Within this circular,
self-reinforcing cycle of exchange, rights are emphasized, strengthened by
their justification in obligation.”119 Katharine Bartlett has reframed this
concept by focusing on the relationship components of parents’
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 5, 56–57 (1985). Children’s value to their parents morphed
from that of an “instrumental or fiscal” asset to “exclusively emotional and affective.” Id. at 11.
115
GROSSBERG, supra note 110, at 8.
116
Id.
117
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
118
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2440 (1995).
119
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 298 (1988).
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responsibilities to children. “Responsibility describes a certain type of
connection that persons may experience in their relationships with one
another . . . . Responsibility, in other words, is a self-enlarging, open-ended
commitment on behalf of another.”120 She suggests that providing parents
with a wide berth in the manner in which they carry out their parental
responsibilities constitutes a logical and natural reliance on the commitment
parents have made to doing their best for their children.121
Scott and Scott, by contrast, analogize the role of parents to those of
fiduciaries: “On this dimension, parental authority over the relationship with
children is offered as the quid pro quo for satisfactory performance . . . .
Recognition of these parental claims in some form is an important
inducement to encourage investment in children’s welfare.”122 Both
approaches recognize that there is an important connection between the legal
responsibilities and obligations that parents shoulder in raising children and
the constitutionally protected authority to carry out those duties in a manner
consistent with one’s personal judgment and values.
A third rationale justifying parental authority in children’s upbringing,
including in health care, is that American law presumes that parents are
motivated to make, and are capable of making, decisions in their children’s
best interests.123 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in Parham v.
J.R., a case addressing parental authority for decisions to place their minor
children in mental hospitals without judicial oversight, opined that the
“natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their
children.”124 While acknowledging that this presumption may not always
hold, as in the case of child abuse or neglect, the Court concluded that the
existence of exceptions “is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages
of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s
best interests.”125 Justice Burger’s assertion regarding the proclivities of
most parents conforms with the dominant view in society that parents try to
do the best they can by and for their children. Indeed, those of us who are
fortunate enough to be parents can attest to the powerful emotional forces
that lead most of us to dedicate ourselves to promoting what we believe is
in our children’s best interests. As Barbara Bennett Woodhouse observes
with the example of a parent who runs into a burning building to rescue his
or her child, parental love and protective instincts can motivate a parent to
120

Id. at 299.
Id. at 299–300.
122
Scott & Scott, supra note 118, at 2440.
123
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit assert as well that it is in children’s best interests to have
autonomous parents whose discretion in decisionmaking is protected against most potential or actual
forms of state intrusion. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4–5
(1973).
124
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
125
Id. at 602–03.
121
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place herself or himself at great personal risk—without a second thought—
to further a child’s well-being.126
Embedded in the presumption that parents act in their children’s best
interests is the notion that the interests of parents and children typically align
or are coextensive. Thus, there is a corollary presumption that there is an
“identity of interests” between parent and child.127 The parent is presumed
to speak on the child’s behalf. Thus, to the extent that there is evidence that
the interests of a parent and minor are not aligned, the appropriateness of
relying on parental decisionmaking is questionable. As Chief Justice Burger
acknowledged, sometimes the evidence is clear that parental conduct and
choices harm or endanger minor children, providing a strong basis to rebut
the presumption that parents are acting in their children’s best interests.128
Yet, there may be situations that fall short of documented child abuse or
neglect that reveal a conflict, rather than identity, of interests between
parents and children.129
A fourth rationale for parental decisional authority over their minor
children recognizes that, in light of the physiological, psychological, and
economic dependence of children, someone must play the roles alluded to
by Grossberg. Most children have not achieved adult levels of maturity in a
range of areas of functioning. They depend upon adults to meet their
essential needs.130 Although the age at which children typically reach
species-typical milestones characterizing adult levels of functioning differs
with the particular skills and capacities in question, and from individual to
individual, it is undeniable that most children need adult care, protection,
and nurturance to survive and to have the best opportunity to thrive.131

126
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Of Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning
Parenthood in Irrational Action, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493, 2496–97 (1995).
127
J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability and the
Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 86–87 (2003); Amy L.
Komoroski, Stimulant Drug Therapy for Hyperactive Children: Adjudicating Disputes Between Parents
and Educators, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 107 (2001). But see Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond,
David Reimer’s Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 5, 30 (2005)
(discussing the concept of parent-child identity versus conflict of interests in the context of surgical
intervention for children with ambiguous genitalia); Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 487, 507 (1973) (proposing that the traditional presumption of identity of interests between
a parent and child should be rejected when the child’s interests are “demonstrably independent” from
those of the parents).
128
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch.
524) (allowing finding of neglect if substantial risk of serious harm due to parents’ failure to obtain
needed medical treatment for child).
129
See the discussion of statutory exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent infra Section
II.B.2.iii.
130
Lois A. Weithorn, A Constitutional Jurisprudence of Children’s Vulnerability, 69 HASTINGS L.J.
179, 226–27 (2017) [hereinafter Weithorn, Children’s Vulnerability].
131
Id. at 227.
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One component of children’s immature physiological and psychological
status is their not-yet-fully-developed cognitive and socioemotional
decisional capabilities. The law generally views children as incapable of
acting in their own best interests and treats their incompetence in making
most personal decisions of legal import, including health care decisions, as
presumptive.132 In Parham, the majority stated that “[m]ost children, even in
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many
decisions, including their need for medical care or treatment.”133 Indeed, the
Court has distinguished the constitutional status of children and adults based,
in part, on children’s perceived “inability to make critical decisions in an
informed and mature manner.”134 For the reasons asserted above, parents are
typically the logical and convenient first choice to serve as proxy
decisionmakers for their children.135
Yet, as many have observed, de facto or actual competence for a
particular legal purpose may not track the bright-line age-based, and to some
extent arbitrary, division between minority and majority that serves as the
default for delineation of legal rights and duties.136 In fact, those “pages of
human experience” referred to by Chief Justice Burger and a growing body
of empirical research tell us that—depending upon the particular skills and
capacities relevant to the law—minors may satisfy legal standards of
competence at ages younger or older than the legal age of majority.137 Thus,
132
B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering First
Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 40–41 (2012); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let’s Get Real:
Quilting a Principled Approach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 771–72 (2002); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 550–51 (2000). See Laurence Steinberg, Does Recent Research on Adolescent
Brain Development Inform the Mature Minor Doctrine?, 38 J. MED. & PHIL. 256, 256 (2013) (citing
constitutional jurisprudence holding that minors’ immaturity mitigates their criminal culpability).
133
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
134
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
135
The Court in Parham indicated that “[p]arents can and must make . . . judgments [as to children’s
need for medical care or treatment].” Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
136
Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors’ Consent to Treatment: A Developmental Perspective,
9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412, 415–16 (1978); Rodham, supra note 127, at 488–89; Lois A. Weithorn,
Developmental Factors and Competence to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 5 CHILD & YOUTH
SERVICES 85, 86 (1982) [hereinafter Weithorn, Developmental Factors].
137
Lois A. Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH,
AND THE LAW 25, 37–38 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984); Grisso & Vierling, supra note 136, at
423; Grace Icenogle et al., Adolescents’ Cognitive Capacity Reaches Adult Levels Prior to Their
Psychosocial Maturity: Evidence for a “Maturity Gap” in a Multinational, Cross-Sectional Sample, 43
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 79 (2019); Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than
Adults?: Minors’ Access to Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop”, 64
AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 586–87 (2009); Weithorn, Developmental Factors, supra note 136, at 95–96; Lois
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982). The capacities of minors to satisfy legal
standards of competence to consent to childhood vaccinations independent of their parents is discussed
below. See infra Parts III.B.2–III.B.3.
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there are circumstances in which the presumption that minors are
incompetent to make important life decisions for themselves, including
certain medical choices, is not supported by the available evidence.138 While
minors’ competence to make health care decisions may not serve as an
independent basis for providing minors with generalized decisional
authority in place of their parents, it may operate to provide the alternative
mechanism for certain health care decisions if, for one reason or another, a
reliance on parental consent alone would not achieve important interests.139
B. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Parental Consent
Parental authority over the lives of their children is neither boundless
nor unregulated. While deference to parents remains the default in the
context of children’s health care decisionmaking, judicial and legislative
balancing of competing interests involving constitutional and policy
considerations created a complex web of exceptions to parental control over
minor children’s health care decisions.
1. Underlying Constitutional and Policy Frameworks
The exceptions can be best understood within the context of certain
constitutional and policy frameworks that allow for analysis of competing
interests among parents, the state, and children. As noted above, parents
have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in exercising discretion in
decisionmaking regarding their children’s welfare, including authority over
decisions for minor children’s health care. This interest has been classified
as fundamental, although this classification does not always result in the
application of strict scrutiny to challenged statutes and regulations. Instead,
the Court appears to apply context-specific modes of analysis, frequently
falling back on balancing tests.140
Not surprisingly, exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent exist in
circumstances where courts or legislatures determine that the interests of the
state or the children are weightier than those of the parents. Minors’ own
138

See infra Parts III.B.2–III.B.3.
See infra notes 237–50 and accompanying text.
140
Despite its status as a “fundamental right,” strict scrutiny review is not always required of state
regulations challenged as interfering with that authority. Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood
Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 908–10. While at times the Court does apply strict scrutiny to
challenged laws, it often applies alternative modes of analysis, such as balancing tests, or other
context-specific standards of review customized to the particular issues and constellation of parties and
interests. Id. See also Margaret Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L. REV. 127, 128 (2018)
(observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has “not articulated a consistent level of scrutiny for judicial
review of restrictions on” parental decisional rights regarding the care, custody, and control of their minor
children). That said, constitutional scholars have concluded that mandatory vaccination laws, even if
providing no vaccine exemptions other than those that are medically necessary, satisfy strict scrutiny.
Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitutional, 110 NW.
U. L. REV. 589, 614 (2016).
139
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constitutional rights may compete with parental claims. Policy
considerations, such as those relating to preserving life or promoting health
may override parental rights. In some instances, the justifications and
rationales underlying the doctrine of parental consent141—each of which
might be viewed as an assumption about the functioning of the family,
parents, or children—may simply not hold true. In these circumstances,
courts or legislatures may fashion exceptions to the doctrine of parental
consent, that is, alternative decisionmaking structures to promote children’s
best interests. Throughout the remainder of this Article, when discussing
legal exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent, we reference one or
another of these constitutional, policy, or practical bases for creating such
exceptions.
The Court often engages in a dyadic balance of parental rights of
decisional autonomy and the state’s interests (parens patriae and police
power) in children’s welfare. The parens patriae power refers to the state’s
paternalistic authority to regulate the lives of individuals to protect and
promote those persons’ own welfare.142 Parens patriae regulations are
typically aimed at those persons, such as children or other vulnerable or
dependent groups, viewed as unable to protect, care, or decide wisely for
themselves, thus triggering a higher level of protection from the state. The
police power, by contrast, seeks to regulate the conduct of individuals in
order to promote the general welfare and promote the interests of the
community or society as a whole.143 A powerful statement of the state’s
police power authority appears in the seminal mandatory vaccination case,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, in which the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
the “social compact” between the state and its citizens, requiring each of us
to acquiesce to policies that advance “the common good” (that is, the safety
and protection of the populace), even when such acquiescence restricts our
liberty.144
141
The four sets of rationales, as laid out above, are as follows: (1) the family unit serves as a core
building block within our social structure, the institution best situated to care for, protect, and socialize
children; (2) parental discretion in raising children is an important accompaniment to legal childrearing
obligations; (3) parents are those persons typically most motivated, able, and best situated to make
decisions in the best interests of their children; and (4) most minors have not yet achieved adult levels of
maturation and must rely on adults to make important decisions for them. See supra notes 111–35 and
accompanying text.
142
“Parens patriae, literally ‘parent of the country,’ is the government’s power and responsibility,
beyond its police power over all citizens, to protect, care for, and control citizens who cannot take care
of themselves . . . .” Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-first
Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382
(2000).
143
Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1402–03. The state’s police power interest justifies
regulations that seek to promote the safety, health, and prosperity of society as a whole. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1214 (1980)
(discussing the state’s parens patriae and police power interests).
144
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
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The state has substantially broader authority to regulate the lives of
children than it does the lives of adults, primarily because government’s
parens patriae and police power interests are weightier relative to children
than to adults.145 State involvement in children’s lives provides a classic
expression of its parens patriae concerns for a subgroup of its citizens.
Unlike adults, children are presumed to be incompetent under the law and
therefore incapable of acting effectively on their own behalves or
safeguarding their own interests.146 The Court has identified, however, a
second factor that also fuels the state’s paternalistic concern. Children are
also thought to be more vulnerable than adults.147 Weithorn provides an
analysis of the construct of vulnerability and its subtypes, as relied upon by
the Court in justifying the differential legal treatment of adults and
children.148 In general, persons who are perceived to be vulnerable are
thought to be at greater risk for, or more susceptible to, deleterious
consequences as a result of certain experiences, influences, or exposures
than are others.149 Children as vulnerable persons are in greater need of
protection by those concerned with their best interests than are those not seen
as vulnerable. The law’s presumption of children’s incompetence and
conceptions of children’s vulnerability frequently trigger the state’s
watchful eye and greater state involvement in children’s than in adults’ lives,
justified by its parens patriae interests.
The state’s police power interests regarding children are also broader
when compared with those justifying intervention in the lives of adults.
Weithorn has identified two subtypes of police power interests relevant to
state regulation of children: those generally related to public safety and those
generally related to children’s socialization.150 The first category is
analogous to the police power interests the state maintains relative to all its
inhabitants. It seeks to protect those within its borders from harm by
restraining dangerous conduct and conditions.151 Thus, a wide range of
policies, such as health codes, environmental regulations, criminal laws, and
more, are in place to constrain actions and activities that threaten the welfare

145

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623 (1979) (indicating that minors under the age of
seventeen are “presumptively incapable of making [a] voluntary commitment decision for
[themselves]”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (asserting that “during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them”).
147
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634 (referring to children’s “peculiar vulnerability” as one of the three
reasons justifying the treatment of children as constitutionally different from adults).
148
Weithorn, Children’s Vulnerability, supra note 130, at 187–88.
149
Id. at 190.
150
Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 1404.
151
Id. at 235.
146
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of others.152 Notably, the most important case reinforcing the state’s
constitutional authority under its police power relative to public health—
Jacobson v. Massachusetts153—concerned mandatory vaccinations.154 The
Court acknowledged that the liberty interest claimed by Jacobson (an adult),
who sought to repel the state’s mandate that he be inoculated against
smallpox or pay a five dollar fine, was the “greatest of all rights.”155 Yet, it
held that this right is not absolute, and must give way in instances such as
that presented in this case, where the public health was at risk from a
life-threatening contagious disease: “[T]he police power of a State must be
held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”156 As we have indicated elsewhere, Jacobson remains good law over
a century after its writing and has been repeatedly cited with approval by the
Court.157
The state’s other primary police power interest relative to children
concerns its goal of fostering children’s socialization in order to promote
their development into the well-adjusted adults who contribute
constructively to society. The Court has noted that, if children do not mature
into such adults, our society cannot prosper: “A democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into
full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.”158 Frequently, the state’s
socialization-oriented police power interests relative to children converge
with its parens patriae interests. In other words, state regulations viewed as
promoting a child’s own best interests typically also contribute to children’s
positive socialization. Two of the best-known regulatory structures justified
by both the parens patriae and police power authorities are compulsory

152

See Jorge E. Galva et al., Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of the State, 120 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 20, 23–24 (2005) (discussing the police power as a way to restrict harmful conduct and
promote the public health).
153
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 11–12 (1905).
154
For a discussion of the case and its implications for the development of the doctrine relating to
the police power and health care, see Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis,
supra note 7, at 894–901.
155
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27.
156
Id. at 25.
157
Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 898–901.
We observed:
Although one can speculate that Jacobson might be decided differently today, to date
no decisions have expressly undercut its authority. To the contrary, Jacobson has been
cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court dozens of times, including in recent
decades, and by other federal and state courts several hundred times. The general
principles set forth in Jacobson are sound and well-established.
Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
158
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 271

7/28/20 10:48 AM

800

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:2

education laws and prohibitions on child labor.159 Mandating education and
restricting children’s participation in the labor force are seen as promoting
children’s best interests.160 They require children to spend most of their
waking hours in settings for the purpose of developing the fundamental skills
the children will need to become capable adults. They also restrict children’s
involvement in settings where they might be injured, exploited, or otherwise
harmed. The laws that promote these parens patriae objectives are also
deemed to achieve police power goals by preparing children for their future
involvement in society.161 Compulsory education laws are expected to
increase the likelihood that children will contribute socially, economically,
and politically162 once reaching adulthood. Child labor prohibitions not only
free up the child to attend school, but are designed to protect children from
dangerous and corrupting influences, such as injuries or other experiences
that may undercut their development into self-sufficient and contributing
adult members of society.163
Thus, although parents are empowered to serve as those persons with
day-to-day responsibility for nurturing and supporting children’s positive
development, government continues to play a significant role in the
formative process. While Meyer and Pierce may have clarified that the
Constitution protects parental choice in educational decisions, these choices
must still satisfy the state’s minimal standards. Indeed, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, a 1972 case allowing Amish parents of three teenagers to withdraw
them from public school a year or two (depending on the child) before
reaching the state-defined minimum age for school exit, the Court made
clear that its acquiescence was due to consideration of the public school
education the children had already received together with the Amish
families’ intention to continue the children’s education by preparing them
for useful occupations within their community.164 The case is often viewed
as creating the template for home-schooling laws, which do not allow
159
See Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at 235–36 (listing compulsory education and child
labor productions following the introduction of parens patriae and police power).
160
Id. at 235.
161
Id.
162
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all . . . [and] has a fundamental
role in maintaining the fabric of our society.”); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (regarding “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the
preservation of a democratic system of government”); Elizabeth Lamura, Our Children, Ourselves:
Ensuring the Education of America’s At-Risk Youth, 31 BUFF. PUB. I NT. L.J. 117, 117 (2013)
(“Education is essential, not only to each individual child, but to the nation as a whole.”).
163
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 168–69 (referring to “the crippling effects of child employment” and
stating that “legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state’s police power,
whether against the parents [sic] claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary
action”).
164
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
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wholesale exemptions from educational mandates, but require parents to
satisfy minimum standards under state regulations.165
In Prince v. Massachusetts, a case in which the Court upheld a state
child labor regulation as applied to a Jehovah’s Witness who allowed her
ward to sell religious newspapers in public, it stated: “[N]either rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the
general interest in youth’s well-being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent’s control . . . .”166 Relative to the police power, the Court
reinforced that “the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest.”167 And, in dicta that zeros in on the issue that is the focus of this
Article, citing conjoined police power and parens patriae concerns, the
Court indicated that parental rights do “not include liberty to expose the
community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or
death.”168
Indeed, although deference to parental health care choices for their
children is the default under our legal system, parental discretion is not
unlimited, and parental choices may be overridden where parents’ decisions
are deemed to endanger their children’s welfare169 or the public’s health.170
When a health care intervention is necessary to serve both the parens patriae
and police power interests, as in the case of preventing the spread of a
contagious disease that endangers the health of the child to be immunized
165

David M. Smolin, State Regulation of Private Education: Ohio Law in the Shadow of the United
States Supreme Court Decisions, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1003, 1012–13 (1986). See also Louis A.
Greenfield, Religious Home-Schools: That’s Not a Monkey on Your Back, It’s a Compelling State
Interest, 9 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2007) (“One of the major impacts of Yoder is essentially the
showing that home-schooling is valid. However, . . . home-schooling is not without its restrictions.”).
166
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67 (“[T]he state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom
and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare . . . .”).
167
Id. at 166.
168
Id. at 166–67.
169
See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110 (Del. 1991) (stating that a parent’s right
to make important decisions for their children is not absolute); Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053,
1056 (Mass. 1978) (overriding parents’ decision to refuse chemotherapy treatment for their child with
leukemia). State civil and criminal child maltreatment statutes stipulate that parents are obliged to provide
their children with adequate medical care, and that failure to do so can result in a finding of medical
neglect. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. ch.
524) (stating that the juvenile court may determine a child is a dependent of the court if “the child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious harm or illness . . . by the willful
or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate . . . medical treatment”).
For a summary and analysis of medical neglect laws, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS ET AL., CHILDREN IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 573–618 (5th ed. 2014).
170
See Garcia v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 106 N.E.3d 1187, 1196 (N.Y. Ct. App.
2018) (upholding New York City Board of Health regulations mandating influenza vaccine for certain
populations of students, stating that “the rules challenged here do not relate merely to a personal choice
about an individual’s own health but, rather, seek to ensure increased public safety and health for the
citizenry by reducing the prevalence and spread of a contagious infectious disease within a particularly
vulnerable population”); see also Brown v. Smith, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 225 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
(distinguishing Yoder as a situation which did not involve risks to the public’s safety or welfare).
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and of the larger community, and the risk to the child from the immunization
is extremely low, the case for overriding parental discretion is exceptionally
strong.171 We have asserted elsewhere that the “current mandatory
vaccination requirements for children are justified by a robust alliance of
police power and parens patriae state concerns, which in the context of state
regulation of children’s lives confers breathtakingly broad authority to
override parental decisionmaking” by requiring parents to vaccinate their
children prior to school entry.172 One can analogize the convergence of the
parens patriae and police power interests in the context of mandatory
vaccination laws to the policies underlying compulsory education and child
labor laws.173 This convergence of parens patriae and police power interests
in the context of required childhood vaccinations distinguishes such medical
interventions from the typical context in which parents retain substantial
discretion in making health care decisions for their minor children (that is,
when parens patriae interests alone are balanced against parental
decisionmaking discretion).174 Given this convergence of interests, the
analogy holds as well when considering our proposal to authorize older
minors to access these interventions independently.
The constitutional framework discussed thus far presumes a dyadic
balancing of interests between parents and the state and assumes that these
two parties’ interests in the child’s welfare will yield a result that serves the
child’s best interests. Some commentators have challenged this model,
critiquing the absence of the “child’s voice,” arguing that children’s interests
are not adequately represented when disputes are framed primarily or solely
as contests between the parents and the state.175 Justice William O. Douglas
171
See Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 140, at 610 (asserting that compulsory vaccination
laws satisfy strict scrutiny).
172
Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 912.
173
Id. at 914.

The primary prevention model driving today’s mandatory vaccination of children can
be closely analogized to the forward-looking goals of compulsory school attendance
and restrictions on child labor. In these contexts, the policies, while seeking to provide
benefits and prevent harms to children contemporaneous with the restrictions, also
emphasize long-term benefits to the children and to society. Many of these benefits
are to be realized when the children become adults. Thus, although child labor
restrictions were motivated in part to protect children from the immediate risks of
workplace dangers, concerns about children’s overall socialization and availability for
educational opportunities predominate in justifying these regulations in modern times.
Id.

174

The Prince Court emphasized that parents’ discretion in making decisions for their children is
far narrower than the discretion adults can exercise when making decisions about their own lives:
“Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170
(1944).
175
See generally Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?,
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famously challenged the Supreme Court majority’s application of a dyadic
balancing test in Wisconsin v. Yoder in a dissent asserting that the
preferences of the three minor children, whose education was at the center
of the case, should have figured into the Court’s analysis.176 The Court began
to engage, increasingly, in “triadic balancing” of the interests of parents, the
state, and children as it recognized that minors have constitutionally
cognizable interests and must be treated as constitutional actors in certain
legal disputes.177
In the health care context, there are perhaps two separate sets of minors’
interests at stake: (1) the interest in health and the preservation of one’s life
and (2) the interest in autonomous decisionmaking regarding one’s health
care, commensurate with their psychological capacities in certain
circumstances.
i.

Children’s Interest in Health and Preservation of Life

According to one state supreme court: “All children indisputably have
the right to enjoy a full and healthy life.”178 Typically, in legal analyses, the
state articulates the interests in children’s good health and survival. The state
asserts interests in preserving human life179 and promoting the “healthy . . .
growth of young people into full maturity.”180 Yet, as those cases that
perform triadic analyses of interests reveal, minors have strong independent
interests in these goals as well. The independent interests of minors in
continued life and good health are aligned with the state’s interests in
promoting minors’ freedom from the harmful effects of life-threatening and
2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67 (1995); Donald H. Stone, The Dangers of Psychotropic Medication
for Mentally Ill Children: Where Is the Child’s Voice in Consenting to Medication? An Empirical Study,
23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 121 (2013); Elaine E. Sutherland, Listening to the Child’s Voice in the
Family Setting: From Aspiration to Reality, 26 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 152 (2014). Recognizing the
importance of independent consideration of the “child’s voice” is but a first step. Debates often follow
on the question of how to access children’s independent interests. For example, there are multiple models
that influence the ways in which children’s interests are represented by lawyers in child protection cases.
See, e.g., Josh Gupta-Kagan, Child Protection Law as an Independent Variable, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 398,
403 (2016).
176
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). But see Emily Buss,
What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 24 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 53 (1999) (questioning whether direct
elicitation of children’s views ultimately serves their interest in the context of free exercise rights).
177
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). For
discussion of a triadic framework recognizing children’s developmental interests as distinct from
interests of parents and the state, see William Galston, Parents, Government, and Children: Authority
Over Education in a Pluralist Liberal Democracy, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 284 (2011). For a
discussion of a “tripartite framework” that reconceptualizes the legal positions of the parties, see Anne
C. Dailey & Laura A. Rosenbury, The New Law of the Child, 127 YALE L.J. 1448, 1506 (2017).
178
Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991).
179
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990) (holding that the state may “assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against” other constitutionally
protected interests); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997) (same).
180
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
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other serious diseases.181 Indeed, state requirements for vaccination of
children prior to school entry serves those ends.182
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was
unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1989, devotes
several articles to articulating children’s human rights to “enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health,” and that “no child is deprived of his
or her right of access to” health care services that include “preventive health
care.”183 Various scholars have concurred with the basic premise that access
to adequate health care is a “human right,” that is, something to which “we
are entitled, simply by virtue of our humanity.”184 The poor performance of
the United States in meeting the health care needs of its citizens, relative to
other industrialized nations, has been the subject of much analysis,
commentary, and criticism.185 We do not revisit that discussion here. Rather,
181

See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1066 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a child whose
parents rejected life-saving chemotherapy treatment had a “long-term interest in leading a normal,
healthy life,” converging with the state’s strong interest in preserving human life, and justifying judicial
order overriding parental refusal of highly effective treatment for their child’s leukemia).
182
For a detailed discussion of the ways in which the law can protect the interests of children in the
context of vaccinations, see Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Rights of the Unvaccinated Child, 73 STUD. L. POL.
& SOC’Y 73, 75 (2017).
183
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24, Nov. 22, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
See also id. art. 23 (recognizing rights of the disabled child to treatment); id. art. 25 (recognizing the right
of a child in state custody for treatment of physical or mental health). The United States signed the
Convention in 1995 but did not ratify it. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 16, 2020); What Is the Difference Between Signing,
Ratification, and Accession of UN Treaties?, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBR. (Apr. 26, 2018),
http://ask.un.org/faq/14594. While becoming a signatory indicates a nation’s support in principle for the
tenets set forth in a treaty, ratification indicates the nation’s consent to be bound by the provisions.
Although most federal and state laws in the United States are consistent with the Convention’s provisions,
some are not. In particular, the legality of corporal punishment and harsh sentencing policies affecting
minors are cited as inconsistent with the Convention. Why Won’t America Ratify the UN Convention on
Children’s Rights?, ECONOMIST (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.economist.com/the-economistexplains/2013/10/06/why-wont-america-ratify-the-un-convention-on-childrens-rights.
184
Mary Gerisch, Health Care as a Human Right, 43 HUM. RTS. 2, 2 (2018); see also George J.
Annas & Wendy K. Mariner, (Public) Health and Human Rights in Practice, 41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 129, 136 (2016) (observing that the goals of the human rights and public health frameworks are
aligned “to promote human flourishing”); Andrea S. Christopher & Dominic Caruso, Promoting Health
as a Human Right in the Post-ACA United States, 17 AMA J. ETHICS 958, 958 (2015) (citing the World
Health Organization’s constitutional declaration for “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health” and noting that this “is one of the fundamental rights of every human being”); Benjamin Mason
Meier et al., Human Rights in Public Health: Deepening Engagement at a Critical Time, 20 HEALTH &
HUM. RTS. J. 85, 86 (2018) (citing and endorsing the United Nations World Health Organization
Constitution: “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights
of every human being”); Richard Smith et al., Shared Ethical Principles for Everybody in Health Care:
A Working Draft from Tavistock Group, 318 BMJ 248, 250 (1999) (listing health care as a human right
and an ethical principle that should govern healthcare systems).
185
See, e.g., KAREN DAVIS ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL: HOW
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY (2014),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_r
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we offer the less controversial and relatively straightforward proposition
that, where there exists a cost-effective high benefit/low risk intervention
that can protect a child from a serious and potentially life-threatening
disease, unjustified barriers to that child’s access to that intervention cannot
be given legal authority.186 Thus, in our view, allowing parents to block
children’s receipt of medically recommended vaccinations unfairly risks
those children’s right to health and life.187 As such, any analysis of the
interests of parents, children, and the state must recognize and weigh heavily
children’s independent interest in access to these easily available,
cost-effective, health-promoting, and life-preserving interventions.
ii.

Children’s Autonomy Interest in Making Certain Health
Care Decisions

There exist strong arguments that minors have a right to choose for
themselves in some health care contexts. The foundation for that right varies
across types of treatment as well in judicial analysis and scholarly
commentary. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in controlling one’s own procreative
processes extends to minor females.188 While the Court has indicated that
minors’ rights are not identical to those of adults because of the balance of
these rights with parental and state interests,189 minors clearly have a strong
interest in exercising some measure of personal choice in the context of
contraception, abortion, and prenatal health decisions. The Court has not
spoken directly as to whether minors have an interest in bodily integrity that
confers an autonomy interest in accessing or rejecting forms of treatment
other than those relating to procreation. It has, however, in cases involving
adults in other contexts, made clear that there exist rights to refuse

eport_2014_jun_1755_davis_mirror_mirror_2014.pdf (analyzing the performance of health care systems
in eleven countries).
186
B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1356 (2015)
(proposing a right to bodily integrity that, “[f]or younger minors, the right takes the form of a right to
bodily security or protection—broadly, a right to have their best interests protected by the state against
parents who fail to do so. For older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an autonomy right to
make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the extent that, they are capable of doing so”).
187
Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 1991) (“All children indisputably have the
right to enjoy a full and healthy life.”); (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 23,
Nov. 22, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (highlighting children’s rights “to enjoy a full and decent life”).
188
See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (recognizing a minor female’s constitutional
liberty interest in controlling her own procreative decisions); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (same).
189
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 418 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 422 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 622–23.
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life-saving interventions,190 psychotropic medications,191 and commitment
in a psychiatric hospital.192 Lower federal and state court decisions and state
statutes have clarified that competent adults have an almost unqualified right
to refuse treatment,193 except where doing so interferes with a weighty police
power interest.194 And while our legal system does not confer an
uncategorical and parallel right to receive treatment on all persons in all
situations, including minors, certain policies seek to reduce barriers to
treatment.195 Many scholars have argued that denial of available treatment
to requesting minors solely due to the individual’s minority unfairly deprives
minors of certain inherent human rights, whether or not those rights are
constitutionally protected.196
The concept of empowering minors to choose for themselves,
commensurate with their capacities for making competent health care
decisions, is not a new one.197 For example, many scholars have proposed
190
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held
that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially protected
by the Due Process Clause includes [various rights to obtain or refuse certain treatments] . . . . We have
also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse
unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990)
(“For purposes of this case, it is assumed that a competent person would have a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”).
191
See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133–34 (1992) (holding that there is a significant
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990) (same).
192
See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“[T]here is . . . no constitutional
basis for confining [mentally ill] persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can live safely
in freedom.”).
193
See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (“[A] patient
has the right to refuse any medical treatment or medical service . . . . This right exists even if its exercise
creates a ‘life threatening condition.’”).
194
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled principles, the police
power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by
legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety.”); Workman v. Mingo Cty.
Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 353–54 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[F]ollowing the reasoning
of Jacobson and Prince, we conclude that the West Virginia statute requiring vaccinations as a condition
of admission to school does not unconstitutionally infringe Workman’s right to free exercise.”); Boone
v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 955–56 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279)
(“[D]etermining that a person has a ‘liberty interest’ under the Due Process Clause does not end the
inquiry; whether [an individual’s] constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by
balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”).
195
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
sex, age, or disability in certain health programs or activities). See generally Children’s Health Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 21
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 25 U.S.C.).
196
See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
197
Although neuroscientific and psychological research have led scholars and the U.S. Supreme
Court to conclude that adolescents’ immaturity should preclude the imposition of the death penalty and
other harsh criminal sentences on minors, researchers and other scholars distinguish questions of
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such a principle, although there are a range of views as to what the triggering
circumstances and restrictions should be for reliance on minors’ capacities
as the bases for authorizing their independent health care decisionmaking.198
For all of the reasons discussed in Section II.A above, we do not propose a
comprehensive shift in the default framework that authorizes parents to
make health care decisions for their minor children. Yet, as the remainder of
this Section demonstrates, there are circumstances in which exceptions to
the default rule are warranted. Indeed, when it is determined that parents
should not be sole decision makers in a particular health care context, for
one reason or another, legislatures or courts must identify the alternative
mechanism by which the health care choice can be made.199 Depending on
the treatment context and other variables, such as the age and maturity of the
children in question, authorizing minors to make autonomous decisions
regarding their own health may be the most appropriate policy solution.200
In the specific context of the choice to vaccinate, we propose that as a
supplementary and alternative consent mechanism, older minors be
authorized to decide for themselves at the ages when their psychological
capacities have matured sufficiently to enable them to satisfy the legal
requirements for competent informed consent. As such, we bring our
proposal in line with various exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent
which operate in a manner analogous to our proposed exception. These
exceptions and others are discussed below in Section II.B.2. In addition, our
proposal is consistent with the relevant provisions of the first Restatement
of the Children and the Law. In 2019, the American Law Institute adopted
Section 19.01.201 Section 19.01 would authorize a minor “who is capable of
treatment decisionmaking capacity from those relevant to the criminal sentencing context. This
juxtaposition is addressed further below in Section III.B.2.
198
See, e.g., Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1136–
39 (arguing that in the context of most medical decisions, minors should have decisionmaking authority
consistent with their psychological capacities to decide competently); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent
Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000) (proposing that
adolescent decisionmaking autonomy correspond to decisional ability in a range of areas of law); Hill,
supra note 186, at 1356 (suggesting that “[f]or older, mature minors, the right becomes primarily an
autonomy right to make their own decisions about their bodies when, and to the extent that, they are
capable of doing so”); Rosato, supra note 132, at 804 (proposing varying levels of decisionmaking
autonomy of minors depending on those minors’ capacities and the nature and consequences of the
particular health care decision); Neelam Chhikara, Note, Extending the Practice of Physician-Assisted
Suicide to Competent Minors, 55 FAM. CT. REV. 430, 439 (2017) (proposing that physician aid in dying
laws be extended to minors who meet the same capacity standards as adults, with no requirement of
parental consent).
199
Lois A. Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence to Make Health Care Decisions
Matter?, PEDIATRICS (forthcoming in Special Issue Defining Cases in Pediatric Bioethics: Future
Insights from Past Controversies) (manuscript at 2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Weithorn, When
Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?].
200
Id.
201
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 19.01 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two
2019).
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giving informed consent to the proposed treatment” the authority to “consent
to routine, beneficial medical treatment.”202 As we have demonstrated in Part
I, ACIP-recommended vaccinations are indeed “routine” and “beneficial”
medical interventions.
2. The Exceptions
We identify three sets of circumstances justifying exceptions to the
doctrine of parental consent. These exceptions exist when legislatures or
courts determine that, relative to a particular health care decision, one or
more of the following conditions exists: (1) parents’ interests in exercising
authority over the child’s health care are outweighed by the state’s parens
patriae or police power interests in the child’s welfare and/or the child’s
independent (and possibly constitutionally protected) interests in health care
decisional autonomy; (2) the presumption that parents are acting, are capable
of acting, or are situated to act to promote their children’s best interests
relative to a health care decision does not accurately reflect the
circumstances; and/or (3) the presumption that minors are incompetent to
decide for themselves is not supported by the evidence. Importantly, though,
the third condition is typically not the sole basis on which an exception is
grounded. More commonly, the capacity of minors to decide for themselves
becomes relevant only after constitutional or policy considerations lead to
rejection or modification of the parental consent requirement.203 At that
point, the capacities of minors to decide becomes a factor in determining
what is the most appropriate alternative or supplementary decisional
structure. Should minors be empowered to choose or should others (such as
the court or a court-appointed guardian) be authorized to decide on the
minor’s behalf? We discuss below three primary alternative decisionmaking
mechanisms: medical neglect proceedings, the mature minor doctrine, and
treatment-specific statutory exceptions.
i.

State Dependency Statutes: Case-by-Case Substitution of
the State as Decisionmaker for the Child Under Medical
Neglect Provisions

All fifty states and the District of Columbia have created legal
mechanisms authorizing state intervention in the family in circumstances
when parents are determined to fall below minimum standards of caregiving
for their minor children.204 The state’s parens patriae and police power
202

Id.
Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?, supra note 199 (manuscript at 3).
204
SAMUEL M. DAVIS, ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, LOIS A. WEITHORN & WALTER WADLINGTON,
CHILDREN IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 439–600 (6th ed. 2020); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from
Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J.
1, 54 (2001) [hereinafter Weithorn, Protecting Children]; Weithorn, Envisioning, supra note 109, at
1323–24; see generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
203
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interests in protecting children from harm and risk of harm permit this
intrusion into the family. The procedures and substantive standards
delineating dependency system intervention must meet constitutional
requirements.205 The legal framework is grounded on a model that requires
individual case-by-case judicial findings of abuse or neglect prior to state
substitution as decision maker on any of a wide range of childrearing
matters, including health care decisions.206 If the court finds that there is
sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect for it to assume jurisdiction over the
child, the statutes confer on the state broad authority to regulate the child’s
life and to supervise the parents’ activities relative to the child.207 The
investigations, proceedings, and interventions are highly intrusive in the
family’s functioning and are premised on a finding of parental unfitness.208
As such, this type of intervention should be invoked only when necessary to
protect the child from serious harm, where other, less intrusive legal
strategies have not been, or are unlikely to be, effective. Such interventions
are most appropriate when parental failure to meet children’s health care
needs is but one aspect of a more pervasive pattern of a failure to meet
minimum caregiving standards or where ongoing state supervision of, and
intervention in, parenting appears necessary to protect the child. When the
only aspect of parenting that is endangering the child is the failure to
immunize children from vaccine-preventable diseases, such an option
should be viewed as an intervention of last resort and a preference given to
less intrusive options.209
DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
define.pdf (describing laws that define child abuse and neglect).
205
Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 778 (M.D. Ala. 1969); DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 522–
31; Weithorn, Protecting Children, supra note 204, at 63–64.
206
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 573–618; Martha Minow, Beyond State Intervention in the
Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 933, 937 (1985); Weithorn, Protecting Children,
supra note 204, at 12–13.
207
See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 204, at 513–650.
208
See Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of “Neglected” Children: Standards for
Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 625–27, 651 (1976).
209
Certain provisions within dependency statutes permit the state to override parental health care
decisions without finding parents neglectful, and thus permit a narrower and somewhat less intrusive
manner of state intervention. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01(35)(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019
First Regular Sess. of the 26th Legislature) (noting that in the context of a parental claim of religious
exemption for the decision not to provide medical treatment for a child, “a parent or legal custodian who,
by reason of the legitimate practice of religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical treatment for
a child may not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason alone, but such an exception does not
. . . [p]reclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, the provision of medical
services by a physician”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1627(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 First
Regular Sess. of the 65th Idaho Legislature 2019) (providing that “[a]t any time whether or not a child is
under the authority of the court, the court may authorize medical or surgical care for a child when . . . the
life of the child would be greatly endangered without certain treatment and the parent, guardian or other
custodian refuses or fails to consent”). Yet this approach requires the initiation of an adversarial dispute,
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A recent survey of state case law current through 2016 found nine cases
in which parental failure to vaccinate was alleged to constitute a ground for
medical neglect findings.210 Policy statements and analyses from committees
of the American Academy of Pediatrics indicate that resorting to medical
neglect proceedings is a disfavored response to parental non-vaccination of
children within the medical community.211
ii.

The “Mature Minor”: Generic Standards in Statute and Case
Law

The “mature minor” doctrine is a statutory or case law principle that
allows minors authority to consent to or reject medical treatment under
certain circumstances.212 As reviews of state statutes and applicable case law
reveal, there is substantial variability across the states in terms of whether
they have adopted any form of a “mature minor” rule and, if so, what the
parameters are of that rule.213 In those states that have adopted some version
of the principle and allow “mature minors” to make independent decisions
about general medical care, the doctrine will generally apply if minors have
reached a specified age or if judges or medical professionals determine them
to be sufficiently “mature” to make their own medical decisions.214
In one of the first scholarly analyses of the doctrine, published in 1973,
the late Professor Walter Wadlington observed that the cases to which the
rule had been applied generally involved older minors, that is, “[t]he
particular minor was near majority (or at least in the range of 15 years of age
upward), and was considered to have sufficient mental capacity to
understand fully the nature and importance of the medical steps proposed”
pitting the state against the parents and requiring judicial resolution. In light of the intrusiveness into the
family and the reliance on the state’s already overburdened child protection resources, dependency
system intervention is a disfavored mechanism for promoting vaccination policy when parents refuse to
immunize their children.
210
See Efthimios Parasidis & Douglas J. Opel, Parental Refusal of Childhood Vaccines and
Medical Neglect Laws, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH L. & ETHICS 68, 68 (2017) (reporting nine cases from
five states, with seven of the nine courts finding vaccine refusals to constitute medical neglect).
211
See, e.g., Douglas S. Diekema & Comm. on Bioethics, Responding to Parental Refusals of
Immunization of Children, 115 PEDIATRICS 1428, 1430 (2005) (recommending an educational approach
in response to parental refusal); Kathryn M. Edwards et al., Countering Vaccine Hesitancy, 138
PEDIATRICS e20162146, e11 (2016) (recommending, in addition, an educational approach in response to
parental refusal).
212
ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER, LEGAL ISSUES IN PEDIATRICS AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 133–
42 (2d ed. 1985); Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 787; Aviva L. Katz & Sally A. Webb, Informed
Consent in Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 PEDIATRICS e20161485, 4 (2016); Rosato, supra
note 132, at 779; Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547,
567 (2000); Walter Wadlington, Minors and Health Care: The Age of Consent, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
115, 117 (1973).
213
See, e.g., Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789–91 tbl.1 (detailing each state’s provision for
minors’ consent).
214
Id. at 789.
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and the “medical procedures could be characterized by the courts as
something less than ‘major’ or ‘serious’ in nature.”215 In the decades since
Professor Wadlington’s seminal article, the generic form of the doctrine has
not been widely adopted.216 Yet, the circumstances in which it has been
applied have, in limited instances, expanded to those in which the treatment
decision was both “major” and “serious,” such as allowing minors with good
prognoses to refuse lifesaving transfusions for religious reasons.217
States’ initial adoptions of “mature minor” rules were a means to
eliminate legal liability of health care professionals treating minors in
circumstances when parents were unavailable or unwilling to consent.218
Yet, in the last several decades, some commentators in the fields of law and
bioethics have asserted that minors should be authorized to make
autonomous decisions regarding their own bodies if they are psychologically
capable of making those decisions.219
Yet, the meaning of the term “maturity” in this context is not completely
clear.220 Some statutes and case law indicate or imply that the term
“maturity” in this context is a synonym for health care decisionmaking
capacity or competence.221 Treatment decisionmaking competence is
215

Wadlington, supra note 212, at 119.
See, e.g., Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789 (indicating that “14 states permit mature
minors to consent to general medical treatment either in all or a range of restricted circumstances, and 3
states allow minors regardless of their age or maturity to consent to treatment in either all or limited
circumstances”); Rosato, supra note 132, at 779–82 (observing that “[e]fforts to adopt a true mature
minor doctrine have been limited” and discussing the limitations of the doctrine within those states that
have statutes or recognized the doctrine in case law).
217
See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 323, 328 (Ill. 1989) (allowing a seventeen-year-old who
was determined by the court to be “mature,” to refuse lifesaving blood transfusions on religious grounds,
despite a predicted 80% likelihood of remission of leukemia with full treatment compliance); Douglas S.
Diekema, Adolescent Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment: Are We Asking the Right Questions?, 22
ADOLESCENT MED. 213, 213 (2011) (discussing the case of Dennis Lindberg, a fourteen-year-old with
leukemia who, like E.G., (1) objected to blood transfusions because of adherence to the tenets of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses; (2) had an excellent prognosis with treatment (predicted 70% chance of remission);
and (3) was determined by the court to be mature enough to make the treatment decision independently);
Weithorn, When Does a Minor’s Legal Competence Matter?, supra note 199 (manuscript at 12–13).
218
HOLDER, supra note 212, at 133–35; Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789.
219
See Hamilton, supra note 198, at 1136–39; Hartman, supra note 198, at 1269; Hill, supra note
186, at 1356; Rosato, supra note 132, at 804; Chhikara, supra note 198, at 439. The empirical research
revealing that older adolescents can demonstrate adult-like levels of psychological competence to make
treatment decisions is reviewed below. See infra notes 344–72 and accompanying text.
220
Shawna Benston, Not of Minor Consequence?: Medical Decision-Making Autonomy and the
Mature Minor Doctrine, 13 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 3–8 (2016); Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at
789–90.
221
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. of the
92d Arkansas General Assembly) (authorizing “[a]ny unemancipated minor of sufficient intelligence to
understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures”
to consent to such medical or surgical care for himself or herself); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4503 (West,
Westlaw through 2019 First Regular Sess. of the 65th Idaho Legislature) (authorizing “[a]ny person . . .
who comprehends the need for, the nature of and the significant risks ordinarily inherent in any
contemplated hospital . . . or other health care . . . to consent thereto on his or her own behalf” (emphasis
216
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generally viewed as a cognitive standard, emphasizing the individuals’
ability to understand, appreciate, and make decisions based on the treatment
information disclosed by the health care practitioner.222 The standard
competence inquiry is relatively circumscribed, focusing on capacity to
make the specific decision at issue, without a broader inquiry into the
patient’s life functioning in other spheres. It is that laid out by the
commentary to the 1979 Restatement of Torts (Second):
To be effective, the consent must be given by one who has the
capacity to give it or by a person empowered to consent for
him. If the person consenting is a child or one of deficient
mental capacity, the consent may still be effective if he is
capable of appreciating the nature, extent and probable
consequences of the conduct consented to, although the
consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible is not
obtained or is expressly refused.223
In 2019, the American Law Institute approved provisions of its new
Restatement of Children and the Law, and adopted the treatment
competence-oriented definition of a “mature minor” as one who is “capable
of giving informed consent to the proposed treatment.”224 The treatment
competence-oriented approach to maturity was articulated by the Maine
Supreme Court in In re Swan, when noting that “[c]apacity exists when the
minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks
and benefits.”225 The court then proceeded to cite the language of the
Restatement of Torts commentary above.226 Yet, in some cases, judges have
laid out two sets of standards: the more familiar treatment decisionmaking
competence or capacity standard and a broader maturity standard.227 This
broader maturity standard strives to capture a host of social, emotional, and
psychological factors in addition to cognitive health care decisionmaking
skills. For example, the Tennessee Supreme Court in Cardwell v. Bechtol
considered:
the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of
maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, [and] the conduct
added)); In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (per curium) (holding that a minor has capacity to
consent or refuse treatment when “the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and
weigh the risks and benefits” and “if he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable
consequences of the conduct consented to”).
222
See infra Section III.B.1.
223
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
224
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW §19.01 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two 2019).
225
569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (per curiam) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
226
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b (AM . LAW INST. 1979)).
227
See, e.g., Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836–37 (W. Va. 1992);
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987) (comparing standards).
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and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident involved.
Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the nature of the
treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and the
minor’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences are to
be considered.228
There is a rich body of scholarship and empirical research
operationalizing notions of treatment decisionmaking competence and
measuring minors’ capacities to make health care decisions. Yet, it is unclear
how an evaluator—whether a health care professional or a judge—should
assess the broad spectrum of additional variables cited in the above quotation
from Cardwell v. Bechtol. Indeed, in those cases in which the broader
“maturity” standard is suggested, the courts lay out an extraordinarily
sweeping and open-ended list of factors such as “age, ability, experience,
education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment.”229
The concept of “maturity” as a condition for independent health care
decisionmaking by minors has existed in the context of abortion law for
decades,230 and thus, theoretically, could serve as a useful model.
Unfortunately, the abortion context provides a poor guide or analogy for
delineating what “maturity” means, in that there is no consensus about, or
even systematic discussion of, the standard. Some have proposed that the
concept of maturity in the context of abortion be focused on competence to
make health care treatment decisions.231 Indeed, the Restatement of Children
and the Law adopts this competence-based definition of maturity in the
context of minor’s abortion decisionmaking.232
Yet, unfortunately, the controversial nature of abortion law in this
country, and the range of viewpoints about regulation of adolescent sexual
activity, appear to influence judicial assessments of minors’ maturity in the
courtroom. Indeed, some judges impose an unattainably high standard of

228

Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748.
Id.
230
In Bellotti v. Baird, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the parental consent requirement where
states provided a procedure allowing minors to demonstrate maturity to a judge as one means to bypass
the requirement. 443 U.S. 662, 623 (1979) (plurality opinion). Many states have, therefore, codified this
requirement. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-34-2-4(e) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Regular Sess. of
the 121st General Assembly) (allowing a minor to bypass parental consent requirement for abortion if
she can demonstrate to a court that she is mature enough to make the abortion decision, or that having
the abortion is in her best interests). Other sections of this statute were struck down as unconstitutional
in Planned Parenthood v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Health, 258 F. Supp. 3d 929 (S.D. Ind. 2017).
231
Gary B. Melton & Anita J. Pliner, Adolescent Abortion: A Psycholegal Analysis, in ADOLESCENT
ABORTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 1, 11–12, 18–19 (Gary B. Melton ed., 1986).
232
RESTATEMENT OF CHILDREN AND THE LAW §19.02 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft Two 2019)
(defining a “mature minor” as one who is “capable of giving informed consent to the proposed medical
treatment,” and authorizing mature minors to consent independently to abortion and to choose whether
her parents are notified of her choice).
229
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maturity233 seemingly entangled with judicial values and attitudes toward
abortion and teenage sexuality.234 Thus, the maturity standard applied in the
context of adolescent abortion provides a poor model for more general
application to minors’ health care decisionmaking.235
The inherent malleability of the concept of “maturity” as the key that
opens the door to health care decisionmaking choices for minors may allow
it to embody social preferences regarding access or barriers to treatment for
minors.236 The broader and vaguer the test of maturity, the greater is the
233

Indeed, Elizabeth Scott refers to the maturity test in the context of abortion bypass hearings to
be a “rather vague prescription” and “indeterminate legal standard,” and observes:
[J]udicial judgments about where the line between childhood and adulthood should
be drawn often seem to depend on attitudes about abortion and teen pregnancy. Some
conservative courts raise the bar very high, evaluating petitioners under a standard for
general maturity that most minors are unlikely to meet. One is sometimes left to
conclude that a “mature” minor would have consulted with her parents (and thus have
no need for the judicial by-pass procedure), and probably would never have been
foolish enough to become pregnant. Other courts appear to rubber-stamp petitions by
pregnant teens [and seem] motivated largely by a paternalistic concern for the health
and welfare of pregnant minors [who may otherwise go on to become teen parents],
rather than by any deference for adolescent autonomy.
Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 574–75
(2000) (internal citations omitted).
234
For example, Carol Sanger indicates:
To determine if [a minor] is mature enough [to make the abortion decision], a number
of judges ask what they consider to be relevant questions about her circumstances.
These often include such questions as why she got pregnant, whether she knows about
birth control now so that this will not happen again, and why she will not involve her
parents in the process. . . . I suspect that the purpose of these hearings is less an attempt
to assure a sound decision regarding the abortion than it is an attempt to humiliate
young women—in old socio-legal terms, it is an attempt to use the process itself as
punishment. The court is supposed to be making a maturity determination, but in
looking through cases where petitions have been denied, it is evident that something
more than a display of maturity is sought. Some indication or display of contrition or
remorse is also valued, and rewarded.
Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 107, 111–12
(2001) (internal citations omitted). See also Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 499 (2009) (further developing the
theme that judicial bypass hearings serve to punish pregnant teens rather than play an evaluative
function).
235
Coleman and Rosoff suggest that the criteria used to assess maturity in the abortion context are
reasonable for assessing minors’ maturity to make health care decisions more generally. Coleman &
Rosoff, supra note 15, at 792 (citing “aspects of the child’s development and experience including age,
level of education, success in school, engagement in work or other extracurricular activities, disciplinary
issues, and future plans”). As in the context of abortion, however, broad criteria invite greater subjectivity
in application. Furthermore, policy considerations may argue for different standards of maturity in
different treatment contexts. As discussed below, standards and thresholds of maturity or competence
may most appropriately vary with the risk/benefit profile of the intervention in question.
236
Michelle Oberman suggests that the concept of maturity in the context of health care
decisionmaking “operates as a code word, invoked to permit minors access to treatments that society
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likelihood that it will serve as a repository for unstated values either about
the treatment in question or minors’ access to or refusal of it. A narrower
and more specific standard of maturity, such as one that focuses on skills
and abilities traditionally associated with capacity to make health care
decisions, can be more easily operationalized and assessed.
iii.

Treatment-Specific
Statutes
Authorizing
Independent Access to Treatment

Minors’

Throughout the past several decades, legislatures have lowered the age
of legal consent for minors’ access to certain health care interventions,
primarily with respect to access to services for contraception, abortion, teen
pregnancy, mental health and substance abuse disorders, sexually
transmitted diseases, and sexual assault.237 In contrast to dependency
determinations, these exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent are not
premised on a finding of parental unfitness and do not subject the family to
intrusive investigation and regulation. Rather, most are narrowly tailored
authorizations for minors to choose for themselves in contexts in which there
are strong social interests in promoting minors’ access to services.
The rationales for such statutory enactments include a complex mix of
constitutional, policy, and practical factors that vary across the types of
health care involved. However, there are many commonalities among these
exceptions. First, and importantly, the state has strong parens patriae and
police power interests in minors’ receipt of the services specified in most of
these exceptions,238 to be discussed in greater detail with respect to each of
deems desirable,” and to limit access when there exist social concerns about potential negative
consequences. Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 127 (1996).
She asserts that the “present system works not because minors are mature, but because of the tacit
utilitarian calculus that govern minors’ access to care.” Id.
237
Some of these legislative changes related to access to contraception and abortion specifically
preceded, while others followed federal and state court decisions delineating the parameters of minors’
constitutional rights to these services without parental consent and, in some cases, without notice to
parents. See, e.g., Maya Manian, Minors, Parents, and Minor Parents, 81 MO. L. REV. 127, 133–46
(2016).
238
We recognize that abortion is a form of treatment about which there is substantial controversy
in this country, and therefore acknowledge that some would challenge the premise that a state has an
interest in facilitating minors’ access. Indeed, some state legislatures have recently sought to limit or
eliminate the availability of abortion, indicating a view that such availability is not in the state’s interest.
See Sabrina Tavernise, “The Time is Now”: States Are Rushing to Restrict Abortion, or to Protect It,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html
(discussing states’ approaches to the issue).
Analysis of the right to abortion, unlike the other treatment categories listed here, is made more
complex by the state’s acknowledged interest in protecting the future life of the fetus, as well as the
concern by some that abortion decisions may have deleterious emotional repercussions for women. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the
infant life they once created and sustained . . . . Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow . . . a
decision so fraught with emotional consequence . . . .”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
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the exceptions below. Of course, the state has such interests in many forms
of treatment for which there are not statutory exceptions authorizing
independent consent by minors. Thus, other factors converge with these state
interests to explain why states allow minors to consent to these services.
Second, one distinction between these treatment contexts and the
run-of-the-mill treatment for appendicitis or strep throat lies in the
“sensitive” nature of services related to sexual activity, pregnancy, mental
health, substance abuse, or sexual assault. While many parents may be fully
supportive of their minor children who seek to access these services, others
may be less so. The presumption, discussed above,239 that there is an identity
of interests between parent and child, does not hold when an older minor
seeks to access services and his or her parent wants to prevent such access.
Arguably, in these circumstances, a conflict of interests exists, undercutting
one of the bases on which the doctrine of parental consent is premised.240 In
an influential 1973 article, Hillary Rodham argued that:
(1992) (“Abortion is . . . fraught with consequences for others: for the woman who must live with the
implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse,
family, and society which must confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some
deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on one’s beliefs,
for the life or potential life that is aborted.”). Some Justices suggest these asserted effects are enhanced
for minors. See, e.g., H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 411 (1981) (“The medical, emotional, and
psychological consequences of an abortion are serious and can be lasting; this is particularly so when the
patient is immature.”).
Yet, these assertions by some members of the Court have been challenged by other Justices citing
research analyzed by key scientific organizations. See, e.g., Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 183–84 n.7 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (citing psychological literature contradicting majority assertions). See also M. Antonia
Biggs et al., Women’s Mental Health and Well-Being 5 Years After Receiving or Being Denied an
Abortion: A Prospective, Longitudinal Cohort Study, 74 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 169, 169 (2017) (“[B]eing
denied an abortion may be associated with initially experiencing adverse psychological outcomes.”);
Diana Greene Foster et al., Comparison of Health, Development, Maternal Bonding and Poverty Among
Children Born After Denial of Abortion vs After Pregnancies Subsequent to an Abortion, 172 JAMA
1053,
1053
(2018)
(“[A]ccess
to
abortion
enables
PEDIATRICS
women to choose to have children at a time when they have more financial and emotional
resources to devote to their children.”); BIXBY CTR. FOR GLOB. REPROD. HEALTH, UCSF, TURNAWAY
STUDY, https://www.ansirh.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/turnaway_study_brief_web.pdf (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020) (summary of findings) (“Abortion does not increase women’s risk of having
suicidal thoughts, or the chance of developing PTSD, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, or lower life
satisfaction.”). Studies examining mental health and life circumstances of women who had abortions
during adolescence or prior to age twenty-one report no greater likelihood of detrimental mental health
consequences for those who had abortions as compared with women who had continued an unintended
pregnancy. Jocelyn T. Warren, S. Marie Harvey & Jillian T. Henderson, Do Depression and Low
Self-Esteem Follow Abortion Among Adolescents? Evidence from a National Study, 42 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 230, 233 (2010); David M. Fergusson, Joseph M. Boden & L. John
Horwood, Abortion Among Young Women and Subsequent Life Outcomes, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 11 (2007).
239
See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
240
See Jennifer Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should Make Health
Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 43 (2000) (arguing for
a “conflict of interest exception” when the interests of the family do not coincide with those of the
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[T]he presumption of identity of interests between parents and
their children should be rejected whenever the child has
interests demonstrably independent of those of his parents (as
determined by the consequences to both of the action in
question), and a competent child should be permitted to assert
his or her own interests.241
These statutory exceptions attempt to address this type of scenario.
A third, and related, barrier to care exists. Many minors are hesitant to
inform their parents of their need for services if it requires disclosing that
they are sexually active, that they are experiencing mental or emotional
problems, that they are using or abusing certain substances, or that they have
been victims of sexual assault. These are sensitive matters, and many minors
would rather forego seeking treatment than involve their parents.242 Even
when minors do not fear adverse parental reactions, they may be
uncomfortable or embarrassed about talking with their parents about these
issues and therefore refrain from such discussions. In some cases, minors
may suspect, accurately or inaccurately, that their parents will deny consent
for, or otherwise prevent them from accessing, these services. In other cases,
the minors may fear negative repercussions from disclosure to parents.243
They may fear being “grounded” or having their conduct otherwise
restricted. They may fear other disciplinary measures or reprisals, or perhaps
even physical or emotional abuse by their parents. Regardless of the
accuracy of minors’ concerns about informing their parents of their need for
treatment, the concerns create barriers. Parents are not capable of acting in
their children’s best interests if their children do not inform them of their
needs. An alternative consent mechanism to promote the minors’ best
interests must exist as a supplement to parental consent. The statutory
exceptions create such an alternative.

patient).
241

Rodham, supra note 127, at 507.
Janine P. Felsman, Eliminating Parental Consent and Notification for Adolescent HIV Testing:
A Legitimate Statutory Response to the AIDS Epidemic, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 339, 383 (1996) (“[M]inors may
forego HIV testing rather than reveal their high risk behavior to their parents.”); Doris G. Kaplan, Right
of Privacy of Minors: Statutory Self-Consent in Oklahoma, 54 OKLA. B.J. 1724, 1728 (1983) (stating
that “the minor, threatened with revealing sensitive personal problems may forego treatment to avoid
conflict, abuse or alienation at home”). See also supra notes 245, 290–95, 303–09 and accompanying
text and Section III.C.
243
H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 438–39 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that
“[m]any minor women will encounter interference from their parents[,]” “parental disappointment and
disapproval,” or “physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support, or actual obstruction of
the abortion decision”); Melissa Weddle & Patricia K. Kokotailo, Confidentiality and Consent in
Adolescent Substance Abuse: An Update, 7 ETHICS JAMA 239, 240 (2005) (noting that among
adolescents who do not involve parents in health care decisions, some “have experienced violence within
the family, and they fear incurring violence” if parents are involved in the treatment process).
242
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Fourth, as discussed in Section II.B.1.ii, there exist constitutional,
bioethical, and policy rationales for permitting minors to exercise autonomy
and choose for themselves in the health care matters for which these
exceptions exist.
Fifth, the presumption that adolescents are not capable of making wise
decisions regarding their own medical care has not been confirmed by the
relevant science. Below, we review the state of knowledge regarding
children’s competence to consent to treatment.244 In general, research
indicates that most adolescents are psychologically capable of making health
care decisions in a manner that satisfies legal standards of competence. The
ages at which these abilities are sufficiently adult-like to meet such standards
typically coincide with the ages identified by those statutes creating
treatment-specific exceptions at the age of consent. While other statutes
creating treatment-specific exceptions may not identify an age of consent,
there appears to be substantial overlap in age between minors who are likely
to seek the services made available to them under the statutes and those who
are likely to be competent to consent. For example, data reveal that most
minors who are sexually active are usually age fifteen or older.245 Abuse of
alcohol and drugs by minors usually begins in adolescence as well.246
Although mental health problems and victimization by sexual assault can
occur throughout minority, there are higher rates of both problems in
adolescence than at younger ages.247 Given that studies suggest that minors
have developed decisionmaking skills that enable them to satisfy legal tests
244

See infra Section III.B.3.
Guttmacher Inst., American Teens’ Sexual and Reproductive Health Fact Sheet, SANDERS INST.
(Aug. 2017), available at https://www.sandersinstitute.com/blog/american-teens-sexual-andreproductive-health-fact-sheet.
245

On average, young people in the United States have sex for the first time at about age
17, but do not marry until their mid-20s.
In 2011–2013, among unmarried 15–19-year-olds, 44% of females and 49% of males
had had sexual intercourse. These levels have remained steady since 2002.
The proportion of young people having sexual intercourse before age 15 has declined
in recent years. In 2011–2013, about 13% of never-married females aged 15–19 and
18% of never-married males in that age-group had had sex before age 15, compared
with 19% and 21%, respectively, in 1995.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
246
Principles of Adolescent Substance Disorder Treatment: A Research-Based Guide, NAT’L
INSTITUTES HEALTH, https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/principles-adolescent-substance-usedisorder-treatment-research-based-guide/introduction (last updated Jan. 2014).
247
See, e.g., Children and Teens: Statistics, RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK (RAINN),
available at https://www.rainn.org/statistics/children-and-teens (indicating that two-thirds of the sexual
assaults of minors involve adolescent victims); Data and Statistics on Children’s Mental Health,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/childrensmentalhealth/data.html
(revealing that adolescence is the stage of minority in which the highest rates of depression and anxiety
occur).
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of competence by age fourteen, and in many cases, by ages twelve or
thirteen,248 it is likely that most minors seeking the services for which the
statutory exceptions are created would meet legal standards of
competence.249
The following types of health care services are those most commonly
the subject of exceptions that allow minors to access services without
parental consent: (1) contraception; (2) prenatal care; (3) abortion; (4)
testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS); (5) substance abuse or mental health treatment; and (6)
sexual assault related services, including counseling, testing, and medical
care. 250

248

See infra Section III.B.3.
Below, we also discuss further the question of what threshold should exist in competence
determinations. See infra Section III.B.3. As we indicate, the dividing line between competence and
incompetence is a policy choice that reflects analysis of competing legal, bioethical, and practical factors.
To the extent that there is a strong social interest in promoting minors’ access to certain services, and
these services expose minors to low levels of risk, and are likely to provide a high level of benefit, the
threshold for capacity may be placed somewhat lower than it would for health care interventions invoking
less compelling social interests and/or with different risk/benefit profiles. See infra notes 367–69 and
accompanying text.
250
Two categories of exceptions are not discussed here. First, there is a limited exception to the
requirement of parental consent for emergency care. This exception has existed for over a century. See
HOLDER, supra note 212, at 125 n.6. We do not include it within the treatment-specific exceptions listed
here because it is not specific to minors, and therefore does not provide a useful analogy for our proposed
exception to the parental consent requirement in the context of vaccinations. It applies to patients of all
ages, and is a mechanism that allows health care providers to dispense with informed consent
requirements for a condition risking serious injury or death, where the treatment is one for which it can
be reasonably presumed the patient would have given consent and “the time it would take to offer an
informed consent would significantly increase the patient’s risk of mortality and morbidity.” STEPHEN
WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BENEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTH
CARE 156–57 (2d ed. 1998). See also Kurt M. Hartman & Bryan D. Liang, Exceptions to Informed
Consent in Emergency Medicine, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1999, at 53, 54–55. In the case of an adult, the
patient may be competent, but there is no time to go through the informed consent process without serious
detrimental consequences. Alternatively, the patient may be unconscious or otherwise unable to provide
legally valid consent, and delaying treatment to contact a substitute decision maker seriously risks the
patient’s health. Thus, as applied to minors, it allows providers to treat a child of any age whose
circumstances meet the criteria without waiting until parents can be reached for consent. HOLDER, supra
note 212, at 125.
Second, we do not address the emancipation exception, which gives minors who are legally
emancipated the sole authority to consent to their own health care. Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in
Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. REV. 55, 70 (2016) (“Emancipated minors step into the shoes of their
parents, exercising for themselves the authority that parents would normally exercise over them.”). See
generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern
Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 258–60 (1992). Typically, conduct that is consistent with
assumption of adult responsibilities or roles (such as financial independence, marriage, military service)
serves as the basis for a determination that the minor is emancipated. This exception is not relevant to
our proposal because we are not positing that minors’ access to vaccinations independent of parental
consent be contingent on a determination that the minor is emancipated.
249
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Contraception

Public health efforts over several decades, including the development
and proliferation of sex education curricula, have sought to reduce teen
pregnancy.251 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report that
“[t]een pregnancy and childbearing bring substantial social and economic
costs through immediate and long-term impacts on teen parents and their
children.”252 For example, according to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention:
Pregnancy and birth are significant contributors to high school
dropout rates among girls. Only about 50% of teen mothers
receive a high school diploma by 22 years of age, whereas
approximately 90% of women who do not give birth during
adolescence graduate from high school.
The children of teenage mothers are more likely to have lower
school achievement and to drop out of high school, have more
health problems, be incarcerated at some time during
adolescence, give birth as a teenager, and face unemployment
as a young adult.253
Clearly, the state’s parens patriae and police power interests are
implicated in preventing teen pregnancy, as are the interests of minors who
could become pregnant and the interests of the children they might bear.
Facilitating minors’ access to contraception furthers these parens patriae
and police power goals of reducing the burdens accompanying teen
pregnancy, for those directly affected, and the general public that will share
many of the costs of teen pregnancies. Sex education programs together with
adolescent access to family planning services are credited with reducing the
teen birth rate by 64% between 1991 and 2015, resulting in an estimated
“$4.4 billion in public savings in 2015 alone.”254
In addition, availability of certain forms of contraception also reduces
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.255 Almost half of the cases of
such diseases in the United States are in the adolescent and young adult
groups, ages fifteen to twenty-four.256 Researchers attribute this
251
Comm. on Adolescent Health Care, Adolescent Pregnancy, Contraception, and Sexual Activity,
AM. C. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (May 2017), https://www.acog.org/Clinical-Guidance-andPublications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Adolescent-Health-Care/Adolescent-PregnancyContraception-and-Sexual-Activity?IsMobileSet=false.
252
Reproductive Health: Teen Pregnancy, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/about/index.htm (last reviewed Mar. 1, 2019).
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Comm. on Adolescent Health Care, supra note 251.
256
Guttmacher Inst., supra note 245.
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disproportionality to “disparities in accessing preventive information and
services,”257 revealing the dramatic effects of barriers to care.
The Guttmacher Institute reports that as of October 2019, twenty-three
states and the District of Columbia expressly allow all minors to consent
independently to contraceptive services.258 Twenty-four states allow minors
to consent independently to contraceptive services if certain conditions are
met.259 For example, eight of these states permit minors who are deemed to
be “mature” or who have reached the age of twelve or fourteen years old to
consent.260 Most of these states permit minors who are married to consent.261
Four states do not have a statutory policy on minors’ consent for
contraceptive services.262
v.

Prenatal Care

Adequate prenatal care for minors promotes their own health during
pregnancy and childbearing and gives their offspring the best chance at a
healthy future.263 Concern about their own parents’ reactions to the
pregnancy has been cited as one of the reasons why minors delay accessing
prenatal care. 264 As of October 2019, thirty-seven states and the District of
Columbia permit minors to have independent access to prenatal services,
although fifteen of those states permit, but do not require, notification of
such services to the pregnant minors’ parents.265
vi.

Abortion

As noted above, teen pregnancy entails medical and social risks for the
adolescent and her future offspring, as well as substantial economic costs to

257

Id.
Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-contraceptive-services.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
See id. (reporting that nineteen of the twenty-four states allow a married minor to consent to
contraceptive services).
262
Id.
263
See, e.g., Byron C. Calhoun, Healthy Management of Very Early Adolescent Pregnancy,
31 ISSUES L. & MED. 191, 195 (2016) (reporting that early prenatal care may help prevent adverse
outcomes in adolescent pregnancy); Katherine Moore, Pregnant in Foster Care: Prenatal Care,
Abortion, and the Consequences for Foster Families, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 29, 64 (2012)
(demonstrating efficacy of early intervention programs serving minors).
264
See Sally Hughes Lee & Laurie M. Grubbs, Pregnant Teenagers’ Reasons for Seeking or
Delaying Prenatal Care, 4 CLINICAL NURSING RES. 38, 42 (1995) (reporting findings that 41.6% of teens
delayed prenatal care because of fear that their pregnancies would be disclosed to their parents).
265
See Minors’ Access to Prenatal Care, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/minors-access-prenatal-care (reporting that fifteen of
the thirty-seven states allow physicians to maintain the minor’s confidentiality if doing so is in the best
interest of the minor).
258
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these individuals and the public.266 The American Academy of Pediatrics
asserts that, in addition to pregnancy prevention efforts, legal policies should
permit medically safe pregnancy termination when minors seek to end an
unintended pregnancy.267 In a 2017 Policy Statement, the Academy stated:
The American Medical Association, the Society for
Adolescent Health and Medicine, the American Public Health
Association, the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, the AAP, and other health professional
organizations have reached a consensus that a minor should
not be compelled or required to involve her parents in her
decision to obtain an abortion, although she should be
encouraged to discuss the pregnancy with her parents and/or
other responsible adults. These conclusions result from
objective analyses of current data, which indicate that
legislation mandating parental involvement does not achieve
the intended benefit of promoting family communication but
does increase the risk of harm to the adolescent by delaying
access to appropriate medical care or increasing the rate of
unwanted births.268
State laws governing minors’ access to abortion are complex, revealing
many variations among states.269 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that if a
state requires parental consent for abortion, it must provide minors with an
option to bypass parental consent, such as the opportunity to demonstrate to
a judge that she is mature enough to make her own abortion decision or that
the abortion is in her best interests.270 Some states, however, while allowing
minors to consent independently to abortion, require notification of the
minors’ parents.271 This type of provision has been upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court, as long as the laws contain certain exceptions identified by
the Court, such as a judicial bypass procedure.272 As of October 1, 2019,
266
See Reproductive Health: Teen Pregnancy, supra note 252 (illustrating the substantial social
and economic costs of teen pregnancy).
267
Am. Acad. Of Pediatrics Comm. on Adolescence, The Adolescent’s Right to Confidential Care
When Considering Abortion, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2017), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/
pediatrics/139/2/e20163861.full.pdf.
268
Id. at 2.
269
See Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/parental-involvement-minors-abortions
(reporting
patterns in state regulation of minors’ access to abortions).
270
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 643–44 (1979).
271
Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 269.
272
See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 327 (2006) (holding
unconstitutional a New Hampshire parental notification statute that does not allow a physician to perform
an abortion at a minor’s request in a medical emergency without parental notification); Ohio v. Akron
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 502 (1990) (upholding an Ohio statutory provision requiring a
physician to notify the parent of a minor prior to performing an abortion, unless the minor is able to
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twenty-six states required parental consent for minors’ abortions, and eleven
states required notification only.273 In three parental consent states, and three
parental notification states, the policies have been judicially enjoined and
are not in effect.274 Seven of the states that require either parental consent or
notification allow other relatives, such as a grandparent, to substitute for the
parent at the minor’s request.275 The remaining states do not have parental
consent or notification requirements for minors’ access to abortion.
The parental involvement laws and the required judicial bypass
procedure have been the subject of much criticism because of barriers and
burdens that attend this process, the inconsistency in standards applied in
adjudicating maturity and best interests, and the lack of evidence that the
policies have a positive impact on teenagers’ sexual and reproductive health,
promote better decisionmaking about abortion by teenagers, or improve
parent-child communication.276 Research reveals that teenagers seeking
abortions without parental consent may face challenging and potentially
insurmountable barriers, including locating a judge who conducts abortion
by-pass hearings, finding transportation to the courthouse (particularly in
rural states), taking time off from school, and dealing with the challenges of
presenting their case to the judge.277 Furthermore, the process can be
“traumatic and stress inducing” and may lead to delay in receiving services,
with deleterious medical and psychological repercussions.278
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence in a judicial bypass hearing that she is mature enough to
make the abortion decision on her own, that the notice is not in her best interests, or that she has been a
victim of abuse perpetrated by a parent); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 417 (1990) (upholding
as constitutional a Minnesota statute that required that notice be given to both parents of a minor prior to
performing an abortion, as long as the statute provides for a judicial bypass procedure); H. L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 398 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a statutory requirement that a physician
notify the parents of an unmarried, dependent girl prior to performing an abortion as applied to a girl who
was immature and unemancipated).
273
See Parental Involvement in Minors’ Abortions, supra note 269 (reporting that twenty-one states
require parental consent, three of which require both parents’ consent and five of which require both
parental notification and consent).
274
See id. (reporting that courts permanently enjoined enforcement of statutes in Alabama,
California, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico, and temporarily enjoined the Montana statute).
275
Id.
276
See Maya Manian, Functional Parenting and Dysfunctional Abortion Policy: Reforming
Parental Involvement Legislation, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 241, 244–46 (2012) (analyzing the inefficacy of the
judicial bypass procedure in improving outcomes for pregnant teens); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity:
Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 414 (2009)
(arguing that the judicial bypass process is unnecessary and works to humiliate and insult young women).
277
See IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL KURTZ & LOIS A. WEITHORN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 1203–04 (5th ed. 2010); Manian, supra note 276, at 244; Sanger, supra note 276, at 439; see
also AMANDA DENNIS ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., THE IMPACT OF LAWS REQUIRING PARENTAL
INVOLVEMENT FOR ABORTION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 1 (2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/parentalinvolvementlaws.pdf (finding that parental involvement laws increase
minors’ interstate travel to avoid these restrictions).
278
See Manian, supra note 276, at 244 (describing the stress experienced by minors undergoing the
judicial bypass process); Sanger, supra note 276, at 429, 461 (asserting that the judicial bypass process
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vii.

Sexually
Transmitted
Immunodeficiency Virus

Diseases

[Vol. 52:2

and

Human

Sexually
transmitted
diseases
(STDs),
including
human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS), are infectious diseases spread through human sexual contact. They
can lead to serious, and at times deadly, consequences if untreated.279 Most
of these conditions are responsive to treatment.280 Timely medical care for
minors who have been exposed to these conditions is essential to promote
the health of a minor seeking services and others who have been, or but for
timely medical intervention might be, exposed to these contagious diseases.
Research surveying the attitudes of teens toward seeking needed services for
STDs reveals that the adolescents’ fears of their parents’ reactions could lead
them to avoid seeking medical services.281 Researchers emphasize the
importance of providing minors with independent access to services for
STDs and with guarantees of confidentiality.282
All fifty states and the District of Columbia provide some form of access
by minors to prevention, testing, or treatment services related to STDs and
HIV without parental consent. Some states permit, but do not require,
practitioner notification of parents.283
viii.

Mental Health or Substance Abuse Treatment

One in five adolescents has suffered from a serious mental health
disorder at some point during his or her minority.284 Despite the existence of
effective treatments, fewer than half of adolescents with such conditions

does not have beneficial medical or psychological implications for teens); see also DENNIS ET AL., supra
note 277, at 1 (reporting study findings that judicial bypass requirements lead minors to travel to states
with less restrictive abortion policies). For a qualitative study of teens who made abortion decisions
without involving their parents, see J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives:
Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 65 (2003).
279
See CDC Fact Sheets, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION: SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASES (STDS), https://www.cdc.gov/std/healthcomm/fact_sheets.htm (containing fact
sheets on various STDs).
280
Id.
281
Jami S. Leichliter et al., Confidentiality Issues and Use of Sexually Transmitted Disease Services
Among Sexually Experienced Persons Aged 15–25 Years—United States, 2013–2015, 66 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 237, 237, 239–40 (2017).
282
Id. at 240; Gale R. Burstein et al., Position Paper: Confidentiality Protections for Adolescents
and Young Adults in the Health Care Billing and Insurance Claims Process, 58 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH
374, 375 (2016), https://www.jahonline.org/article/S1054-139X(15)00723-5/pdf.
283
Minors’ Consent Laws for HIV and STD Services, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/states/minors.html (last updated Nov. 30, 2018).
284
Office of Adolescent Health, Mental Health in Adolescents, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES,
https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/adolescent-development/mental-health/index.html
(last
reviewed Feb. 24, 2017).
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seek treatment.285 Research indicates that “[m]ental and substance use
disorders are the leading cause of disability in children and youth
worldwide,” surpassing other medical conditions.286 More generally, we
have learned in recent years that mental health conditions are among the
most costly—and are perhaps even the most costly—category of illnesses in
terms of its lifetime burden of disability.287 One of the reasons for this effect
is that, unlike heart disease and many other chronic medical conditions,
mental health disorders often present early in life and can limit the
opportunities for full and healthy participation in various spheres for those
affected throughout the lifespan.288 Early diagnosis and treatment is in the
interests of both the person with the condition and of society at large. In
addition, rates of suicidality (considering, attempting, and committing
suicide) among adolescents are high.289 Related to mental health conditions,
use and abuse of various illicit substances by adolescents is common,
unfortunately, and presents a myriad of short- and long-term risks to those
using such substances, including detrimental effects on the developing
brain.290 Medical professionals indicate that early intervention is essential to
give minors the best opportunity at a healthy life and to avoid or recover
from damaging physical and psychological effects of substance abuse.291
In the context of both mental health and substance abuse treatment,
concerns about confidentiality constitute significant barriers, and are
perceived by mental health and medical professionals as a deterrent to
adolescent help-seeking.292 Unfortunately, in our society, there is substantial
stigma associated with mental disorders, leading to bias, discrimination, and
285

Id.
H.E. Erskine et al., A Heavy Burden on Young Minds: The Global Burden of Mental and
Substance Use Disorders in Children and Youth, 45 PSYCHOL. MED. 1551, 1558 (2015) (emphasis
added).
287
See, e.g., Sebastian Trautmann et al., The Economic Costs of Mental Disorders: Do Our Societies
React Appropriately to the Burden of Mental Disorders?, 17 EMBO REP. 1245, 1247 (2016) (“Mental
disorders therefore account for more economic costs than chronic somatic diseases such as cancer or
diabetes, and their costs are expected to increase exponentially over the next 15 years.”); Daniel Vigo et
al., Estimating the True Global Burden of Mental Illness, 3 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 171, 171 (2016)
(calculating that mental illness accounts for one-third of the world burden of disability, placing it well
ahead of any other category of disorders).
288
Erskine et al., supra note 286, at 1551–52 (“Half of all cases of mental disorders develop by age
14 years although most remain undetected and untreated until later in life.”).
289
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUICIDE 1–2 (2015), https://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/suicide-datasheet-a.pdf; S.K. GOLDSMITH, REDUCING SUICIDE: A NATIONAL
IMPERATIVE 33–58 (2002).
290
AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, SUBSTANCE USE SCREENING AND INTERVENTION IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE 2–3, 16–19 apps. 2, 3, https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/substance_use_screening
_implementation.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
291
Id.
292
See, e.g., id. at 8–9; Amelia Gulliver, Kathleen M. Griffiths & Helen Christiansen, Perceived
Barriers to Mental Health Help-Seeking in Young People: A Systematic Review, 10 BMC PSYCHIATRY
113 (2010).
286
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a range of social and psychological repercussions.293 The evidence for
stigma is even greater in the context of substance abuse disorders.294 These
biases create barriers to treatment because individuals hesitate to seek
services, in part due to fear of the negative repercussions that might flow
from disclosure of their conditions to others.295 Adolescents seeking such
treatments may refrain from discussing their need for treatment with parents.
If not guaranteed the same confidentiality as is promised to adults seeking
mental health and substance abuse treatment, minors will likely be reluctant
to contact providers.296
Most states contain an exception to the doctrine of parental consent for
substance abuse and mental health treatment.297 In some instances, either
parent or child can legally consent to such treatment. Statutes authorizing
minors’ consent may set a minimum age, typically twelve or fourteen years
of age,298 although New Jersey recently passed legislation authorizing such
independent consent at age sixteen.299
293
See GOLDSMITH, supra note 289, at 332–34 (reporting survey results indicating that 45–60% of
Americans wanted to distance themselves from persons with depression or schizophrenia).
294
Id. at 333; Sarah Wakeman & Josiah Rich, Barriers to Medications for Addiction Treatment:
How Stigma Kills, 53 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 330, 330 (2018).
295
Patrick W. Corrigan et al., The Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on Seeking and Participating in
Mental Health Care, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 37, 42–43 (2014).
296
MaryLouise E. Kerwin et al., What Can Parents Do? A Review of State Laws Regarding
Decision Making for Adolescent Drug Abuse and Mental Health Treatment, 24 J. CHILD ADOLESCENT
SUBSTANCE ABUSE 166, 167 (2015).
297
See, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Adolescent Decision Making: Legal Issues with Respect to Treatment
for Substance Misuse and Mental Illness, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 75, 90 (2012) (discussing
“statutory exceptions to the default rule”); Kerwin et al., supra note 296, at 16–17 tbl.1; Tori Lallemont,
Anna Mastroianni & Thomas M. Wickizer, Decision-Making Authority and Substance Abuse Treatment
for Adolescents: A Survey of State Laws, 44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 323, 323 (2009) (discussing how
“[s]ome states have carved out exceptions” to the doctrine of parental consent). States vary in the ages at
which minors can consent to substance abuse treatment independently, as well as whether confidentiality
is promised. Kerwin et al., supra note 296, at 16–17 tbl.1; Pedro Weisleder, Inconsistency Among
American States on the Age at Which Minors Can Consent to Substance Abuse Treatment, 35 J. AM .
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 317, 319 (2007). One survey found that thirty-one states permit a minor of any
age to consent to alcohol or drug abuse treatment, while another additional thirteen states permit minors
of specified ages to obtain such services without parental consent. Boldt, supra, at 90–92.
298
See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-14 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess.)
(authorizing health care professionals to consult with or provide medications to minors age fifteen or
older seeking services for mental health or substance abuse without parental consent); OR. REV. STAT. §
109.675 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Sess. and 2018 Special Sess. of the 79th Legislative
Assembly) (same at age fourteen).
299
Ray Glier, Seeking Mental Health Support: Teens Help Pass New Law to Access Mental Health
Care Without Parental Consent, YOUTH TODAY (Mar. 14, 2016), https://youthtoday.org/2016/03/
seeking-mental-health-support-teens-helped-pass-new-law-to-access-mental-health-care-withoutparental-consent/ (reporting that the New Jersey legislature initially passed a bill authorizing minors’
independent access to mental health treatment for minors age thirteen and older but amended the bill
when former Governor Chris Christie refused to sign the bill without the revision). Some statutes contain
additional conditions related to the minor’s maturity or the potentially detrimental effects of denying
treatment. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 33.21(c) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2019, ch. 373).
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Sexual Assault Services

As a society, we are on the cusp of greater legal and social awareness of
the traumatic impact of sexual assault on victims. Minors, as well as adults,
are victims of such assaults: “One third of all victims of sexual assault
reported to law enforcement agencies are adolescents (13 to 17 years
old).”300 The impact on victims can be extensive and presents substantial risk
to their health and well-being. Victims may experience a range of physical
injuries.301 In addition, rape of female adolescents is associated with a
myriad of psychosocial effects, such as depression, eating disorders, and
other mental health problems and suicidal ideation or attempts.302 Minors’
access to intervention is important for the diagnosis and treatment of the
effects of the assault on the victim and to enable the criminal justice system
to apprehend the perpetrator and achieve important social goals of
deterrence and promoting public safety. Sexual assault services involve not
only diagnostic and treatment interventions, but forensic evaluation to assist
law enforcement: “Sexual assault treatment generally consists of a medical
history, a physical examination, an anogenital examination, testing and
prophylaxis for HIV and sexually transmitted diseases, emergency
contraception, pregnancy testing and counseling, treatment for any other
injuries, rape crisis counseling, referrals for additional services and the
collection of forensic evidence.”303
Laws specifically addressing minors’ independent access to sexual
assault related services are relatively new. Illinois law provides an example:
Where a minor is the victim of a predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal
sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse or criminal
sexual abuse . . . the consent of the minor’s parent or legal
guardian need not be obtained to authorize . . . medical
personnel to furnish health care services or counseling related
to the diagnosis or treatment of any disease or injury arising
from such offense. The minor may consent to such counseling,

300
Jeffrey S. Jones et al., Comparative Analysis of Adult Versus Adolescent Sexual Assault:
Epidemiology and Patterns of Anogenital Injury, 10 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 872, 872 (2003).
301
Id. at 876.
302
“Studies of female adolescents have found rape during childhood or adolescence to be associated
with increased risky behaviors and mental health problems, including younger age of first voluntary
intercourse; higher rates of depression, including suicidal ideation/attempts; and other self harm
behaviors such as self-mutilation and eating disorders.” Miriam Kaufman, Care of the Adolescent Sexual
Assault Victim, 122 PEDIATRICS 462, 464 (2008).
303
JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TEENAGERS, HEALTH CARE & THE
LAW: A GUIDE TO THE LAW ON MINORS’ RIGHTS IN NEW YORK STATE 93, 93 n.149 (2d ed. n.d.).
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diagnosis or treatment as if the minor had reached his or her
age of majority . . . .304
Similarly, Maryland’s statutes provide that a minor has the same
capacity to consent as an adult to “Physical examination and treatment of
injuries from an alleged rape or sexual offense; . . . Physical examination to
obtain evidence of an alleged rape or sexual offense.”305 While statutes as
specific as those of Illinois and Maryland may not exist in all states, authors
have noted that the range of services required to respond adequately to a
sexual assault may fall within several of the other exceptions to the parental
consent doctrine already on the books, such as exceptions for STI testing
and treatment, family planning, mental health counseling, and emergency
medical services.306 Therefore, medical professionals working with minor
victims of sexual assault generally take advantage of the range of exceptions
available under the law to provide the wide range of services necessary to
assist these victims without requiring parental consent.307
Clearly, the interests of the minor in receiving needed medical and
psychological care are weighty, as are the state’s interests in facilitating that
care and pursuing its law enforcement objectives. In light of the sensitive
nature of this type of assault, minors would be less likely to seek services if
parental consent was required. Indeed, in some instances, parents or other
family members perpetrated the assault. Confidentiality of services is also
strongly recommended by practitioners, in that fear of disclosures to parents
may discourage many adolescents from seeking help.
***
The analyses above reveal the strong policy interests in facilitating
minors’ access to the services that are the subject of the statutory exceptions
to the doctrine of parental consent. In each case, a requirement for parental
consent presents barriers to many minors who need access to services. In
light of the sensitive or controversial nature of the services or the activities
leading to the need, it is understandable that many minors are hesitant to
involve their parents. It is not relevant whether a minor’s reluctance to
disclose her need for medical services is accurate in its prediction of a likely
punitive or obstructive parental response. If the minor believes that a nonsupportive parental response will follow such disclosure, the minor will be
deterred from involving her parents. In such cases, whether or not there
exists a true conflict of interests between the minor and the parent, parents
are not situated to be able to act in their minor children’s best interests.
304

410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/3(b) (West through P.A. 101-115).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 20-102(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. of the
General Assembly).
306
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 303, at 41–42, 57, 62.
307
See generally id. at 37–63 (describing the types of care minors can receive without parental
consent, and, in those situations, what New York State agencies require of hospitals and physicians, for
instance when they treat a rape survivor or receive the results of a positive HIV test).
305
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Furthermore, as noted with respect to many of the exceptions above, there
are concerns among medical professionals and minors that legal authority
for independent access to services for minors is an illusory right without a
guarantee of confidentiality. As we discuss in Part III below, access to
childhood vaccines by minors whose parents have failed to vaccinate them
presents issues analogous to those raised for access to services related to
contraception, prenatal care, abortion, STDs, mental health and substance
abuse, and sexual assault. Therefore, we recommend that a legislative
exception to the doctrine of parental consent for childhood vaccinations
should be enacted by the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
III. INDEPENDENT AND CONFIDENTIAL ACCESS BY ADOLESCENTS TO
CHILDHOOD VACCINES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND POLICY
ISSUES
In Part II, we analyzed the justifications for the most common statutory
exceptions to the doctrine of parental consent across the United States. In
this Part, we demonstrate that, in light of recent patterns of parental refusal
to consent to medically necessary vaccinations for their minor children,
minors’ independent access to such vaccines is one of several policy
responses necessary to promote the health of unvaccinated minors and the
general public.
A. The Necessity of an Exception to the Doctrine of Parental Consent
1. The Childhood Vaccination Crisis
Patterns of parental childhood vaccine refusal have led to clusters within
communities with low vaccination rates which have, in turn, led to increases
in the rates of disease. By mid-year in 2019, the rate of measles had
surpassed the highest annual rate since 1992.308 Most of the victims of the
outbreaks were unvaccinated children in communities with low vaccination
rates. For example, in a large outbreak in Rockland County, New York,
80.4% of the 312 cases reported as of September 25, 2019 were persons
under age eighteen, 79.5% had not received any MMR inoculations.309 Only
3.2% of those infected had been fully vaccinated with the MMR. There was
a direct relationship between parental failure to vaccinate their children and
this and other outbreaks. The rates of vaccination are dangerously low in
some geographical areas, with numbers of unvaccinated children continuing

308
Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last reviewed Oct. 11, 2019).
309
2018 - 2019 Measles Outbreak in Rockland County, COUNTY ROCKLAND,
http://rocklandgov.com/departments/health/measles-information/ (last visited June 19, 2020).
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to increase.310 In light of these factors, the state’s interest in increasing
vaccination rates to protect the public’s health is exceedingly strong.
2. The Convergence of State and Child Interests in Immunization from
Vaccine-Preventable Diseases
As noted above, state childhood vaccination mandates serve not only the
state’s police power interest in protecting public health, but also its parens
patriae interest in promoting the health of the vaccinated children. States
have allowed parents to refuse vaccinations under limited circumstances.311
The existence of those exemptions, however, reflects a concession by
policymakers to the competing interests of parents in making health care
choices for their children and in practicing religions—the teachings of which
are inconsistent with compliance with state vaccine mandates. These
concessions, however, do not reflect a dilution of the state’s strong
legislative intent to protect the public and individual children from
vaccine-preventable diseases through high rates of vaccination of the student
population.312 And, indeed, with recent increases in non-vaccination rates,
several states that have experienced outbreaks of vaccine-preventable
diseases have restricted or eliminated nonmedical exemptions.313 Clearly
these state legislatures have determined that, as the risks to public health
increase, parental discretion must be limited to the extent necessary to
contain the spread of infectious diseases.314
Until recently, the number of parents refusing vaccinations was
sufficiently low that herd immunity protected children whose parents
intentionally refused immunization and persons who cannot be vaccinated
due to age or medical contraindication. Thus, exemption from vaccine
requirements did not, in the past, measurably risk the welfare of the
unvaccinated minors or others in the community. Yet, in recent years, public
310
Holly A. Hill, Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months — United States,
2017, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1123, 1126–27 (2018).
311
See Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 915–
19 (summarizing and discussing the pattern of statutory exemptions that exist across the states). See also
States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 14, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunizationexemption-state-laws.aspx (summarizing state vaccination exemption policies).
312
In addition, the existence of exemptions does not reveal any legislative position on whether teens
who seek to comply with governmental vaccination recommendations should be able to do so. With the
exception of those instances cited within, legislatures have not previously addressed the question of
minors’ legal authority to consent to childhood vaccinations. See supra notes 20–24.
313
See Neal D. Goldstein, Joanna S. Suder & Jonathan Purtle, Trends and Characteristics of
Proposed and Enacted Legislation on Childhood Vaccination Exemption, 2011–2017, 109 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 102, 104–06, 105 tbl.2 (2019) (summarizing bills enacted between 2011 and 2017).
314
Some scholars recommend that all states follow this lead. See, e.g., Chemerinsky & Goodwin,
supra note 140, at 589 (proposing elimination of all nonmedical vaccination law exemptions); Mark
Fadel, 360 Years of Measles: Limiting Liberty Now for a Healthier Future, 39 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 1, 13
(2019) (same).
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health experts have expressed concerns that herd immunity is gradually
weakening as the number of unvaccinated persons increases, particularly in
certain geographic locales where there are large clusters of unvaccinated
children.315 Thus, the threat to the public’s health from a continuation of the
current non-vaccination trends is real, as are the dangers to each individual
unvaccinated child. As we have noted elsewhere, the state’s police power
and parens patriae interests are to some extent additive, resulting in a
formidable, although not unlimited, grant of state authority that can, in some
circumstances, override traditional deference to parental discretion, as in the
case of laws regulating compulsory education and child labor, child
protection laws, and states’ mandatory vaccination laws.316
The state’s interests also converge with the interests of minors who wish
to be vaccinated despite parental objection.317 Children have independent

315
For example, in a recent article, several authors, including Anthony S. Fauci, Director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases of the National Institutes of Health, expressed
concerns about the risks to persons in those population subgroups who cannot be immunized and were
previously protected by herd immunity:

The greatest risk of measles-related complications occurs in immunosuppressed
people. This population may have atypical presentations with severe complications
that have not been documented in immunocompetent patients, such as giant-cell
pneumonia and measles inclusion-body encephalitis. Exposure to measles in people
with HIV infection has led to serious complications and even death. Higher rates of
measles complications and deaths have also been reported in patients with cancer,
patients with solid organ transplants, people receiving high-dose glucocorticoids, and
those receiving immunomodulatory therapy for rheumatologic disease. People with
profound immunosuppression cannot be safely vaccinated with the live-attenuated
vaccine and must rely on herd immunity to protect them from measles infection.
Exposure to measles in the community certainly represents a danger to high-risk
persons during a local outbreak; however, nosocomial transmission may pose an even
greater threat and has been reported throughout the world. For example, during a
measles outbreak in Shanghai in 2015, a single child with measles in a pediatric
oncology clinic infected 23 other children, more than 50% of whom ended up with
severe complications, and the case fatality rate was 21%. When the umbrella of herd
immunity is compromised, such populations are highly vulnerable.
Catherine I. Paules, Hilary D. Marston & Anthony D. Fauci, Measles in 2019—Going Backward, 380
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2185, 2187 (2019) (citations omitted). See also Robert A. Bednarczyk, Walter A.
Orenstein & Saad B. Omer, Estimating the Number of Measles-Susceptible Children and Adolescents in
the United States Using Data from the National Immunization Survey–Teen (NIS-Teen), 184 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 148, 154 (2016) (reporting that, while national levels of immunization at the time of their
study were still at or higher than the threshold of 92%, the level needed to sustain herd immunity, the
numbers and patterns of clustering of nonvaccination could lead to circumstances in which herd
immunity may not protect some segments of the population); Jacqueline K. Olive et al., The State of the
Antivaccine Movement in the United States: A Focused Examination of Nonmedical Exemptions in States
and Counties, 15 PLOS MED., June 2018, at 1, 7 (2018) (warning of the existence of a hotspot vulnerable
to outbreaks because of high rates of exemptions from vaccines requirements).
316
Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 913–14.
317
See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text.
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interests in avoiding serious illness, disability, and death.318 Where a
medically recommended high benefit/low risk intervention is available to
protect the minor’s health, the minor’s interest in receiving that intervention
over parental objection is substantial. That interest becomes even weightier
when parents choose to rely on misinformation and myths in the exercise of
their parental decisionmaking authority, denying minors interventions
endorsed universally by medical experts. Minors’ interests in protecting
their own health and that of others outweigh parental authority to endanger
their children’s and the public’s health through vaccine refusal, particularly
when aligned with the interests of the state.
We do not espouse wholesale rejection of the doctrine of parental
consent. Each treatment context in which the state or a minor seeks an
exception from the doctrine must be evaluated on its own merits. Thus, our
proposal does not extend beyond the instant case. We recognize that
questions about minors’ best interests in the medical context are complex,
and that what specifically is in any child’s best interests might be
indeterminate or unknowable without hindsight. And even where outcomes
are certain, reasonable minds may differ as to what is “best” in many
situations.319 Yet, this lack of clarity does not characterize decisions to
accept the recommended childhood vaccinations. Indeed, these vaccinations
provide the quintessential example of a high benefit/low risk intervention
supported by a near-universal medical consensus. Thus, we need not
confront many of the thorny ethical analyses inherent in allocations of
decisionmaking authority among disputing parties when questions of
children’s medical best interests are at issue.320 Indeed, the
318

See supra notes 178–87 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1110, 1120 (Del. 1991) (declining to override
parental decisionmaking authority on the basis that parents who rejected treatment were acting in the
child’s best interests, even though the parental decision would likely result in the child’s death within six
to eight months, where recommended treatment for the child’s cancer had a 40% chance of success, but
entailed substantial risks and discomforts, and could itself cause death).
320
In recent decades, pediatric bioethicists and other scholars have contributed substantially to
debates about the meaning of the best interests standard in the context of medical treatment of children.
For example, Loretta M. Kopelman provides an overview of the best interests standard, discussing the
differences among the versions of the standard applied by clinicians, philosophers, and policy makers.
Loretta M. Kopelman, The Best-Interests Standard as Threshold, Ideal, and Standard of Reasonableness,
22 J. MED. & PHIL. 271, 272–73 (1997). Some scholars have argued for rejection of the best interest
standard. See, e.g., Erica K. Salter, Deciding for a Child: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Best Interest
Standard, 33 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 179, 180 (2012). Douglas Diekema has written a number
of articles arguing that the “harm principle”—that is, that “state intervention should not be trivial but
should be triggered when a parental decision places the child at significant risk of serious harm”)—should
replace the best interest standard, see, e.g., Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment:
The Harm Principle as Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 243, 252
(2004) (introducing the “harm principle”); Douglas S. Diekema, Revisiting the Best Interest Standard:
Uses and Misuses, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 128, 128 (2011) (defending the “harm principle” as superior
to the best interest standard). In a recent issue of the American Journal of Bioethics, several scholars
further elaborated on the advantages of the best interest standard, see, e.g., Johan Christiaan Bester, The
319

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 304

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT

833

ACIP-recommended vaccinations provide the quintessential example of a
high benefit/low risk intervention.
Parental choices to rely on misinformation about vaccines and mistrust
of the medical profession, or to privilege personal philosophical or religious
beliefs over the welfare of their children and the community, should not be
given legal effect in light of the risks to unvaccinated children and the
general public. Consistent with the Court’s assertion in Prince, parental
rights do “not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”321
The current balance of interests requires new legal solutions. States must
consider policies to increase rates of parental compliance with mandatory
vaccination laws.322 In addition, where reliance on the doctrine of parental
consent fails adequately to protect the welfare of minors and presents a
danger to the public health, alternate decisional mechanisms must be
considered. We propose one such mechanism below.
3. The Nature of Parental Opposition to Vaccinations Creates
Challenging Barriers to Care
The growing literature analyzing the vehement opposition that many
parents demonstrate to childhood vaccinations323 reveals that this
phenomenon presents particularly challenging barriers to care. While some
parents may be only “vaccine-hesitant,” others may be “vaccine-rejecting,”

Harm Principle Cannot Replace the Best Interest Standard: Problems with Using the Harm Principle
for Medical Decision Making for Children, 18 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9, 10 (2018) (providing a bioethical
analysis favoring retention of the best interest standard); Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Best Interest
Standard for Health Care Decision Making: Definition and Defense, 18 AM . J. BIOETHICS 36, 36 (2018)
(supplementing Bester’s argument with a legal analysis favoring the best interest standard).
321
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944).
322
Reiss & Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 1611–15.
323
See, e.g., Amin et al., supra note 95, at 874, 877 (detailing the results of a study finding that
endorsement of harm and fairness ideas do not predict parental vaccine hesitancy); Gabriela Capurro et
al., Measles, Moral Regulation and the Social Construction of Risk: Media Narratives of “Anti-Vaxxers”
and the 2015 Disneyland Outbreak, 43 CANADIAN J. SOC. 25, 40–42 (2018) (discussing the skewed
media presentation of “anti-vaxxer” and “vaccine hesitant” parents in light of the 2015 Disneyland
measles outbreak); Matthew Motta, Timothy Callaghan & Steven Sylvester, Knowing Less but
Presuming More: Dunning-Kruger Effects and the Endorsement of Anti-Vaccine Policy Attitudes, 211
SOC. SCI. & MED. 274, 274–75 (2018) (detailing the results of study that found that Dunning-Kruger
effects explain vaccination opposition); Glen J. Nowak & Michael A. Cacciatore, Parents’ Confidence
in Recommended Childhood Vaccinations: Extending the Assessment, Expanding the Context, 13 HUM.
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 687, 695–97 (2017) (discussing a study that examined confidence
ratings and parental behavior towards vaccination); Gregory A. Poland, Jon C. Tilburt & Edgar K.
Marcuse, Preserving Civility in Vaccine Policy Discourse: A Way Forward, 322 JAMA 209, 209–10
(2019) (advocating for principled pluralism to restore civility to the vaccination discussion); Aaron
Rothstein, Vaccines and Their Critics, Then and Now, 44 NEW ATLANTIS 3, 8–11 (2015) (overviewing
the history and evolution of anti-vaccination movements).
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that is, “adamant in their refusal to consider vaccination for their
children.”324 Hagood and Herlihy indicate that, in the cases of these parents:
[S]uch rejection may not be based upon previous history of a
vaccine-related adverse event, or actual medical
contraindication to vaccination, either for themselves or for
their children. [Vaccine-rejector] parents may express beliefs
that vaccines cause more harm than good, or that vaccines are
a plot of a conspiracy involving governments, health
organizations and pharmaceutical companies. They commonly
express beliefs in other conspiracy theories as well. These
belief systems indicate a lack of truth in public institutions and
“allopathic” medicine. Therefore, [vaccine-rejector] parents
are more likely to utilize so-called “complementary” or
“alternative” medical practices, and are least likely to receive
regular care in a pediatrician’s office. Thus, they are least
likely to be open to education on the issue due to their
irrational belief systems.325
Parents who hold such strong beliefs are likely to see their minor child’s
desire to be vaccinated in an extremely negative light. Adolescents will no
doubt be well aware of their parents’ viewpoints and the futility of any
attempt to persuade their parents to allow them to be vaccinated. Indeed, the
parents’ refusal to vaccinate their children in prior years—contravening
governmental policy and the social consensus favoring vaccination—
provides strong evidence that the parents would refuse to consent to
vaccinations upon a request from their children.326
Furthermore, minors may reasonably fear other negative repercussions
from an expression of interest in being vaccinated, ranging from tension and
conflict in the parent-child relationship, parental actions to prevent the minor
from taking steps to become vaccinated, punitive consequences for the
minor or, in extreme cases, abuse directed at the minor.327 Minors’
324
E. Allison Hagood & Stacy Mintzer Herlihy, Addressing Heterogeneous Parental Concerns
About Vaccination with a Multiple-Source Model: A Parent and Educator Perspective, 9 HUM.
VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPEUTICS 1790, 1791 (2013).
325
Id. (citations omitted).
326
It is possible that some parents whose children are unvaccinated or who have received only some
of the full series of recommended vaccines are not actively opposed to vaccinations but have simply not
made the effort to complete the series. In those cases, parents may be willing to consent if their children
request vaccination. Yet, as states tighten standards and procedures for vaccination exemptions, see Reiss
& Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood Vaccination Crisis, supra note 7, at 918–19, the effort required
to obtain exemptions will exceed the inconvenience of obtaining vaccinations, making it more and more
likely that parental failure to fully vaccinate their children reflects intentional rejection of state
requirements.
327
While we are speculating that in rare cases such abuse might occur, we draw this inference from
the occasional incidents in which those opposing vaccinations have threatened violence against scholars
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knowledge of the fervent nature of their parents’ anti-vaccine attitudes may
deter them from broaching the topic at all. Based on the zealousness with
which many vaccine-rejecting parents advocate their viewpoints, we do not
second-guess the wisdom of such cautiousness. Indeed, we argue that the
nature of some parents’ strongly held opposition to recommended childhood
vaccinations parallels parental opposition to abortion and other activities
implicated by the “sensitive” health care interventions just discussed. While
immunization for vaccine-preventable diseases does not fall within one of
the traditional categories of behavior or treatment typically characterized as
“sensitive,” the barriers to care are analogous. A minor’s expression of
preferences inconsistent with parental viewpoints about vaccinations are
likely to be treated as taboo in households headed by vaccine-opposing
parents. A minor seeking immunization may be perceived as violating
family values and norms. Children reasonably may worry that expression of
disagreement with their parents on this matter will lead to rebuke by, or
chastisement from, parents and obstruction of subsequent attempts to access
vaccines.
B. Statutory Authorization of Adolescents’ Independent Consent for
Childhood Vaccinations
A statutory exception to the doctrine of parental consent, authorizing
older minors independently and confidentially to access state-mandated
childhood vaccinations, constitutes an important addition to the range of
legal responses states are implementing to confront the high rates of nonvaccination within their populations. Access to childhood immunization for
vaccine-preventable diseases is justified by the same factors that legitimize
state empowerment of minors to provide independent consent in the context
of the other statutory exceptions, bearing the strongest analogy to treatment
for STDs. In both cases, the medical intervention seeks to protect minors
from infectious diseases that present substantial risk to health and life.
Furthermore, in both cases, infection of the minor presents immediate and
serious dangers to others who might be exposed to the disease.
1. Competence to Make Health Care Decisions
According to legal principles in the fifty states, practitioners generally
do not have legal authority to treat a patient unless that patient provides
informed consent. In order to be legally valid, a patient’s health care
and others who promote policies consistent with ACIP and CDC vaccination recommendations. See, e.g.,
Meredith Wadman, Vaccination Opponents Target CDC Panel, 363 SCIENCE 1024, 1024 (2019),
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/363/6431/1024.summary; Nina Shapiro, Vaccine Proponents
Receive Death Threats. Again., FORBES (July 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ninashapiro/
2019/07/22/vaccine-proponents-receive-death-threats-again.
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decisions must be informed, competent, and voluntary.328 The requirement
that consent be informed imposes on health care practitioners the duty to
disclose to prospective patients the information necessary to make the
treatment decisions. That information should describe, consistent with the
best available knowledge, and in a manner comprehensible to the patient:
(1) the nature of the condition, illness, disorder, or symptom for which
treatment is recommended; (2) the likely consequences of failure to treat the
condition, illness, disorder, or symptom; (3) the nature of each alternative
treatment; (4) the possible benefits, risks, discomforts, and side effects of
each of the alternative treatments and their anticipated likelihood; and (5)
the treating practitioner’s recommendation among the treatment alternatives
and its rationale.329 The patient must be competent, that is, have the capacity
to understand and, according to some standards, also to reason about, or
appreciate the implications of, the information provided. Finally, patients’
decisions regarding treatment must be made voluntarily, that is, at a
minimum, free from coercive or controlling influences, in order to be legally
valid.330
Beginning in the 1970s, researchers have engaged in empirical work
conceptualizing, operationalizing, and evaluating competence to make
treatment decisions. 331 This work was advanced substantially by the creation
of the MacArthur Foundation Network on Treatment Competence. Building
on the earlier research, that group developed standards for assessment of

328
Alan Meisel, Loren H. Roth & Charles W. Lidz, Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of
Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285, 286–87 (1977).
329
This summary consolidates themes drawn from legal, bioethical, and medical guidelines. See,
e.g., Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 2.1.1, AM. MED. ASS’N: INFORMED CONSENT, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (indicating that the
physician should inform the patient of “1. The diagnosis (when known)[;] 2. The nature and purpose of
recommended interventions[;] 3. The burdens, risks, and expected benefits of all options, including
forgoing treatment”); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
121–22 (6th ed. 2009); Meisel, Roth & Lidz, supra note 328, at 286–87 (describing the three elements
of informed consent); Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An
Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 421–38 (1980); Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions”
to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical
Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 418.
330
See Paul S. Appelbaum, Charles W. Lidz & Robert Klitzman, Voluntariness of Consent to
Research: A Conceptual Model, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 30 (2009) (analyzing the meaning of the
voluntariness requirement); Robert M. Nelson et al., The Concept of Voluntary Consent, 11 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 6, 6 (2011) (same).
331
See, e.g., PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CHARLES W. LIDZ & ALAN MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT:
LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 3–4 (1987); CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT:
A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 3–9 (1984); Loren H. Roth, Alan Meisel & Charles W.
Lidz, Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM . J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977); Lois A.
Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982).
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competence332 that have had substantial influence in law, scholarship, and
medical practice. Scholars and researchers today generally recognize that the
following standards of competence are core components of modern
assessments of treatment decisionmaking capacity, although statutory or
case law definitions of competence may emphasize some, but not all, as
required in particular contexts: (1) ability to communicate a choice (that is,
“[c]learly indicate a preferred treatment option”); (2) ability to understand
relevant information (that is, “[g]rasp the fundamental meaning of
information communicated by” the practitioner); (3) ability to reason about
treatment options (i.e., “engage in a rational process of manipulating the
relevant information”); and (4) ability to appreciate the situation and its
likely consequences (that is, “acknowledge medical condition and likely
consequences of treatment options”).333
The four standards do not always appear in all legal definitions of
competence. Most commonly, statutes will incorporate a focus on patient
understanding of the information provided by the practitioner and
communication of a treatment preference. For example, California—by
statute—defines treatment decisionmaking capacity as “a person’s ability to
understand the nature and consequences of a decision and to make and
communicate a decision, and includes in the case of proposed health care,
the ability to understand its significant benefits, risks, and alternatives.”334
Yet, some statutes identify understanding and appreciation (of the
consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures),
while still others also incorporate a reasoning standard (such as “weigh risks
and benefits” of the options and their likely consequences).335 The
332
See THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO
TREATMENT: A GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 1–14 (1998) [hereinafter
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE]; Paul S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834 (2007) [hereinafter Appelbaum,
Assessment]; Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I:
Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 106 (1995)
[hereinafter MacArthur I] (discussing the changes in medicine and law in response to mental illness);
Jessica Wilen Berg, Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Constructing Competence: Formulating
Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 348 (1996);
Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II: Measures of Abilities Related to
Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127, 128 (1995) [hereinafter MacArthur
II]; Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III: Abilities of
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149, 150 (1995)
[hereinafter MacArthur III] (explaining the results). See also The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study: Executive Summary, MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L.,
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/treatment.html#N_1_ (last updated May 2004).
333
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 31–60; Appelbaum,
Assessment, supra note 332, at 1836 tbl.1; see also MacArthur I, supra note 332, at 108–11.
334
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4609 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. ch. 524).
335
For example, the competence concepts defining “maturity” for the purpose of the mature minor
rule appear in statute or case law as follows: ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (West, Westlaw through
2019 Regular Sess. of the 92d Arkansas General Assembly) (authorizing “[a]ny unemancipated minor of
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MacArthur group also developed standardized measures that can be used by
health care practitioners336 or researchers. 337 The measures allow evaluators
to customize the assessment of capacity for each treatment or research
decisionmaking context.
Scholarship considering minors’ competence to make treatment
decisions generally falls within two categories: (1) analyses of basic research
on children’s development and maturation, cognitive functioning,
socioemotional functioning, and other domains potentially relevant to
capacity as defined by one or more legal standards; and (2) reports of
empirical studies designed to measure children’s treatment decisionmaking
competence, particularly in comparison with adults, by evaluating
functioning relative to one or more legal standards of competence. Both sets
of studies are important. The former category identifies and describes the
domains and patterns of development that change over time, and how
various factors affect their expression and maturation as children develop
into adults. The latter category focuses specifically on assessment of minors’
capacities according to the legal tests identified above, ensuring that the
skills and abilities measured are those that are criterion-relevant. Indeed,
one of the most important contributions of the past several decades of
research on legal competencies is the core principle that it is necessary to
operationalize or translate the relevant legal tests into an assessment strategy
or tool that allows measurement of the functional abilities specified by the
applicable legal standard.338
Capacity or competence to make treatment decisions339 is one of several
types of functional abilities that may be of relevance to the law regulating
sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical
treatment or procedures” to consent to such medical or surgical care “for himself or herself”); In re Swan,
569 A.2d 1202, 1205 (Me. 1990) (holding that a minor has capacity to consent or refuse treatment when
“the minor has the ability of the average person to understand and weigh the risks and benefits” and “if
he is capable of appreciating the nature, extent, and probable consequences of the conduct consented to”
(citation omitted)).
336
THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR
TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) 1–2 (1998).
337
PAUL S. APPELBAUM & THOMAS GRISSO, THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL
FOR CLINICAL RESEARCH (MACCAT-CR) 1–4 (2001).
338
THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS
404–60 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES].
339
The terms “capacity” and “competence,” in theory, have slightly different meanings in this
context. Lois A. Weithorn, Psychological Distress, Mental Disorder, and Assessment of Decisionmaking
Capacity Under U.S. Medical Aid in Dying Statutes, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 637, 641 & n.10 (2020)
[hereinafter Weithorn, Aid in Dying Statutes]. One set of authors characterized the distinction:
“‘Capacity’ refers to abilities relevant to performing a task, while ‘competency’ is a legal judgment that
one has sufficient abilities to perform the task.” Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to
Decide on Treatment and Research: MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103, 110
(1999). See also GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 11 (“Most authors
distinguish between assessments of decisionmaking capacity, which health care professionals can
conduct, and determination of competence, which are legal judgments left to the courts.”). Yet, the
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children’s lives.340 Different legal competencies tap somewhat different
skills and abilities, which may mature on different developmental
trajectories than other types of competencies of relevance to the law.
“Unfortunately, many writers and professionals—including, but not limited
to . . . policymakers and health care personnel—fail to differentiate among
the various legal competencies . . . .”341 Because each type of legal
competence is defined by functional criteria relevant to that legal context,
assessments of each type of competence must track those situation-specific
functional criteria.342 Findings of incompetence or competence in one legal
sphere do not obviate the necessity to perform focused criterion-relevant
assessments of capacity targeted to any other legal question that is of
interest. This latter observation is one of several factors explaining why a
conclusion that minors in a given age range may be less mature than adults
in certain juvenile justice contexts, does not foreclose the question of
whether minors in the same age range might be competent to make
independent health care decisions.343
2. Psychological and Neuroscientific Developmental Findings
Informing Questions About Minors’ Capacities to Make Treatment
Decisions
In the 1970s and early 1980s, some scholars focused on the cognitive
developmental work of researchers such as Piaget and Kohlberg to
hypothesize when children would be able to perform the functions necessary
to understand, reason about, and appreciate health care treatment
distinction breaks down in practice, particularly when state policies authorize health care professionals’
clinical evaluations of patients’ capacity to constitute legally valid judgments. Weithorn, Aid in Dying
Statutes, supra, at 641 n.10. In such cases, clinicians’ determinations of capacity have the effect of legal
judgments of competence. GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 11. It is
noteworthy, however, that, in the context of children’s legal authority to make health care decisions, the
terms capacity and competence are frequently used interchangeably within or across cases, statutes, and
scholarly publications.
340
See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, FORENSIC EVALUATION OF JUVENILES 41–140 (2d ed. 2013);
ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 118–80 (2008); Lois A.
Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, in CHILDREN, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE LAW 25,
49–50 (N. Dickon Reppucci et al. eds., 1984) [hereinafter Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal
Contexts].
341
Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, supra note 340, at 49.
342
GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES, supra note 338, at 9 (“No single legal criterion or test
applies across all legal competencies. Each legal competence refers to somewhat different abilities . . .
.”). Even beyond the formal legal criteria for each type of competence, there are additional relevant
situation-specific factors. Thus, for example, in determinations of competence to make treatment
decisions, evaluators must be mindful of the types of information about treatment options that patients
must understand and reason about in order to demonstrate competence. For expanded discussion of such
additional relevant factors, see, for example, GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra
note 332, at 21–24.
343
See infra notes 356–60 and accompanying text.
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information.344 These researchers predicted that minors ages fourteen or
fifteen might be able to demonstrate legally valid competence to consent.345
As our knowledge of development has itself matured, ultimately
incorporating neuroscientific understandings of brain development, together
with direct observation of functioning when assessed with attention to the
relevant legal standards, discussions about the relevance of these insights for
children’s capacities in treatment contexts have evolved as well.
Research on brain development has revealed that important neurological
maturational changes continue to occur throughout adolescence, and into the
early twenties.346 We have learned that the “frontal lobes, home to key
components of the neural circuitry underlying ‘executive functions’ such as
planning, working memory, and impulse control, are among the last areas of
the brain to mature; they may not be fully developed until halfway through
the third decade of life.”347 Furthermore, certain “psychosocial
characteristics such as impulsivity, sensation seeking, future orientation, and
susceptibility to peer pressure” show continued development into young
adulthood.348 By contrast, however, “the ability of a[] [person] to reason and
consider alternative courses of action . . . reaches adult levels during the
mid-teen years.”349 Indeed, researchers have distinguished between “cold”
and “hot” cognition.350 “Cold cognition refers to mental processes (such as
working memory or response inhibition) employed in situations calling for
deliberation in the absence of high levels of emotion.”351 Generally during
circumstances characterized by “cold cognition,” minors have relatively
unimpeded access to their close-to-adult-like logical reasoning abilities, in
that emotional arousal is lower and the wild card of peer influence is
minimized.352 “Hot cognition involves mental processes in affectively
charged situations where deliberation is unlikely or difficult.”353 In these
situations, factors such as impulse control and susceptibility to peer
influence can interfere with an adolescent’s use of his or her reasoning and
analytic thinking skills.354 Steinberg and others have noted what they refer
344

Grisso & Vierling, supra note 136, at 417, 420; Weithorn, Developmental Factors, supra note
136, at 96.
345
See Weithorn, Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, supra note 340, at 35–38.
346
See, e.g., Sara B. Johnson, Robert W. Blum & Jay N. Giedd, Adolescent Maturity and the Brain:
The Promise and Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 216, 216 (2009) (finding that the brain continues to mature after the end of adolescence,
justifying a link between neuromaturation and maturity of judgment).
347
Id.
348
Steinberg et al., supra note 137, at 587.
349
Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 79.
350
Id. at 71.
351
Id.
352
Johnson et al., supra note 346, at 218; Steinberg, supra note 132, at 258.
353
Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 71.
354
Steinberg, supra note 132, at 258.
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to as a “maturity gap” in the points in development at which individuals are
most likely to demonstrate adult-like functioning on tasks invoking cold
versus hot cognition.355
Researchers have distinguished the contexts in which minors’ health
care decisions typically occur from those characterizing certain other
decisions.356 They observe that the competencies needed for medical
decisions typically occur in circumstances “where the presence of adult
consultants and the absence of time pressure impose sufficient external
control to minimize the dangers of impulsive decisionmaking.”357 By
contrast, decisions made in the context of criminal behavior, driving, and
use of alcohol and drugs, which are often influenced by peers, invoke hot
cognition.358 Researchers examining the relevant psychological and
neuroscientific databases generally predict that minors are capable of
making mature health care decisions by adolescence.359 Yet, scholars
disagree as to the precise ages during adolescence at which minors are likely
to be capable of demonstrating adult-like decisionmaking in the cold
cognition context of medical care. Some predict that minors as young as
eleven or twelve may manifest such capacities,360 while others identify ages
fifteen or sixteen.361 Predictions are just that, of course, and must be further
investigated with measures that operationalize the legal standards. It is
possible that minors will achieve adult-like levels of capacity at different
ages, depending on the standard of competence evaluated. In addition,
certain health care treatment situations will present more complex and
challenging decisionmaking tasks. Finally, as noted below, depending on the
risk-benefit profile of the treatments involved and the range of legal and
social factors surrounding the treatment context, policymakers may impose
a “sliding scale” of sorts in setting the threshold that separates competence
from incompetence, imposing a higher threshold in some situations, and a
lower one in others.362 Without specification of the relevant standards of
competence, the complexity and difficulty of the particular health care
decision, and the degree of capacity that must be demonstrated in order to
be considered competent, predictions regarding ages at which minors will
be capable are necessarily imprecise.

355

Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 82–83; Steinberg, supra note 132, at 261–65.
Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 71 (citation omitted).
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
See infra notes 360–62 and accompanying text.
360
Petronella Grootens-Wiegers et al., Medical Decision-Making in Children and Adolescents:
Developmental and Neuroscientific Aspects, 17 BMC PEDIATRICS 120, 126 (2017).
361
Icenogle et al., supra note 137, at 80 (citation omitted).
362
This concept is discussed further below. See infra Part III.B.4.
356
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3. Empirical Research Examining Children’s Capacities to Make
Treatment Decisions
Some researchers have empirically investigated minors’ capacities to
make treatment decisions by evaluating children’s understanding or
appreciation of, or reasoning about, hypothetical treatment scenarios or their
actual health care situation.363 Weithorn and Campbell’s 1982 study, and
some investigations that have succeeded the MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study’s work, have incorporated assessment according to the
several legal standards emphasized by the MacArthur work.364 While some
research examined participants’ responses to hypothetical medical vignettes
in the laboratory,365 others evaluated the capacities of participants who were
medical patients concerning their own treatment or potential treatment or
clinical research protocols.366
Those studies that have conducted criterion-relevant assessments in
which the measures used track the legal standards that courts and legislators
have determined should serve the gatekeeping function when patients’
capacities to decide are at issue have not found statistically significant
363

For reviews of such studies, see EXPERT PANEL WORKING GRP. ON MAID FOR MATURE
MINORS, COUNCIL OF CANADIAN ACADS., THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON MEDICAL ASSISTANCE IN
DYING FOR MATURE MINORS (2018), https://cca-reports.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/The-State-ofKnowledge-on-Medical-Assistance-in-Dying-for-Mature-Minors.pdf (summarizing ethical, legal, and
clinical perspectives on medical assistance in dying (MAID)); Victoria A. Miller et al., Children’s
Competence for Assent and Consent: A Review of Empirical Findings, 14 ETHICS & BEHAV. 255, 255
(2004).
364
See Tiffany Chenneville et al., Decisional Capacity Among Youth with HIV: Results from the
MacArthur Competence Tool for Treatment, 28 AIDS PATIENT CARE & STDS 425, 426 (2014); Irma M.
Hein et al., Why Is It Hard to Make Progress in Assessing Children’s Decision-Making Competence?, in
IRMA M. HEIN, CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT OR RESEARCH 9, 10
(2015),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/28c0/43408c5e5ca1f5ce218ed811cf749d16096e.pdf
[hereinafter Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent]; Irma M. Hein et al., Accuracy of the
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR) for Measuring Children’s
Competence to Consent to Clinical Research, 168 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1147, 1148 (2014) [hereinafter
Hein et al., Accuracy] (assessing competence to consent against legal age standards); Irma M. Hein et
al., Feasibility of an Assessment Tool for Children’s Competence to Consent to Predictive Genetic
Testing: A Pilot Study, 24 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 971, 973 (2015) [hereinafter Hein et al., Feasibility];
Irma M. Hein et al., Informed Consent Instead of Assent Is Appropriate in Children from the Age of
Twelve: Policy Implications of New Findings on Children’s Competence to Consent to Clinical Research,
16 BMC MED. ETHICS 76, 78–79 (2015) [hereinafter Hein et al., Informed Consent]; Debbie Schachter
et al., Informed Consent and Stimulant Medication: Adolescents’ and Parents’ Ability to Understand
Information About Benefits and Risks of Stimulant Medication for the Treatment of
Attention-Deficient/Hyperactivity Disorder, 21 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 139,
146–47 (2011) (discussing capacity to consent in the context of adolescent behavioral disorders); Lois
A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed
Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1590 (1982).
365
Miller et al., supra note 363, at 271; Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 364, at 1592.
366
Chenneville et al., supra note 364, at 426; Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra
note 364, at 16; Hein et al., Accuracy, supra note 364, at 1148; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364,
at 973; Hein et al., Informed Consent, supra note 364, at 2; Schachter et al., supra note 364, at 140.
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differences between the capacities of adolescents ages fourteen and older
and comparison groups of adults.367 Weithorn and Campbell examined
ten- to eleven-year-olds, fourteen-year-olds, eighteen-year-olds, and
twenty-one-year-olds, and found statistically significant differences
between the youngest group and the three older groups on most competence
scales.368 They did not examine twelve or thirteen-year-olds. Hein and her
colleagues have examined the capacities of minors within this earlier
adolescent and pre-adolescent group.369 Their work suggests that even
minors as young as twelve and thirteen years of age can demonstrate
adult-like competence according to legal standards.370
A Canadian panel of experts was charged with making
recommendations regarding the availability of medical aid in dying to
mature minors. In summarizing the body of empirical work on adolescents’
competence to consent, the panel concluded: “Together, these data point to
the idea that cognitive foundations for mature decisions are generally in
place by early adolescence (12 to 15 years of age). Therefore, age should not
preclude a minor from providing informed consent to the same healthcare
decisions that adults are presumed capable of making.”371
Several observations regarding the findings discussed here are relevant.
First, although researchers applying the studies discussed in Part III.B.2
suggest that age fifteen is the point at which minors have developed
adult-like cognitive skills that facilitate the logical reasoning and
understanding tasks relevant to competence,372 some who have assessed
capacity according to criterion-relevant competence measures with samples
including preadolescents have identified age twelve as the point at which
minors do not differ significantly from adults.373 The findings from these
two sets of studies are not necessarily inconsistent. It is possible that the
skills required to be competent according to legal standards may not require
acquisition of fully developed adult skills. Rather, those minors whose
logical reasoning and cognitive analytic abilities approach adult-like
levels—that is, those who are ages twelve, thirteen, and fourteen—may have
attained sufficient levels of capacity to meet legal standards of treatment
367

See, e.g., Weithorn & Campbell, supra note 364, at 1596.
Id. at 1591, 1595.
369
Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra note 364, at 10; Hein et al., Accuracy,
supra note 364, at 1148; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364, at 973; Hein et al., Informed Consent,
supra note 364, at 6–7.
370
Hein et al., Children’s Competence to Consent, supra note 364, at 12; Hein et al., Accuracy,
supra note 364, at 1151–52; Hein et al., Feasibility, supra note 364, at 975–76; Hein et al., Informed
Consent, supra note 364, at 6.
371
EXPERT PANEL WORKING GRP. ON MAID FOR MATURE MINORS, COUNCIL OF CANADIAN
ACADS., supra note 363, at 74.
372
Id.
373
Id.
368

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 315

7/28/20 10:48 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

844

[Vol. 52:2

decisionmaking competence, despite the continued development of those
abilities likely to occur in the subsequent few years.
Second, and importantly, the developmental neuroscience research
reveals that socioemotional factors—that is, psychosocial maturity—can
impair adolescent decisionmaking.374 Thus, in any health care context in
which minors’ participation in decisionmaking is sought, factors that
deleteriously affect minors’ abilities to exercise their logical reasoning and
analytic processes should be identified, and minimized. For example, minors
will be best able to make use of their cognitive capacities if they are provided
with complete information, and are given time to process, analyze, and
discuss the information in consultation with neutral adults such as health
care professionals.
Third, not all health care decisions are the same. Two sets of factors, in
particular, distinguish some decisions from others. On one hand, the
complexity of the disclosed information may vary as might the difficulty of
deciding among options. It is possible that some health care choices require
more sophisticated cognitive decisionmaking skills than do others. This, in
turn, could lead to findings of developmental differences depending on the
complexity of the information and difficulty of deciding among options.
This could lead to developmental differences among minors during the
transitional ages of twelve to fifteen years, varying with the cognitive
demands of the health care decision. On the other hand, and independent of
the cognitive tasks required, health care decisions differ as well in terms of
the constitutional and policy issues discussed earlier in this Article. Use of
different standards of competence, and different thresholds for determining
when competence is achieved, may be appropriate depending upon the
nature and consequences of particular health care decisions and the
constellation of interests involved.
Based on the relevant research on children’s capacities, and in light of
the nature and policy context of decisions regarding the recommended
childhood vaccinations, we conclude that there is ample evidence that
minors ages fourteen and older can be presumed to be competent to make
decisions to receive vaccinations independent of parental consent. We
believe that the policy goals underlying this proposal can be more efficiently
achieved if states adopt a statutory age of consent of fourteen years, rather
than requiring minors age fourteen and older to demonstrate capacity on a
case by case basis. The more efficient option is justified in this context,
where the intervention is a highly effective low risk-high benefit
intervention, the risks to the child’s and public’s health of creating barriers
to access are great, and empirical research on minors’ capacities supports a
policy granting decisionmaking authority to children age fourteen and older.
We temper this recommendation, however, with the important caveat that,
374

Id. at 81.
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if a state makes vaccinations available to minors without parental consent,
the administering health care professionals must ensure that the informed
consent interaction is a thoughtful and deliberative one that facilitates the
minors’ best use of their cognitive capacities. This is most likely to be
achieved if the administrating professional takes the time necessary to fully
inform, discuss, and address questions about the immunizations.
In addition, in light of the policy goals just discussed, the low risk/high
benefit profile of the vaccinations, and research findings by Hein and
colleagues,375 it is reasonable to presume that minors ages twelve or thirteen
are also competent to choose vaccinations for themselves. Indeed, we
encourage legislatures to allow twelve- and thirteen-year-olds to provide
independent consent for vaccinations if a physician finds them to be
competent. Furthermore, courts employing a “mature minor” standard that
does not incorporate rigid age-based criteria could, in particular
circumstances, determine that any particular minor in the preadolescent age
group is mature enough to decide.
4. Risk-Related or Sliding-Scale Considerations in Determining the
Appropriate Threshold of Treatment Decisionmaking Competence
Health care decisions occur within particular contexts, and there may be
policy reasons for setting higher or lower standards as the threshold
delineating competence from incompetence.376 Some scholars emphasize the
importance of examining the consequences—and particularly the
risk-benefit ratio of a treatment decision—when setting the threshold for
competence.377 In elaborating upon this “sliding scale” model, Thomas
Grisso and Paul Appelbaum point out that “[a]s a general rule, a lower
threshold for competence is set when a patient is accepting a treatment
option” with a high benefit/low risk profile.378 By contrast, “a somewhat
higher threshold for competence may be required for patients who are
refusing” high benefit/low risk treatments.379
In some respects, standards for decisionmaking in each health care
context are an expression of the government’s reconciliation of the tensions
among competing goals and values inherent in the decisions.380 We may
375

See supra notes 28–71 and 364–71 and accompanying text.
See generally GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332; Dan W. Brock,
Decisionmaking Competence and Risk, 5 BIOETHICS 105, 105 (1991); Ian Wilks, The Debate Over RiskRelated Standards of Competence, 11 BIOETHICS 413, 426 (1997); Weithorn, Aid in Dying Statutes,
supra note 339, at 687–91.
377
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 24–26; SCOTT Y. KIM,
EVALUATION OF CAPACITY TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT AND RESEARCH 34–35 (2010).
378
GRISSO & APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE, supra note 332, at 25.
379
Id.
380
Alternatively, we can conceptualize these balances as reflecting reconciliation of competing
bioethical principles of beneficence or paternalism versus decisional autonomy. See, e.g., Brock, supra
note 376, at 105. With respect to decisionmaking for or by children, three sets of interests typically
376
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therefore apply lower standards of competence when the state, acting in its
parens patriae or police power role, seeks to facilitate patients’ access to a
low risk/high benefit treatment. We can see this principle at work when we
envision the prospect of refusing to give a twelve-year-old antibiotics for
treatment of a sexually transmitted disease, knowing the minor may not
return to the clinic with a parent if refused independent access. In this case,
the strength of the parens patriae interests (ameliorating suffering and
preventing serious illness, disability, or death), the police power interests
(avoiding further transmission of the infection to future sexual partners of
the minor and identifying past partners for treatment and counseling on
preventive measures), in combination with the minor’s voluntary request for
services and the low risk/high benefit treatment profile could reasonably
lead policymakers to apply a less demanding standard of competence. The
decision of where to set the bar or threshold in determining competence is
not a scientific one. It is a social policy judgment and reflects the delicate
balance between competing interests. The competence threshold will and
should depend on the consequences of the choices involved. For example,
when a minor is choosing whether to consent to a low risk/high benefit
intervention endorsed by medical consensus and government mandate, there
is no reason to require the minor to demonstrate a higher level of capacity or
broader array of skills than are required of adults in similar contexts. In the
case of ACIP-recommended vaccinations, strong parens patriae and police
power interests converge with the minors’ own interests in maintaining
health and exercising autonomy. By contrast, different standards and
decision rules might operate if a minor wished to refuse a lifesaving
treatment with a relatively low risk and high benefit profile. In that case, the
minor’s rejection of treatment is in conflict with the state’s interest in
promoting the minor’s health, justifying a somewhat more persuasive
demonstration of maturity.381
compete: those of the state, parents, and child. See supra Section II.B. Jennifer Rosato emphasizes the
context-dependence of the decisionmaking guidelines involving children, noting that “[t]he facts in each
case need to be carefully considered to determine” the particular balance of potentially competing
bioethical principles. Rosato, supra note 132, at 795.
381
The operation of the current constellation of policies governing minors’ treatment
decisionmaking in the United Kingdom provides an example. Sensible policy making may distinguish
between authorizing minors to make independent decisions regarding consent to recommended
treatments and authorizing them to make independent decisions regarding refusal of recommended
treatments where such refusal would subject them to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm.
See, e.g., Stephen Gilmore & Jonathan Herring, “No” Is the Hardest Word: Consent and Children’s
Autonomy, 23 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 3, 3 (2011). For a discussion of some of the situational factors that
might lead to greater scrutiny of minors’ health care preferences, see Diekema, supra note 217, at 214.
We note, however, that acceptance of treatment does not necessarily argue for lower, narrower
standards and rejection for higher, broader standards. A decision to refuse treatment may not trigger a
broader and more searching maturity inquiry where a patient’s prognosis with treatment is poor and the
costs of continuing treatment outweigh the benefits. Indeed, whether sole reliance on the preferences of
a capable minor in such situations is appropriate may depend, in part, on the minor’s prognosis and the

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 318

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT

847

In general, therefore, when a minor’s interests (in promoting and
protecting his or her health and in exercising decisional autonomy) converge
with the state’s interests in promoting the minor’s health and protecting the
public’s health, a lower threshold for determining capacity might be set to
enable a minor to access a low risk/high benefit intervention that is
medically necessary to protect against an infectious disease. Furthermore,
depending on the particular decisionmaking context, the threshold dividing
competence from incompetence, and the choice of standards of competence,
might vary.
C. Protecting the Confidentiality of Minors’ Independent Contacts with
Health Care Professionals Regarding Vaccinations
We have analogized the need for adolescent access to vaccinations
independent of parental consent to access to “sensitive” health care services,
such as contraception, abortion, diagnosis and treatment for STDs, mental
health and substance abuse, and sexual assault.382 Various health care
provider associations recommend that when states extend to minors the legal
right to consent to sensitive treatments independent of parents, the medical
information must be maintained in confidence if the adolescents choose not
to authorize disclosure.383 Most such associations also recommend advising
risk/benefit profile of the proposed intervention. A minor’s refusal of life-saving intervention in certain
contexts may require special decision rules. See, e.g., Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent in
Decision-Making in Pediatric Practice, 138 PEDIATRICS 1, 4 (2016).
382
See supra Section III.B.2.iii.
383
See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Ethics Opinion 5.055 – Confidential Care for Minors, 16
VIRTUAL MENTOR 901, 901–02 (2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.amaassn.org/files/2018-05/coet1-1411.pdf (“For minors who are mature enough to be unaccompanied by
their parents for their examination, confidentiality of information disclosed during an exam, interview,
or in counseling should be maintained. Such information may be disclosed to parents when the patient
consents to disclosure.”); Ass’n of Women’s Health, Obstetric & Neonatal Nurses, Confidentiality in
Adolescent Health Care: Position Statement, 46 J. OBSTETRICAL GYNECOLOGICAL & NEONATAL
NURSES 889, 889 (2017) (“Nurses are responsible to provide safe, high quality, confidential health care
to adolescents.”); Pamela J. Burke et al., Soc’y for Adolescent Health & Med., Sexual and Reproductive
Health Care: A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine, 54 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 491, 492 (2014) (“Be aware of and promote the availability of confidential [sexual and
reproductive health] services to ensure that adolescents, especially those at greatest risk, do not forego
needed care.”); Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, The Adolescent’s Right to Confidential
Care when Considering Abortion, 139 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2017) (“[The AAP] reaffirms its position that
the rights of adolescents to confidential care when considering abortion should be protected.”); Am.
Acad. of Family Physicians, Adolescent Health Care, Confidentiality, AAFP.ORG,
https://www.aafp.org/about/policies/all/adolescent-confidentiality.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2019)
(“Physicians should deliver confidential health services in situations involving sexuality (including
sexually transmitted infections, contraception, and pregnancy), substance use/abuse, and mental health
to consenting adolescents.”). See also NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., THE PROMISE OF
ADOLESCENCE: REALIZING OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL YOUTH 231–35 (Richard J. Bonnie & Emily P.
Backes eds., 2019) (addressing the importance of ensuring confidentiality and privacy for adolescents in
the context of screening and services for “sensitive” health matters).
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adolescents to involve their parents in their health care decisions whenever
possible, while recognizing that, without protections for confidentiality,
many minors will forego seeking services.384
Research findings and clinical experiences reveal that minors’ concerns
about parental access to health care information can be a major deterrent to
adolescents seeking, and therefore receiving, needed care for sensitive health
matters (such as those related to sexual activity and reproduction, sexually
transmitted diseases, mental health or substance use, or sexual assault).385
For example, one comprehensive national study reported that
U.S. adolescents who forgo care due in whole or in part to
confidentiality concern are a particularly high-risk population
in need of health care services. Among boys, prevalence of
mental health difficulties was significantly higher among
those who cited confidentiality concern as a reason for forgone
care, as compared with those who did not cite confidentiality
concern. Among girls, those citing confidentiality concern had
a significantly higher prevalence of risk characteristics related
to mental health, sexual/reproductive health, and substance
use. . . . [A]dolescents who reported elevated depressive
symptom levels, suicidal ideation, suicide attempt, sexual
activity, birth control nonuse at last sex, STI history, alcohol
use, and/or unsatisfactory parental communication were
significantly more likely than adolescents who did not report
these factors to cite confidentiality concern as a reason for not
seeking needed care in the past year.386

384

For examples of such recommendations, see Am. Med. Ass’n, Code of Ethics Opinion 5.055 –
Confidential Care for Minors, supra note 383, at 901; Pamela J. Burke et al., Soc’y for Adolescent Health
& Med., supra note 383, at 492; Comm. on Adolescence, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, supra note 383, at 1;
Am. Acad. of Family Physicians, Adolescent Health Care, Confidentiality, supra note 383, at 1.
385
See, e.g., Jocelyn A. Lehrer et al., Foregone Health Care Among U.S. Adolescents: Associations
Between Risk Characteristics and Confidentiality Concern, 40 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 218, 222 (2007)
(examining “risk characteristics of adolescents for whom confidentiality concerns” deterred use of health
care services); Jami S. Leichliter et al., Confidentiality Issues and Use of Sexually Transmitted Disease
Services Among Sexually Experienced Persons Aged 15-25 Years—United States, 2013-2015, 66
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 237, 239 (2017) (reporting a relationship between minors’
reluctance to seek reproductive and sexual health care and concerns of disclosure to parents). See also
supra Section III.B.
386
Lehrer et al., supra note 385, at 222. Other studies support the observation that a substantial
proportion of adolescents who forego needed medical care do so out of concerns about confidentiality.
See, e.g., Tina L. Cheng et al., Confidentiality in Health Care: A Survey of Knowledge, Perceptions and
Attitudes Among High School Students, 269 JAMA 1404, 1407 (1993); Carol A. Ford et al., Foregone
Health Care Among Adolescents, 282 JAMA 2227, 2232 (1999); Jonathan D. Klein et al., Access to
Medical Care for Adolescents: Results from the 1997 Commonwealth Fund Survey of the Health of
Adolescent Girls, 25 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 120, 125 (1999).
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We expect that in the absence of confidentiality for services related to
vaccinations, minors will likewise be deterred from seeking care
independent of parental consent. Parents who have refused vaccinations for
their minor children have already registered their strong opposition to the
minor’s receipt of vaccinations by rejecting medical recommendations and
refusing to comply with legal requirements. Minors in the age groups that
we recommend be eligible to receive vaccinations without parental consent
will be aware of their parents’ viewpoints on these matters.
Legal protections for confidentiality of minors seeking medical services
independent of parental consent vary across states and with types of health
care service.387 At the federal level, parents typically have full access to their
child’s medical records under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA)’s rules, because they act as their child’s
personal representatives.388 HIPAA’s provisions indicate, however, that
when a minor exercises a personal legal right to obtain the relevant
treatment—that is, if the minor has a right to consent directly—the minor
retains independent control over her records.389 Yet, HIPAA’s policy may
not be the last word on this matter. HIPAA typically defers to state
regulations concerning parental authority and minor children’s health care
information.390 Depending on the particular state policies, such deference
may “allow or prohibit disclosure of confidential information [regarding
adolescents’ health care] to parents or guardians.”391 Therefore, state
legislators have substantial control over the level of privacy protection given
to health care information flowing from adolescents’ contacts with health
care professionals. Legislators can pair statutory authorization for minors to
387
See ABIGAIL ENGLISH ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., CONFIDENTIALITY FOR INDIVIDUALS
INSURED AS DEPENDENTS: A REVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND POLICIES 5–6 (2012),
https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/confidentiality-review.pdf; JOY PRITTS ET AL.,
HEALTH POLICY INST. & O’NEILL INST. FOR NAT’L & GLOB. HEALTH LAW, PRIVACY AND SECURITY
SOLUTIONS FOR INTEROPERABLE HEALTH INFORMATION EXCHANGE: REPORT ON STATE MEDICAL
RECORD ACCESS LAWS 3-12–3-18 apps. A-8a–A-9d (2009), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/
files/290-05-0015-state-law-access-report-1.pdf; Amy L. McGuire & Courtenay R. Bruce, Keeping
Children’s Secrets: Confidentiality in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
315, 320–28 (2008); Amy B. Middleman & Kelly A. Olson, Confidentiality in Adolescent Health Care,
UPTODATE (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.uptodate.com/contents/confidentiality-in-adolescent-healthcare.
388
Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information: General Rules, 45 C.F.R. §
164.502(g)(3)(i) (2018); see also ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 5–6; PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387,
at 3-11–3-12.
389
Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information: General Rules, 45 C.F.R. §
164.502(g)(3)(i) (2018); see also ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 5–6 (discussing HIPAA
confidentiality standards); PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387, at 3–11.
390
PRITTS ET AL., supra note 387, at 3-11–3-12.
391
HIPAA, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000); Standards for Privacy of Identifiable
Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg 53,182, 53,199–53,203 (Aug. 14, 2002); Melissa Weddle & Patricia K.
Kokotailo, Confidentiality and Consent in Adolescent Substance Abuse: An Update, 7 VIRTUAL MENTOR
239, 240 (2005) (citations omitted).
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consent to vaccines with protection of the confidentiality of the health care
information related to those services. We recommend such confidentiality
provisions as an essential component of such legislation.
Even when state laws prohibit disclosure of adolescent health care
information to parents by health care professionals, however, this protection
would not automatically prevent the parent from receiving an Explanation
of Benefits (EOB) from the insurance company if the minor uses the parent’s
health insurance plan to pay for the vaccinations.392 Many states require
EOBs to be provided to subscribers to prevent health fraud.393 This
requirement has already created privacy concerns for young adults (ages
eighteen and older) who are covered on their parents’ health plans until age
twenty-six.394 Similar disclosure problems have arisen in the context of
treatment for sexually transmitted diseases.395 Regulation of obligations to
provide EOBs for a specific treatment typically occurs at the state level,
together with insurance company or plan policies.396 Therefore, it will be
necessary for state legislators to include a provision that protects minors
against inadvertent disclosure of their vaccinations through insurance
communications to parents.
IV. STATES LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING MINORS’ CONSENT TO
VACCINATION: A PROPOSAL
As discussed in Parts II and III, there are strong grounds to authorize
minors to consent to vaccines, independent of their parents. We agree with
Silverman and colleagues on this issue that doing so is consistent with a
range of policy objectives and ethical principles in health care delivery and
is justified by the literature on adolescents’ decisionmaking.397 This Section
develops a legislative proposal.
We strongly recommend enacting the proposed changes via statute.
Legislative enactment constitutes a more effective mechanism for
introducing policy reform than does case-by-case judicial determination.
First, statutes can contain clear, specific language and criteria for the purpose
392

ENGLISH ET AL., supra note 387, at 9–13.
Id. at 5.
394
Id.; Valerie K. Blake & Jessica A. Haught, Health Care at a Price: The Impact on Young Adults’
Medical Privacy and Autonomy of Being Covered on Their Parents’ Health Insurance Until Age
Twenty-Six, 51 FAM. L.Q. 303, 304 (2017).
395
HARRIET B. FOX & STEPHANIE J. LIMB, INCENTER STRATEGIES: THE NAT’L ALL. TO ADVANCE
ADOLESCENT HEALTH, STATE POLICIES AFFECTING THE ASSURANCE OF CONFIDENTIAL CARE FOR
ADOLESCENTS 1–2 (2008), http://ww2.nasbhc.org/RoadMap/CareManagement/Special%20Topics/
State%20Policies%20and%20Confidential%20Care%20for%20Adolescents%20NAAAH.pdf; Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Sexually Transmitted Diseases Treatment Guidelines, 2010, 17
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 10 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr5912.pdf.
396
FOX & LIMB, supra note 395, at 3–4 (noting that state policies govern EOB requirements even
for Medicaid).
397
Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 104.
393
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of regulating the relevant subject matter. Drafters can anticipate a broad
range of fact patterns that may fall within the purview of the statute. By
contrast, judicial decisions vary substantially in the degree to which they
merely resolve the dispute before the court or can delineate rules that will
govern prospectively. Second, legislatures are generally viewed as more
competent in developing policies that respond to social needs and changes
for the purpose of bringing about prospective law reform.398 While courts
may and do respond to such changes when necessary to resolve a dispute or
adjudicate a constitutional challenge, various doctrines (such as stare
decisis) and judicial philosophies (such as judicial restraint in deciding cases
as narrowly as possible) limit the potential breadth of a holding’s
applicability.399 Third, legislatures can engage in research that takes into
account scientific information, epidemiological data, and other sources that
will inform their lawmaking. Courts may also consider such sources, but
may be limited by the rules of evidence as well as the proclivities of
individual judges to consider extra-legal knowledge and expertise.400 Fourth,
legislation can avoid conflicts with existing statutes by referencing the
relationship between the new provisions and existing law. If such potential
conflicts are not raised by the parties in litigation, it is possible the conflicts
will not be addressed by a judicial decision.401 Finally, as we note below, in
the context of authorizing minors to have independent access to
vaccinations, there are uniquely legislative functions—such as allocation of
funds—that are required for effective implementation of the policies. In
addition, only the legislature can ensure that companion provisions essential
to the efficacy of the policy reform, such as confidentiality protections, are
included in the reform package. Because it is possible that not all states will
pass such statutes, however, Part V suggests a limited judicial solution in the
absence of a legislative response.
398
See, e.g., STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE, at xxiii–xxiv (2d ed. 2004); Jed Barnes, In Defense of Asbestos Tort Litigation:
Rethinking Legal Process Analysis in a World of Uncertainty, Second Bests, and Shared Policy-Making
Responsibility, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 5, 6–7, 15–16 (2009) (contrasting judicial and legislative
functions).
399
Barnes, supra note 398, at 8, 10; Doriane Lambelet Coleman & Philip M. Rosoff, The Legal
Authority of Mature Minors to Consent to General Medical Treatment, 131 PEDIATRICS 786, 788 (2013).
Note that courts sometimes do step in successfully when legislatures do not act. In general, however,
policy reforms are more frequently and appropriately effectuated by legislatures. Barnes, supra note 398,
at 6–7, 15–16.
400
Barnes, supra note 398, at 8, 10.
401
For example, below we observe that the complex interplay of federal and state confidentiality
protections, as well as the regulations regarding insurance company dissemination of Explanations of
Benefits to subscribers, may conflict with, and thereby undercut, state policies allowing minors to consent
independently to vaccinations. See supra notes 387–97 and accompanying text. Therefore, it will be
necessary for the legislature to take proactive steps to reconcile the potential conflicts when creating an
exception to the doctrine of parental consent as applied to recommended vaccinations.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 323

7/28/20 10:48 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

852

[Vol. 52:2

Our central proposal, however, recommends statutory reform, creating
a treatment-specific exception to the doctrine of sole parental consent in the
context of childhood vaccinations. The exception would authorize certain
groups of minors to consent independently to ACIP-recommended
vaccinations. Such an exception is consistent with the law creating other
limited exceptions to the policy of parental control over health care decisions
for their minor children. Over the last several decades, the laws governing
such exceptions have become increasingly well-established and
uncontroversial. Furthermore, our proposed exception is also consistent with
the recent legislation and court decisions that promote compliance with
mandatory vaccination policies. Indeed, we are not aware of successful legal
challenges to mandatory immunization policies. In particular, multiple
courts have already held that school-entry immunization requirements are
necessary to address a compelling state interest in protecting the public’s
health by preventing the spread of disease.402
The research on children’s development and health care decisionmaking
reveals that minors age fourteen and older should be presumed capable of
consenting to the recommended childhood vaccines.403 Age fourteen is also
consistent with, for example, the age of consent identified in many states’
statutory or case law mature minor exceptions.404 Even younger minors are
permitted to provide consent for vaccines related to sexually transmitted
infections in, for example, California.405 Given the relevant policy
considerations, high benefit/low risk profile, and medical consensus
regarding advisability of recommended vaccines, together with research on
children’s decisionmaking capacities, we contend that minors ages twelve
and thirteen are also competent to consent to recommended childhood
vaccinations. In the case of minors ages twelve and thirteen, however, we
recommend that states require that physicians evaluate minors’ capacities to
make the decision before authorizing such consent as an additional
precaution to ensure that all minor consents are competent.406
Our proposal is, to some extent, asymmetrical. It authorizes minors to
consent to vaccines independent of their parents but does not authorize
402

Workman v. Mingo Cty. Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348, 355–56 (4th Cir. 2011); Whitlow v.
California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (S.D. Cal. 2016); Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135, 1146
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
403
See supra Section III.B.3.
404
See, e.g., A LA. CODE § 22-8-4 (Westlaw through Act 2019-540) (authorizing any minor age
fourteen or older to give effective consent for medical care); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745
(Tenn. 1987).
405
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6926(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Regular Sess. ch. 524) (“A
minor who is 12 years of age and older may consent to medical care related to prevention of a sexually
transmitted disease”); Table of State Laws Relevant to Minors’ Consent to Vaccinations Independent of
Parents, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uUDrkdYqzzSG9icTTSHEIWQbgtm0uFVGtBZ7rT
DU8sQ/edit?usp=sharing (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
406
See supra notes 367–72 and accompanying text.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 324

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT

853

minors to refuse vaccines where their parents provide consent. Decisional
structures in other health care contexts involving minors might lead to a
different allocation of decisional authority between parents and children. In
each context, such allocations follow from analysis of the constitutional,
policy, and practical considerations; the risk-benefit profile of the specific
intervention; the medical consensus concerning recommendations for the
specific health care intervention; and the capacities of minors to make health
care decisions.407 In the context of ACIP-recommended vaccines, which are
low risk/high benefit health care interventions endorsed by a consensus of
medical experts and state legislatures to promote the welfare of the
vaccinated minor and the public’s health, both parent and competent child
should possess the legal right to consent, even over the objection of the other.
We consider also the process for obtaining the minor’s informed
consent. The federal National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act requires the
disclosure of specified information included in the Vaccine Information
Statement (VIS) to the vaccine recipient or his or her legal representative
prior to vaccinating.408 Under our proposal, minors authorized to consent to
vaccination would become the legally designated recipients of the VIS. We
recommend additional guarantees for the informed consent process when
minors are the persons consenting so as to ensure that the recipient’s
acquiescence reflects a meaningful consent process.409 The vaccine
administrator should review the VIS after the minor has received and read
it, and offer to answer questions for the minor, emphasizing sections
describing the disease that the vaccination was developed to prevent and its
risks, who should not be vaccinated, the vaccine’s risks, and what the minor
should do if experiencing a problem following the vaccination. Furthermore,
we recommend that the minor be asked to initial each of these sections and
407

See supra Part II.B.2. For further discussion of “asymmetries” in minors’ involvement in health
care decisions, see, for example, Neal C. Manson, Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative
Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal, 29 BIOETHICS 66, 67 (2015).
408
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-26(d)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-108) (“[N]ot later than 6 months
after the date such materials are published in the Federal Register, each health care provider who
administers a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury Table shall provide to the legal representatives of
any child or to any other individual to whom such provider intends to administer such vaccine a copy of
the information materials developed pursuant to subsection (a), supplemented with visual presentations
or oral explanations, in appropriate cases. Such materials shall be provided prior to the administration of
such vaccine.”).
409
There are good grounds to think that an adult-informed consent process should also involve an
oral explanation, and certainly an opportunity to ask questions. See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Nili
Karako-Eyal, Informed Consent to Vaccination: Theoretical, Legal, and Empirical Insights, 45 AM. J.L.
& MED. 357, 400 (2019) (“[W]hile the first circulate determines that the information may be provided to
parents orally, in writing, or through pamphlets, the second circulate clarifies that an information form
does not replace oral explanation (suggesting that an oral discussion is necessary even if written materials
are provided).”). Legislatures can—and we think should—put in place additional procedural
requirements to ensure that minors are adequately informed and have the opportunity to discuss any
questions or concerns.
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indicate via signature that the information was explained to him or her, and
that he or she has had the opportunity to ask questions to clarify
understanding. This procedure sets up the conditions for cold cognition,
facilitating minors’ best use of their cognitive capacities in light of the
decisionmaking task before them.410
The Vaccine Information Statement is accessible, clear, and provides the
information needed for a vaccine decision.411 It satisfies the general legal
requirements for disclosure of information under informed consent law. As
pointed out by Silverman and colleagues, the current VIS is written at a tenth
grade reading level.412 This language may therefore need to be modified for
minors who have not yet reached tenth grade. Until revised materials are
developed, the oral explanation of the vaccine administrator and
clarifications that follow any questions raised by a minor will be crucial
complements to the document, together with the minor’s signed
acknowledgement of receipt of the explanation.413
As we emphasize above,414 the interplay of HIPAA and state
confidentiality provisions may lead to inadequate protection for the privacy
of health care information flowing from minors’ legally authorized
independent contacts with providers regarding vaccination consultation and
receipt of immunizations. Therefore, it is incumbent upon state legislators to
incorporate confidentiality protections into statutes that authorize to consent
for vaccinations.
An additional risk to the confidentiality of medical information is
present when vaccinations are paid for through minors’ parents’ private
insurance policies and minors receive vaccines without parental consent.415
Insurance company dissemination of EOBs to parents informs them of the
minor’s receipt of the vaccinations paid for through their insurance plan. The
challenges attending minors’ use of parental insurance to pay for
vaccinations underscore the potential barrier that financing of vaccines may
pose to minors’ independent access to vaccinations. In general, in the United
States, vaccines are paid for either under private or public insurance
programs such as Medicaid or under the Vaccines for Children Program.416
This latter program provides ACIP-recommended vaccines as a federal

410

See supra Section III.B.2.
Reiss & Karako-Eyal, supra note 409, at 418.
412
Silverman et al., supra note 11, at 105–06.
413
Id.
414
See supra Section III.C.
415
Under the Affordable Care Act, insurance plans that are not grandfathered must cover vaccines
recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-108).
416
See How to Pay, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.vaccines.gov/getting/pay
(last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (providing information about the different ways to pay for vaccines).
411
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benefit to uninsured or underinsured children.417 In order to eliminate
barriers related to cost or disclosure of medical information from insurance
companies, we recommend that states: (1) allow minors to receive vaccines
free of charge in health departments; (2) adopt provisions prohibiting
insurers from sending EOBs listing vaccines that were administered to
minors without parental consent; and (3) allow pharmacies to sell vaccines
to eligible minors who choose to pay independently, consistent with
pharmacies’ authority to sell such vaccinations to adults in that state.
Research reveals that health care professionals frequently have
incomplete information about the often-complex confidentiality rules that
apply to health care interventions with adolescents.418 Therefore, when
implementing a statute authorizing minors’ consent to vaccinations, state
officials must ensure that vaccine administrators (that is, physicians, nurses,
state health officials, pharmacists, and others) are familiar with the
applicable confidentiality protections for the minors. Because liability for
any harm from vaccines—a possible, although highly unlikely scenario—is
already covered by a no-fault federal program, the proposal need not address
the potential liability of the provider.419
Finally, the success of our proposal in facilitating competent minors’
voluntary access to recommended vaccinations requires that such minors be
made aware of this option and how to exercise it. Ethan Lindenberger, in an
interview with the authors, highlighted the need to provide teens with the
information about the availability and processes for obtaining vaccines.420
We recommend that state departments of health incorporate information
about such options and procedures for minors’ consent into the websites they
maintain to educate the public about school immunization requirements.
Such information can also be incorporated into the health education modules
in the public school curricula. States can also require public school districts
to post such information on the school district websites.
Proposed Statute: Authority of Older Minors to Consent to Vaccination
1.

Purpose: this statute’s purpose is to provide requesting
minors with the authority to consent to vaccines
recommended for their age group, or for younger children
if they did not receive the vaccinations at those earlier ages,

417
Vaccines for Children Program, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html (last visited July 29, 2019).
418
Margaret Riley et al., Physician Knowledge and Attitudes Around Confidential Care for Minor
Patients, 28 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 234, 239 (2015).
419
H. Cody Meissner, Narayan Nair & Stanley A. Plotkin, The National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program: Striking a Balance Between Individual Rights and Community Benefit, 321
JAMA 343, 343 (2019).
420
Skype Interview with Ethan Lindenberger (June 16, 2019) (recording with authors).
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if their parents are unwilling or unable to consent to
vaccination.
Eligible minors, as defined in this section, may consent to
receiving vaccines recommended for their age and medical
status, or recommended for younger children (if the minors
did not receive the vaccines at the recommended ages), by
the federal Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP), without need for parental consent. Eligible minors
are:
a. Minors age fourteen years and older.
b. Minors ages twelve and thirteen, upon
determination in writing by a physician that the
minor is capable of consenting to vaccination. The
authorizing physician can administer the
vaccination, direct another health care professional
to administer the vaccination, or write a
prescription authorizing other professionals legally
qualified to administer vaccines in this state, such
as pharmacists or nurses, to administer the
vaccinations.
c. Emancipated minors.
“Capacity to consent” under Section 2b requires that the
individual understand the nature and consequences of the
proposed vaccination (that is, the risks and benefits of the
vaccination to be administered) and is capable of making
and communicating an informed decision concerning the
administration of the vaccine.
A consenting minor, acting as her or his own legal
representative under this act, will receive the Vaccine
Information Statement (VIS) required under 42 U.S.C. §
300aa-26. The vaccine administrator will explain the
sections addressing the disease that the vaccine is intended
to prevent and its risks, who should not be vaccinated, the
vaccine’s risks and what to do if there is an adverse reaction,
and will offer to answer and will answer any questions
regarding this information. The minor will initial those
sections and sign a form indicating that the minor was
provided and understands the explanation of the vaccine’s
risks and benefits.
Any branch of the state Department of Health will provide
vaccines free of charge to minors seeking to vaccinate under
this act.
The confidentiality of minors who request vaccinations
shall be protected. Laws addressing medical freedom shall
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be interpreted to permit non-disclosure of medical
information related to the request and provision of
vaccinations to minors who seek immunization without
parental consent. To the extent permissible by federal law,
Explanations of Benefits related to administration of
vaccinations to minors eligible under Section 2 of this
statute, will not be sent to parents. Insurance programs may
implement alternatives to prevent fraud in these areas.
Pharmacies and other locations providing vaccines,
including school clinics, may administer vaccines to
eligible minors without parental consent under the
conditions and requirements specified in this act.
The state’s health department will include information
about minors’ right to consent on the state’s public
education website that describes the state’s school
immunization requirements, on pages providing general
information about vaccines, and on other pages likely to
appear in internet searches for the information by a minor.

V. JUDICIAL CREATION OF A TREATMENT-SPECIFIC MATURE MINOR RULE
AUTHORIZING CAPABLE MINORS TO CONSENT TO VACCINES IN THE
ABSENCE OF PERTINENT STATE LEGISLATION
We recognize that, despite the advantages of implementing our
recommendations through legislative reform (that is, development of a
coordinated framework that establishes a right to vaccinations for eligible
minors, addresses practical barriers to vaccinating, and provides clear
guidance to providers and agencies), there may be obstacles to passage of
such a statute. Vaccine-resistant parents, in spite of their strong appeal to the
language of choice and right when it comes to fighting school mandates,421
may vehemently oppose legislation allowing minor children to get
vaccinated over parental opposition.422
421

Barbara Loe Fisher, Forcing Vaccination on Every Child Undermines Civil Liberties, LEAPS
MAG. (Mar. 28, 2019), https://leapsmag.com/forcing-vaccination-on-every-child-undermines-civilliberties (characterizing state vaccination mandates as “elimination of civil liberties, including freedom
of speech and the right to dissent guaranteed under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution”).
422
This is an experience-based observation, not a theoretical prediction. In several states that
introduced such legislation, anti-vaccine activists resisted strongly. For a relatively measured
anti-vaccine response, see Kate Raines, New York Bill Would Strip Parental Consent for Vaccinating
Children, VACCINE REACTION (Mar. 28, 2019), https://thevaccinereaction.org/2019/03/new-york-billwould-strip-parental-consent-for-vaccinating-children; and, for a more typical response, see AMA Says
Mature 12-Year-Olds Can Consent to Vaccination Without Parents Taking Away the Last Barrier
Protecting Innocent Children from Big Pharma, CHILD. HEALTH DEF. (June 18, 2019),
https://childrenshealthdefense.org/news/ama-says-mature-12-year-olds-can-consent-to-vaccinationwithout-parents-taking-away-the-last-barrier-protecting-innocent-children-from-big-pharma.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 329

7/28/20 10:48 AM

858

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:2

In the absence of such legislation or an existing mature minor doctrine,
we recommend that courts adopt a narrow mature minor doctrine allowing
capable minors to become vaccinated without parental consent. In support
of this doctrine we cite the strong parens patriae interests and high
benefit/low risk profile for recommended childhood vaccination (that is, the
expert consensus that, absent medical contraindications, vaccination is the
safer course of action for the minor, providing protection from the dangerous
effects of the vaccine-preventable diseases); the important police power
interests (that is, the benefits of decreasing the threat to the public from
disease outbreaks); and the evidence that adolescents and many
preadolescents are capable of making decisions regarding vaccinations.423
Furthermore, we recognize minors’ right to protect their own health and
well-being, particularly when their personal choices are aligned with the
state’s interests. In light of the misinformation that appears to be guiding
many vaccine-resistant and vaccine-hesitant parents, it is both reasonable
and good public policy to allow minors to correct an objectively ill-founded
parental decision that endangers their health.424
States with a mature minor doctrine typically do not set a specific age
for the doctrine, though Tennessee’s courts apply the rule of sevens used in
other areas of tort law to suggest that minors over the age of fourteen are
presumed capable to consent, while minors age seven to thirteen are
423
See supra Section II.B for a full discussion of the mature minor doctrine and its underlying
rationale.
424
Several states, such as Illinois, Kansas, Tennessee, and Washington have broader mature minor
doctrines than the specific, vaccine-related one proposed here. See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989)
(holding that a “mature” seventeen-and-a-half-year-old minor may refuse a lifesaving blood transfusion);
Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330 (Kan. 1970) (holding that a “mature”
minor may consent to a beneficial surgical procedure); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn.
1987) (holding that a mature minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment); Smith v. Seibly,
431 P.2d 719 (Wash. 1967) (holding that a mature minor may give valid consent to a surgical procedure).
Coleman and Rosoff suggest that a state’s silence as to the existence of a mature minor doctrine should
not be taken as leaving open a door, but as a reaffirmation of the traditional principles of parental consent.
Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 791. Similarly, the existence of other exceptions to the rule of
parental consent can, as mentioned, be read as implying lack of other exceptions under the omitted case
canon which states that “[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus
omissus pro omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered.” ANTONIN
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93 (2012).
However, we do not agree that this principle necessarily applies here. Statutory exceptions to the
general rule of parental consent are enacted when the legislature seeks to create such an exception, and
it is not limited in its authority by the existence of the general doctrine. When a legislature drafts a statute
focusing specifically on, for example, whether minors can consent to treatment for STDs, the more
specific legislation provides the governing authority. The omitted case canon can be legitimately applied
if the statute creating the exception specifies the inclusion of treatment, for example, for HIV and
Chlamydia, but is silent on, for example, treatment for HPV, and there is a question as to whether the
general doctrine or limited exception applies to treatment for HPV, since the application of the exception
will be limited to that which it explicitly covers. The legislature may further create other
treatment-specific parental consent exceptions incorporating mature minor principles.

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 330

7/28/20 10:48 AM

2020]

VACCINES AND THE AGE OF CONSENT

859

presumed not to have the ability to consent.425 Both presumptions are
rebuttable if contrary persuasive evidence is presented.426 Other states focus
on capacity, not age, in determining maturity.427 We recommend that,
consistent with our proposal above, reviewing courts hold that minors over
fourteen can consent to vaccines recommended for them. Furthermore, we
recommend that the court should examine the capacity to consent of younger
minors and allow minors who are mature—applying a treatment
decisionmaking capacity standard of maturity—to consent to recommended
vaccines.
Minors found capable under the doctrine should be permitted to consent
to both childhood vaccines and adolescent vaccines recommended by the
Advisory Committee of Immunization Practices. When the minor is
completely or partially unvaccinated, “catch-up schedules” created by the
CDC can guide vaccine administrators and minors as to the appropriate
timing and spacing of vaccines going forward. Judicial decisions should
also, to the extent possible under state privacy laws, protect the
confidentiality of the minor’s decision to vaccinate.
Judicial doctrines do not, however, solve the problems of funding
discussed in Part IV. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether courts can protect
confidentiality in the face of state medical privacy laws or insurance
company policies that permit parents access to information regarding their
minor child’s request or receipt of vaccinations. In some states, health
departments provide free or low-cost vaccines, and minors can find options
by consulting with the health department (or using online services).428 Use
of parental insurance without a statute addressing explanations of benefits
would likely alert parents to the minor’s receipt of vaccinations. State
medical privacy laws may also create parental rights to access minors’
medical records. Judges may have limited authority to alter the application
of such policies, although there may be room for interpretations that will
protect a minor’s confidentiality.
CONCLUSION
Modern parental refusals of childhood vaccinations differ dramatically
from many other circumstances in which parents reject the recommendations
of health care professionals when exercising their legal discretion in health
care decisionmaking for their children. There is an epidemic of
425

Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 746–49 (Tenn. 1987).
Coleman & Rosoff, supra note 15, at 789.
427
Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748 (stating that application of the mature minor rule is a question of
fact for the jury as to “the minor’s ability to appreciate the risks and consequences” of the treatment, as
well as several other factors).
428
Where to Go, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, https://www.vaccines.gov/getting/where
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
426
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misinformation regarding the safety and efficacy of vaccines influencing the
judgment of vaccine-resistant and vaccine-hesitant parents. This epidemic
has proven remarkably impervious to correction through education and
persuasion. This phenomenon, in turn, places children who are intentionally
unvaccinated at medical risk while also threatening the health of many in the
public who are too young or medically unable to be vaccinated. For these
reasons, policymakers must consider alternatives in the vaccination context
to the default of sole parental decisionmaking for their minor children’s
health care. The evidence indicates that teenagers are capable of
understanding the risks and benefits of vaccinations and of making
competent informed decisions to be vaccinated. Children of
vaccine-refusing parents should be authorized to receive accurate medical
information about the recommended childhood vaccinations upon request.
If such minors reach a decision regarding vaccination that is in conflict with
that of their parents, they should be legally authorized to provide
independent consent to the administration of the vaccinations.
In an interview with Ethan Lindenberger addressing his decision to
vaccinate, Ethan explained his moment of understanding of the minimal
degree of risk presented by vaccines:
When people say there’s a risk to vaccines, and that nothing is
without risk, that makes the world sound so dangerous and
scary. When that vocabulary is so misleading . . . it’s the same
thing as saying there’s always a risk of going to sleep, there’s
always a risk in like driving a car. Honestly, it’s a million times
more scary driving a car than getting vaccines. And that’s the
thing I didn’t realize . . . yes, there is a “potential” that is below
a one in a million chance, you’re more likely to die [from] a
coconut. So, I never heard that. And understanding that was so
important, because when I realized that and looked at the math
I realized: “well, duh, this is fine.” And I went in and
everybody was really kind . . . .429
Further, understanding the social consequences sealed the decision for
him:
The biggest part was learning that vaccinating wasn’t just for
yourself–it was for other people in your community. So
learning that part was a thing that really pushed me, where I
said “wow, being unvaccinated could end up causing a disease
to transmit from me to someone else–and that person could
die.”430

429
430

Skype Interview with Ethan Lindenberger (June 16, 2019) (recording with authors).
Id.
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Ethan revealed himself to be a socially conscious, responsible, and
caring teen—as many parents wish their teens to be. He realized that he was
putting others at risk by not being vaccinated and wished to correct that
problem.
When, prior to the age of eighteen, Ethan decided he wanted to receive
immunizations, he faced legal barriers. He thus began the process to become
vaccinated upon reaching adulthood. There too he faced challenges. In the
final analysis, he received his vaccines at his local health department rather
than through his health care provider (although with the knowledge and
support of his provider).431 Adolescents who have decided to make the
responsible choice for themselves and the public to become vaccinated now
face legal barriers. Our state governments must eliminate these barriers. We
recommend that states adopt our proposal in light of the converging interests
of the state and the minor. The courageous decisions of teens to receive
vaccinations despite their parents’ opposing viewpoints must be supported
rather than burdened or barred. The default of parental consent more
appropriately applies to contexts in which there is not a conflict between the
interests of parents and their children and that do not contribute to a growing
threat to the public’s health.

431

Id.
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